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The Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) program traces its roots back to Desert Shield 
and Desert Storm. At that time, warfighters observed the use of Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles and recognized the potential for their ground use. Literature supporting this 
research focuses on UGV history, the Sigmoid Curve, associated push and pull factors, 
and the Department of Defense (DOD) Acquisition Strategy. DOD UGV master plans, 
which are used to conduct comparative analyses of programs, changes, and trends from 
year to year, examine the cost, schedule, and performance of all programs from 1991 to 
2004. This research focuses on experienced schedule overruns, slippage, and the 
examination of characteristics leading to system success. This research also explains the 
relationship between push and pull factors and further outlines the evolution of UGV 
program requirements based on global conflicts and various mission types. This research 
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Core requirements that led to the creation of the Unmanned Ground Vehicle 
(UGV) program in 1990 are unavailable, but reasonable assumptions can be made based 
on programs presented in the 1991 master plan. According to the 1991 master plan, there 
are five potential payoffs of UGVs: 
1. reduced risk to human life and increased operational flexibility in combat 
or other hazardous environments, 
2. economy of manpower or reduced costs in operations done repetitively 
(e.g., logistics) where manpower savings more than offset investments in 
equipment, 
3. reduced training costs and increased training realism, 
4. improved performance where automated systems either perform better 
than humans or eliminate the system compromises required by human 
physiological limits (creature comfort, fear, fatigue, vibration, etc.), and 
5. force multiplication where operators with UGVs bring substantially more 
capability to bear than would be possible by individual troops without 
UGVs. (Department of Defense [DOD], 1991, p. 2) 
Based on these potential payoffs, the initial uses for unmanned ground systems 
were created. “There are a variety of potential applications of robotics to land operations 
that can increase efficiency and safety. These, include reconnaissance, target engagement, 
logistics, runway repair, minefield detection and neutralization, explosive ordnance 
disposal, physical security, and operations in contaminated environments” (DOD, 1991, 
p. 3). The program continued to expand, and under the 1991 master plan, three programs 
were established. The three programs are the Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicle 
(TUGV) program for Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) 
mission, the Remote Ordnance Neutralization Device (ROND) program for Explosive 
Ordnance Disposal (EOD) technicians, and the Rapid Runway Repair (RRR) program for 
the creation of runways in full-spectrum operations against a large-scale military threat. 
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The overall UGV program advanced as a result of operations Desert Shield and 
Desert Storm. Warfighters observed the use of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs) in the 
conflicts and these likely triggered ideas for further use of unmanned systems on the 
ground. 
A. PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research is to provide the reader with an analysis of how the 
UGV program evolved over a 14-year period. It is important to understand the changes 
observed with each new master plan and to identify trends and challenges that are 
common and relevant to the UGV community and other similar DOD programs. When 
dealing with advanced technology development, it was necessary to observe the impact 
of funding on technology development and program schedule expectations. The research 
considers supply and demand factors as well as the impact of success on a DOD program 
or system. The research further aims to manage technology performance expectations and 
explain why certain programs achieve full rate production and others remain in a 
perpetual state of research and development (R&D). For programs that are rich in 
technological complexity, the research offers potential considerations to achieve program 
success. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This paper focuses on answering the following questions: 
1. Do UGS programs historically experience cost and schedule overrun, and 
if so, why? 
2. Are there characteristics that lead to the successful fielding of UGS or that 
prevent a system from achieving full rate production? 
3. What effect do political and global security events have on programs 
within the UGV portfolio? 
4. What role do push and pull factors play in the success of a UGV program? 
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C. BENEFITS OF THE RESEARCH 
This research provides a historical analysis of the first 14 years of the unmanned 
grounds systems program, which can assist in managing expectations for cost, schedule 
and performance of highly complex technology-based programs in the DOD. It also helps 
explain the fine balance between push and pull factors and how both factors are required 
before integration of new technology. 
D. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
Prior literature and relevant DOD documents on this topic are limited, affording 
limited analysis. The research does not include classified information, which could reveal 
significant trends not identified in this research project. 
E. SCOPE AND RESEARCH METHOD 
A comparative analysis was conducted on all DOD Unmanned Ground Systems 
master plans from 1991 to 2004. A side-by-side comparison of documents displayed 
changes to program schedules and funding that led to findings within the research. A 
focus on requirements and user demand led to the results of this research. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE RESEARCH REPORT 
Chapter II examines prior literature written on the topic of UGS, the history of 
UGS, how the Sigmoid Curve (S-Curve) is relevant to the research and the DOD 
acquisition strategy for UGS. Chapter III discusses the methods of data collection used 
and the analysis conducted to arrive at the results presented in the research paper. Chapter 
IV examines all available DOD Unmanned Ground Systems master plans from 1991 to 
2004. Further analysis of the PackBot and Talon robots is included as a case that adds 
unique value and concludes with the intervention of DARPA on the UGV program in 
2004. In the final section, Chapter V, the overall research is summarized, results are 
concluded, and future research is recommended. 
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G. SUMMARY 
The overall UGV program grew significantly in a 14-year period. New programs 
and systems were created based on current and perceived threats. Most, if not all, of 
current new programs and systems derive from programs and technologies of the past. 
UGV development is an evolutionary approach, but the complex technology has its 
limitations. Achievement of highly autonomous operations will require major 
technological breakthroughs, whose future benefits far outweigh any possible obstacles. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Army has seen significant 
growth in the procurement and application of unmanned ground systems (UGSs) to 
enhance mission capabilities and to protect service members on the battlefield. The 
supporting service members are capable of conducting reconnaissance, surveillance, 
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)/improvised explosive device (IED) detection, 
transportation of troop gear, and movement of service members around the battlefield. 
Advances in unmanned systems technology, which enhance mission capability and 
protection of service members, took many years of research and development to come to 
fruition. Therefore, to understand the technological advances on the modern battlefield, it 
is necessary to examine early research efforts which have made these advances possible.  
In this literature review, early research efforts, methods of determining 
technology development (the S-curve), and the implementation of unmanned ground 
systems throughout the DOD are examined annually in the UGV master plans. It is 
important to recognize that minimal research was conducted on the analysis of the UGS 
program, which is the primary focus of this thesis. The majority of this research material 
came from congressional and DOD reports, because there is not an abundance of 
information published in scholarly journals. Comparative analysis of the UGV master 
plan is used to discuss trends observed in the first 15 years of UGS and to present 
considerations for future UGS programs and other highly advanced, technology-based 
programs.  
B. BRIEF HISTORY 
A brief history of UGS systems requires the reader to look back over 40 years ago 
to the 1960s to gain perspective of how early robotic systems evolved over time and how 
their development influenced modern-day mobile robotics and unmanned military 
applications. One of the first examples of major robot development, Shakey, was 
developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). According to 
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Gage (1995), “Shakey was a wheeled platform equipped with steerable TV camera, 
ultrasonic range finder, touch sensors, connected via an RF link to its SDS-940 
mainframe computer that performed navigation and exploration tasks” (p. 2). Shakey is 
designed to be fully autonomous and receive commands given by a human operator to 
move objects around the lab environment. The Shakey mobile robot is designed to be 
autonomous, but never achieved its operational goal and therefore is considered a failure. 
However, the Shakey project identified technical deficiencies, established functional and 
performance baselines, and aided in the artificial intelligence (AI) research areas of 
planning, vision, and natural language processing (Gage, 1995). The key technological 
lessons learned from the development of Shakey are the advances in technology and 
components discovered from this particular system, which can be researched and 
developed further, and the technologies utilized in future robotic systems.  
Nearly 20 years later, in the 1980s, DARPA refocused its studies from the Shakey 
Project and understanding of AI and created a new program called the Autonomous Land 
Vehicle (ALV). Under this new project, DARPA’s Strategic Computing (SC) program’s 
goal “was to provide a realistic task environment for technology research” (Gage, 1995, 
p. 3). DARPA was able to use previously discovered technologies and knowledge from 
the Shakey project, build upon them, and create the ALV, which was an autonomous 
platform built on an “8-wheel hydrostatically-driven all-terrain vehicle capable of speeds 
of up to 45 mph on the highway and up to 18 mph on rough terrain” (Gage, 1995, p. 3). 
The ALV program used technologies, applications, and an integrated project team, which 
consisted of the integration contractor Martin-Marietta (merged with Lockheed 
Corporation in 1995) and functional components provided by other ARPA-funded 
technology developers such as Hughes Research Lab, Carnegie-Mellon University, and 
the University of Maryland (Gage, 1995). Various developers and collaboration among 
government research laboratories, the technology industry, and academia enabled 
projects such as Shakey and the ALV to develop prototypes and demonstrate applications 
that had an impact not only in the civilian sector, but the military as well.  
The prospect of utilizing autonomous applications for military purposes created 
opportunities for the market to develop systems, which could provide unmanned ground 
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vehicle applications for military commanders. These systems could provide commanders 
with Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) capabilities on the 
battlefield without risking the lives of service members. Thus in the mid- to late-1980s, 
the DOD invested in programs and applications similar to what is seen on the modern 
battlefield today (Gage, 1995).  
Programs and prototypes such as the Teleoperated Vehicle (TOV), Teleoperated 
Mobile All-Purpose Platform (TMAP), Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicle (TUGV), 
Surveillance and Assessment Robot for GI Enhancement (SARGE), and Gecko were all 
developed to provide the military commander with the capability of not putting service 
members in harm’s way.1 
C. THE S-CURVE 
As part of this research and analysis, it is important to understand where 
technology and the innovation to create advances in robotics come from. As discussed in 
Section B, Brief History, the beginning of the robotics evolution of unmanned systems 
began with the Shakey and Autonomous Land Vehicle (ALV) programs. The S-Curve is 
a visual representation (see Figure 1) of how long it takes a new technology to be adopted 
from innovation, to adoption, then to “taking off” and finally “leveling off” when the 
technology is considered mature.  
In order to conduct analysis on the S-Curve, it is important to understand the 
drivers of innovation, which are demand-pull and supply-push. According to Geroski 
(2003), demand-pull is when a new innovation is pulled out of the lab and allows 
innovators to develop a product or service that is specific to meet customer requirements 
and can be released into the market.  
                                                 
1 For further reading and more detailed information on each program/prototype specification, reference 
the article “UGV History 101: A Brief History of Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) Development 
Efforts,” written by Douglas W. Gage (1995).  
 8
 
Figure 1.  S-Curve representation of the path technology takes from innovation, 
through adoption, to maturity (from Geroski, 2003) 
According to Geroski, supply-push is when a new innovation is “pushed” out to 
the market and occurs when existing technology experiences a breakthrough and then 
branches out into a new technology trajectory (see Figure 2). Geroski stated, “A 
technology trajectory is a sequence of innovations which follow each other, all drawing 
on the same basic scientific or engineering principle(s), each drawing from and then 
contributing to a cumulatively increasing body of knowledge and expertise” (Geroski, 
2003, p. 39). When looking at the evolution of ground robotics technology, it can be 
deduced that it is a supply-push to the market. 
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Figure 2.  Technology Trajectory (from Geroski, 2003). 
The S-Curve literature is useful to help the reader understand where UGS stand 
today in terms of technology maturation. This becomes more apparent in later sections of 
this paper. 
D. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
With the development of new technologies and the perception of a lack of 
coordinated research and development effort, in 1989, Congress mandated in the Defense 
Appropriation Act, “The Deputy Secretary of Defense for Tactical Warfare Programs 
should assume the role of focusing these technology efforts … and should submit a 
master plan by May 1, 1989 addressing Department initiatives to advance joint robotics 
programs” (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics [OUSD(AT&L)], Portfolio ... Robotics Enterprise, 2006, p. 5). This act created 
one robotics program called the Joint Ground Robotics Enterprise (JGRE). 
UGS has proven itself effective in current and past operations such as Operations 
Desert Shield/Storm, Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan (OEF-A), Operation 
Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and peacekeeping missions in Bosnia. During these operations, 
UGS saved lives and provided crucial support capabilities to ensure the commander on 
the ground could successfully accomplish the mission (OUSD[AT&L], Portfolio ... 
Robotics Enterprise, 2006, p. 3). The UGS used during these conflicts provided service 
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members with the capability to exploit IEDs, provide reconnaissance, detect and dispose 
of explosive ordnance and ensure force protection of the warfighter while conducting 
operations (OUSD [AT&L], Portfolio ... Robotics Enterprise, 2006, p. 3). 
As discussed in Section B, the ability to provide enhanced UGS capabilities began 
with industry leaders in robotics collaborating with each other to conduct research and 
then develop new technologies to ensure new applications could be created and improved 
upon. According to the 2006 Report to Congress, the main strategy for the development 
of ground robotics is a joint collaboration among the military services, industry, and 
academia. To be more cost effective and better stewards of the taxpayer’s dollar, the 
collaborative strategy directed the government to  
leverage funding, share technological advancements, accelerate research, 
development and fielding of solutions, promote synergy across the DOD 
unmanned systems (UMS) community, and to promote interoperable 
systems … teaming initiatives focus on basic research in science and 
technology areas likely to product robotic technology breakthroughs. 
(OUSD [AT&L], Portfolio ... Robotics Enterprise, 2006, p. 4) 
In addition to directing the coordinating activities, the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2006, Sec. 261 requested an update to the NDAA 
for FY01, which included a goal for the military to have one-third of its operational 
ground combat vehicles unmanned (Moreau & Nugent, 2005). With the advantage of 
hindsight, this goal appeared to be very aggressive and perhaps too optimistic, as it is 
now 2014 and the military is not close to meeting these numbers. This goal will need to 
be reviewed and a determination made of when or if the military will or can meet this 
objective. 
Future Unmanned Ground System (UGS) programs may be affected by the 
current budget-constrained environment. Due to the inherent risk of deploying service 
members and putting them in harm’s way to engage state and non-state actors, it is 
assumed that the requirements for further research and development of new and emerging 
technologies will either remain constant or increase over time. The justification for this 
assumption is the pending reductions in the military force structure numbers (U.S. Army) 
based on proposed budget requests. The proposed reduction focuses on reducing the 
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number of Soldiers from its current strength of 520,000 to approximately 440,000 active 
military, which is a delta of 80,000 Soldiers (Simeone, 2014). Further analysis is required 
to determine if the benefits of having a more automated or robotically enhanced military 
is conducive to the U.S. military meeting National Security Interests and Objectives. 
Advances in technology and combat capabilities to enhance the commander’s 
capabilities are available, but it appears there is a disconnect between linking UGS 
capabilities and incorporating them with the organic structure of the current military 
force. This study assumes that only EOD and Engineer military units understand and 
have taken advantage of having UGS systems, developed doctrine which directs the unit 
command on “how to” employ EOD and Engineer UGS, and is part of its Modified Table 
of Organization and Equipment (MTOE). According to the U.S. Army Quartermaster 
(2014) homepage, “The MTOE document is a modified version of a TOE approved by 
Headquarters, Department of the Army that prescribes the unit organization, personnel 
and equipment necessary to perform an assigned mission in a specific operational or 
geographical area” (Brown, 2000). 
Other combat and combat service support units could take advantage of the UGS 
programs, but without direction from U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC), how long will it take for these systems to become organic to the unit? The 
U.S. Army attempted to do this with the Future Combat System (FCS) program, but the 
program was unsuccessful and subsequently cancelled due to cost overruns and schedule 
slippage. 
Through comparative analysis of the UGV road maps, a visual representation of 
the current state of the unmanned ground systems (UGS) program over the past 14 years 
(1991–2004) is provided in Chapter IV. Based upon extensive research of the data 
retrieved from the Robotics System Joint Project Office (RSJPO) intranet, it was 
determined this type of analysis was not conducted and the results will provide DOD 
leadership with a snapshot of the UGS environment. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
From 1991 to 2004, the DOD published master plans to explain the current state 
of UGS in the U.S. Army and show cost, schedule, and performance of each program. In 
this thesis, the comparative analysis method of the data provided in the master plans is 
used to conduct a year-to-year analysis of each program and observe the overall 
performance of each UGV program in the time period specified. All programs in each 
year’s plans are discussed, but this thesis focuses on, tracks, and summarizes only five 
programs throughout the entire research project. The decision to track these programs is 
based on their consistency and traceability throughout the years analyzed. The five 
programs include Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicles (TUGV), Remote Ordnance 
Neutralization System (RONS), Robotic Excavation Vehicle (REV), Engineer Vehicle 
Teleoperation Capability (EVTC), and Mobile Detection Assessment Response System—
Exterior/Interior (MDARS-E/I). Analyzing the master plans allows the observation of 
trends in schedule and funding which may help prevent future budget and schedule 
challenges in similar programs. 
Limited research on this topic resulted in the utilization of unique sources for the 
literature review portion of this thesis. Scholarly and non-traditional academia sources are 
evaluated, which aids in understanding the subject and assists in preparing the literature 
review. This data was collected from NPS, the U.S. Army War College, the Defense 
Technical Information Center (DTIC), the U.S. Army’s website for publications and 
doctrine, the Robotics Systems Joint Project Office (RSJPO), the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and 
Congressional Research Service (CRS). 
This reference material focuses on the current state of UGS, its history, research, 
and development (R&D), and implementation in the DOD. Other literature collected 
describes the U.S. Army acquisition strategy from program inception through present day 
and addresses the notion of implementing such a drastic technology change into the force. 
A portion of the data collection focused on the challenges the U.S. Army faces with the 
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integration of UGS into the force and the current U.S. Army doctrine and military tables 
of organizational equipment (MTOE). 
This thesis reviews U.S. Army doctrine, available through multiple sources such 
as the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) website, which provides information about 
various military occupational specialties that utilize UGS in their operations 
(http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/index.html). This search of doctrine began with 
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), combat engineer, and chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) units to determine if doctrine 
existed in these career fields. The search was then expanded into special operations forces 
(SOF) and conventional forces. Lastly, the search was expanded into weapons doctrine to 
determine if unmanned systems exist. MTOEs were collected from the referenced career 
fields to determine if UGS is listed as mandatory items on unit property books. 
Master plans, road maps, books, journals, and other online sources were utilized 
to better understand the current UGS environment and development of UGS technology. 
Master plans and technology development were examined chronologically to observe 
advancements and challenges new to a master plan or those that were repetitive year after 
year. Schedule figures and funding tables were created for key programs, which cover 
five-year periods from 1991 to 1995, 1996 to 2000, and 2001 to 2004. An overall 
schedule and funding figure was also created, which examines key programs from 1991 
to 2004. Lastly, a quantitative analysis of the DOD budget against the UGV program 
budget was conducted to determine if a correlation exists and if future budget trends are 
predictable. 
The Sigmoid-Curve (S-curve) model allows examination of the UGS industry and 
allows an educated estimate about where the industry lies on the S-Curve today. 
Literature was further utilized as a means of analyzing exploration of new technology 
versus exploitation of existing technology. Push and pull factors were examined for the 
key systems in the UGV program to help explain why some systems flourish and are 
delivered to warfighters and other simply remain in a perpetual state of R&D. 
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Master plans, road maps, and congressional budgetary documents were used to 
analyze the UGS program schedules and budgets and their effect on the program. 
Funding allocated to R&D, procurement, and individual systems from the beginning of a 
program were examined as well as changes to the schedules and funding over time. The 
researchers seek to determine whether there were trends in the program related to budget 
uncertainty and if smaller Acquisition Category (ACAT) III programs tend to go over 
budget and schedule or are more stable due to their small scope. Another goal is to 
examine the overall growth of the program in regard to dollars and numbers of systems. 
This information is used to determine if there is a correlation between specific events in 
time and UGV program funding, or if the program was gaining popularity within the 
DOD and receiving a larger portion of the budget because of the demand for UGS. The 
same sources are utilized to examine the U.S. military’s cultural feelings in regard to 
UGS. The purpose of this was to determine if the organizational culture is a barrier to 
success for UGS due to factors such as pride, status, and glory on the battlefield or a 
basic lack of trust in UGS. Cultural beliefs are compared with the amount of systems 
currently fielded by various branches and communities in the Army to determine if the 
presence of systems has an effect on cultural acceptance. 
All master plans are assembled in chronological order to analyze various factors. 
The goal is to compare what was planned in each master plan to what was actually 
accomplished over time. The researchers investigate what was implemented into various 
units, what was cancelled, and the reasons for success and failure of specific systems. All 
of the information analyzed is used to present interesting trends among UGS programs, 
which may be practical for future UGS program consideration or for other highly 
advanced technology programs in the DOD that are similar to UGS technology. 
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IV. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF ROAD MAPS (1991–2004) 
The unfolding figure (see Figure 3) for UGVs provides a visual representation of 
the requirements rationale over time. From 1991 to 2004, the United States was involved 
in six conflicts, which is depicted by the red cylindrical time line at the top of the page in 
Figure 3. From the conflicts, requirements are identified and highlighted by the yellow 
rectangles below the time line. To satisfy requirements, UGV solutions were developed 
and are highlighted by the green ovals. In 1991, only three programs existed to satisfy 
some of the capability gaps (CAPGAP). As the UGV program progressed, new programs 
emerged to satisfy the CAPGAP. From the original programs in 1991, new programs and 
systems emerged to satisfy warfighter needs based upon the current threat.  
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A. 1991 MASTER PLAN THROUGH 1995 MASTER PLAN 
In Section A, the research identifies each UGV program mentioned in the master 
plans from 1991 to 1995, and conducts a comparative analysis of the schedule and 
funding of each program. The purpose of the research is to identify adjustments to the 
overall schedule and funding while examining program growth in terms of new systems 
and UGV program funding. The section concludes with an analysis of schedule and 
funding from 1991 to 1995 on programs that continued through the years observed. 
1. 1991 Unmanned Ground Vehicle Master Plan 
The 1991 unmanned ground vehicle master plan (UGVMP) is the first formalized 
document that presents a DOD level plan and strategy for UGVs. Its main purpose is to 
“provide a single, integrated DOD document that lays out the strategy for introducing 
supervised robotic vehicles into our forces and the plan for development and acquisition 
of unmanned ground vehicle systems” (DOD, 1991, p. 2). The plan, which was created in 
response to recent combat operations during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, also 
addresses unmanned systems utilized during combat operations, primarily in the air. The 
requirements that led to the solution for that year are shown in Table 1.  
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Table 1.   Requirements Articulation 1991 UGV Master Plan 
 
 
The plan presented several reasons to explain why UGVs are desirable. Firstly, 
the development and implementation of UGVs reduces the loss of human life and creates 
operational flexibility on the battlefield and in hazardous, contaminated environments. 
Secondly, UGVs result in economic savings in manpower and in repetitive operations 
through the use of unmanned systems as well as reduce and improve training costs and 
training realism. UGVs can also perform better than humans in many circumstances 
because they do not feel fear or fatigue, and they can withstand physical stress that the 
human body simply cannot endure. Lastly, UGVs can serve as a force multiplier that can 
bring a capability that does not exist among a human-only force (DOD, 1991). 
In 1991, the DOD recognized the potential opportunities for these systems in the 
following areas: reconnaissance, target engagement, logistics, runway repair, minefield 
detection and neutralization, explosive ordnance disposal, physical security, and nuclear, 
biological, and chemical operations on the battlefield (DOD, 1991). DOD leadership also 





Minefield Detection & Neutralization






Cold War (Soviet Union 1945‐1991)
Desert Shield/Storm ‐ Iraq (1990‐1991)
UGV Solution
Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicle (TUGV)
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA)
NBC Detection and Laser Designation
Rapid Runway Repair (RRR)/Robitic Evacuation Vehicle(Rev) (Initiated 1990)
Runway Repair (fix holes, remove debris,safe removal of personnel and hazardous areas)
Remote Ordnance Neutralization Device (ROND)/Remote Ordnance Neutralization System(RONS)(Initiated 1990)
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
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technology that could make them more lethal without having to place them in dangerous 
engagements with the enemy. 
While clear desire to implement this technology existed, challenges made full 
implementation difficult. Software development, for instance, was a major challenge for 
future unmanned systems, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) openly 
acknowledges in the UGVMP that teleoperation was feasible in 1991, but autonomous 
operation was not. Autonomous operation can save forces money on repetitive operations 
and reduce manpower costs, but without autonomy, there is actually a manpower burden 
from unmanned systems. 
The 1991 UGVMP states that the program acquisition strategy is based on the 
coordinated evolution of demonstrated capabilities and user requirements. In the near-
term, the focus was placed on teleoperated and teleassisted UGVs. The mid-term focus 
was on supervised robotics for navigation, recon, surveillance, and target acquisition. The 
far-term strategy focuses on highly autonomous systems that are derived from artificial 
intelligence through research primarily conducted by DARPA (DOD, 1991). 
In this master plan, there are three projects pursued under the heading 6.3B, which 
is advanced system development (ASD). The three projects are tactical unmanned ground 
vehicles (TUGV), rapid runway repair (RRR), and the remote ordnance neutralization 
device (ROND). Figure 4 gives some perspective on the meaning of 6.3B development 
funding in relation to the DOD acquisition milestone chart. Table 2 depicts a five-year 
funding plan for the three projects. The tactical unmanned ground vehicle (TUGV) is the 





Figure 4.  6.3B Funding in Relation to DOD Acquisition Milestones (from Defense Manufacturing Management  
Guide for Program Managers, 2012) 
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Table 2.   Planned Funding for 6.3B Development Programs  
($M; from DOD, 1991) 
 
 
a. Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicle 
The first project is a tactical unmanned ground vehicle (TUGV) and the system in 
development is the surrogate teleoperated vehicle (STV) shown in Figure 5. The TUGV 
can serve as an operator, which can remotely conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and 
target acquisition (RSTA), and nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) detection and 
laser designation. In this document, the project is in the design and build phase with 
Milestone III projected for 1997, when production of the system is expected to occur. The 
planned TUGV program schedule is shown in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 5.  Picture of the Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicle Program 
Surrogate Tactical Vehicle (from DOD, 1991) 
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Figure 6.  TUGV Program Schedule (from DOD, 1991) 
The program schedule shown in Figure 7 displays how funding will transition 
from OSD to the services that want to acquire the system. Eventually, the OSD is 
relieved of all financial obligations and the services finance the procurement and 
sustainment of the system. 
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Figure 7.  TUGV Program Schedule and Funding (from DOD, 1991) 
b. Rapid Runway Repair (RRR) 
The second project is the rapid runway repair (RRR), which is a teleassisted repair 
system that can drive to a damage site, fix holes, and remove debris, thereby enabling the 
safe removal of personnel from hazardous areas. The RRR system, a semi-autonomous 
John Deere excavator shown in Figure 8, is used primarily for demonstrating the system’s 
capabilities. The master plan calls for the development of a new excavator vehicle in 
support of this project. Figure 9 depicts the schedule and funding for the RRR. In 1997, 
the initiated program should achieve Milestone III, and by 1995, OSD will be phased out 
of the funding scheme and become the requirement of each service. 
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Figure 8.  RRR Demonstration Unit (from DOD, 1991) 
 
Figure 9.  RRR Program Schedule and Funding (from DOD, 1991) 
c. Remote Ordnance Neutralization Device (ROND) 
The third project in this master plan is the remote ordnance neutralization device 
(ROND). This system, depicted in Figure 10, is designed for use by explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD) technicians to give them a safe standoff from hazardous explosives. The 
system consists of a remotely operated platform, a closed circuit TV display, and 
interchangeable EOD tools that can be used for work purposes by the systems arm. This 
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system is a six-wheeled prototype and looks like the foundation of many EOD systems 
that are currently in use today such as the TALON or PackBot robots. Like the RRR, this 
project was also initiated in 1990 and is expected to achieve Milestone III in 1997. As 
shown in Figure 11, OSD funding expires in 1995, leaving services financially 
responsible for the project. 
 
Figure 10.  ROND Exploratory Development Prototype (from DOD, 1991) 
 
Figure 11.  ROND Program Schedule and Funding (from DOD, 1991) 
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d. DEMOs I and II 
The primary purpose of the DEMO I program aims to mature technologies on 
first-generation UGVs and demonstrate their readiness for acquisition programs (DOD, 
1991). In the DEMO I program, five high mobility multi-wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) 
were utilized as demonstration vehicles for RSTA and NBC detection operations. DEMO 
I includes technology from outside the UGV program to maximize technology integration 
and transfer into the UGV program. 
DEMO II strives to mature navigation technologies that allow UGVs to progress 
from labor-intensive teleoperated systems into supervised autonomous systems (DOD, 
1991). DEMO II’s primary objective is for the TUGV to be able to conduct RSTA while 
on the move. The planned funding for DEMO I and DEMO II and the potential for 
funding of another technology maturation program based on the findings of an ongoing 
but unnamed study mentioned in this master plan is shown in Table 3. 
Table 3.   UGVTEE Program Funding ($K; from DOD, 1991) 
 
 
The DEMO I and II program’s significance stems from its management by 
DARPA and includes a large number of key players focused on the R&D of UGVs. The 
management structure of the program is shown in Figure 12. As a significant 
collaborative event planned and executed between DARPA, academia, industry, Army 
R&D, the DOD and other DOD services, the development and advances have impacted 
the field. The structure of the DEMO II program is shown in Figure 13. DEMOs I and II 
are key components to the advancement of this emerging technology, and in 1991, the 
program was still in its infancy. The planned technology exploration is ambitious with the 
end state of supervised autonomous UGVs as the main objective. 
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Figure 12.  DEMO II Program Interrelationship between Academia, Industry, 
and Government (from DOD, 1991) 
 
Figure 13.  DEMO II Program Milestones (from DOD, 1991) 
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e. Conclusion 
In this document, the RRR and ROND are projects that have a niche—RRR to 
create runways during full spectrum operations, and ROND within EOD, designed to 
give operators safe standoff from unexploded ordnance (UXO) during neutralization 
missions. The TUGV is the premier project; one goal is for TUGV technology to be 
mature enough to conduct supervised autonomous operations by 2000, and the second 
goal is for the DOD to mature technology to the point that it is highly autonomous. The 
plan calls for the fielding of TUGV systems to the Army and Marines by the year 2010. 
The master plan also discusses the desire for one operator to have the ability to control 
multiple UGVs overseeing multiple operations through the use of automation. 
The master plan concludes with a memorandum of agreement between the tactical 
warfare program (TWP) and DARPA with specifications “to develop and mature 
supervised autonomous navigation technologies for advanced system development of 
unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) by 1995” (DOD, 1991, p. A-1). By committing to 
advancing UGVs, DARPA solidifies the commitment to quality, advanced research 
conducted within the agency, industry and academia, and in turn increases the chances of 
success of this program and the development of this technology. The funding committed 
by DARPA and TWP to this program, through DEMO II is shown in Table 4. 
Table 4.   Funding Agreement between DARPA and TWP ($M;  
from DOD, 1991) 
 
 
2. 1992 Unmanned Ground Vehicle Master Plan 
In the 1991 master plan, the remote control reconnaissance monitor (RECORM) 
program is no longer a part of the Joint Robotics Program; therefore, there is nothing 
significant to report. However, in the 1992 master plan, more details about this program 
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emerge, and it becomes evident that the program remains in the engineering, 
manufacturing & development (EMD) phase, as depicted in Table 5. The RECORM is 
funded through the joint EOD program with a Milestone III decision planned for 1993 as 
well as a planned procurement of 340 vehicles with a unit cost of $110,000 per vehicle 
(DOD, 1992). This program is more mature than other programs mentioned in either 
document. 
Table 5.   Requirements Articulation 1992 UGV Master Plan 
 
 
Overall Program Schedule 
The schedule of programs being tracked in 1992 is shown in Figure 14. The new 







Minefield Detection & Neutralization
NBC Detection and Laser Designation
Physical Security





Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicle (TUGV)
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA)
NBC Detection and Laser Designation
Rapid Runway Repair (RRR)/Robitic Evacuation Vehicle(Rev) (Initiated 1990)
Runway Repair (fix holes, remove debris,safe removal of personnel and hazardous areas)
Remote Ordnance Neutralization Device (ROND)/Remote Ordnance Neutralization System(RONS)(Initiated 1990)
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Mobile Detection Assessment Response System ‐ Exterior (MDARS‐E) (Initiated 1992)
Reduce manpower by patrolling exterior of buildings and compounds in day, night, hot, cold, wet & dry conditions
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Figure 14.  1992 UGV Program Schedule (from DOD, 1992) 
While programs generally remain the same in the latest master plan, there are 
funding and schedule changes depicted but not directly addressed. The following tables 
and figures highlight the changes that occurred over the past year. 
The change in funding for all programs listed under the 6.3B developmental 
program’s budget, and the top table shown in Table 6 illustrates the prior year’s master 
plan. As shown, the future years funding planned for the TUGV was reduced for 1993 
and increased in 1994, ultimately bringing the total program funding down. 
Subsequently, planned funding for the RRR increased in 1994 along with the program 
total and the overall funding of the Remote Ordnance Neutralization System (RONS) 
went down. In 1991, the program, known as ROND, appears to have lost future funding 
when the name changed, but the difference is not depicted in the table. No reason is given 
for why the program was changed from ROND to RONS. 
 
 33
Table 6.   1991 Program Funding Compared to 1992 Program Funding ($M, 
from DOD, 1991, 1992) 
 
 
a. TUGV from 1991 to 1992 
The slippage of the TUGV schedule from 1991 to 1992 is shown in Figure 15. 
The Milestone III decision shows a one-year shift from FY97 to FY98, which also shifted 
the planned second generation TUGV to the same year. The TUGV demonstration, 
validation, and EMD category resulted in the extension in duration of various events and 
moved the estimated completion date further into the future. As a result, the design and 
build of EMD TUGV prototypes completion occurs in the first quarter (QTR) of FY96 
instead of the second QTR of FY95 with DT&E, not concluding until the last QTR of 
FY97 as opposed to the first QTR of FY96. This event also doubled the length of time to 
complete. Lastly, IOT&E shifts to completion in FY98 instead of the first QTR of FY97. 




Figure 15.  1991 TUGV Schedule Compared to 1992 TUGV Schedule  
(from DOD, 1991, 1992) 
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The TUGV funding changes from the 1991 to 1992 master plans is shown in more 
detail in Figure 16. The OSD plans to increase funding by 100% in FY94 while the Army 
drastically reduces its funding of TUGVs from FY94 to FY97. The Marines also reduce 
funding to the program, but only in FY95 and FY96. However, the plan does not address 
the required amount planned for the 1991 master plan. There is a significant gap between 
the amount required and what is planned in 1991. 
 
 
Figure 16.  1991 TUGV Schedule and Funding Compared to 1992 TUGV 
Schedule and Funding (from DOD, 1991, 1992) 
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According to the 1992 master plan, the achievement of Milestone III results in the 
procurement of 1,200 TUGVs. The goal of the STVs at this point is to provide users with 
familiarization of this system, refine requirements, and determine further operational 
capabilities and benefits before entering into EMD in FY94 (DOD, 1992). The document 
states that 14 STVs were ordered in 1990 and have been delivered, two of which are 
designated for safety and technical performance tests, and 12 for operational testing. 
b. RRR from 1991 to 1992 
From 1991 to 1992, very little changed in regard to the RRR schedule and 
funding. On the other hand, OSD funding for FY94 increased from $500,000 to $1 
million, with no other changes reported. 
The 1992 master plan stated that an EMD decision for the RRR is set for FY94 
with the Milestone III decision expected to occur in FY97. The plan called for the 
procurement of approximately 125 RRRs. In 1991, Eagle-Picher industries was awarded 
the contract for design, development, and fabrication of the RRR prototype. 
c. ROND/RONS from 1991 to 1992 
Figure 17 is a picture of the RONS; Figure 18 depicts a comparison of the 1991 
ROND program against the 1992 RONS program. ROND became RONS in the 1992 
master plan, but there was not much change to the funding or schedule as a result of the 








Figure 18.  1991 RONS Schedule and Funding Compared to 1992 ROND 
Schedule and Funding (from DOD, 1991, 1992) 
EMD for RONS, designed primarily for use in the EOD community, was planned 
for FY94, and the 1992 master plan called for the procurement of over 200 RONS 
beginning in FY98. In 1991, a contract to design, develop, and fabricate an advanced 
development model (ADM) was awarded to Battelle, Pacific Northwest Laboratories 
(DOD, 1992). Before RONS can achieve Milestone II, it must complete a long list of 
apparent challenging tasks in relation to the time period and level of technology 
maturation. The tasks include the following: the ability to be used continuously for six 
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hours, to have one hour of battery life without engine use, to climb 450 stairs, to travel 
across grass, to be able to lift 100 pounds, to operate with 1000 meter separation between 
the unit and operator, and to provide EOD technicians with manipulator functions.  
d. DEMOs I and II from 1991 to 1992 
According to the 1992 master plan, DEMO I was almost complete and achieved 
its primary objective of maturing existing technology and demonstrating critical system 
component technologies for first generation UGVs. DEMO I accomplished a few key 
autonomous navigation feats: road following, path retrace, and path retro traverse with 
automated turnaround and backup (DOD, 1992). Obstacle detection and avoidance during 
autonomous operations is still a limiting factor; at this time, the vehicles can avoid 
collisions with large objects, but are not sophisticated enough to function in traffic or in 
many varieties of terrain and man-made environments. 
During this time, path retrace is seen as one of the key breakthroughs for TUGVs; 
it allows the operator to command the UGV to return home and provides the ability to 
supervise or conduct other operations. This is also considered a key integration into the 
RONS program to further reduce EOD technician’s exposure to hazards while trying to 
recover equipment at the conclusion of a mission. 
In the 1992 master plan, DEMO II is only in Phase 1 with emphasis mainly on 
HMMWVs. Figure 19 presents the DEMO II program in its four phases to its planned 
completion in FY95. 
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Figure 19.  DEMO II Program Overview (from DOD, 1992)  
e. Conclusion 
The master plan presents new potential systems and uses that may come to 
fruition in the near future. Also, for the first time, the mobile detection assessment 
response system—exterior (MDARS-E) is mentioned with a goal of significantly 
reducing manpower by patrolling the exterior of buildings and compounds in day, night, 
hot, cold, wet, and dry conditions. 
Environmental restoration is another projected use for UGVs which could meet a 
large requirement in the coming years. Other recommended uses for UGVs at this time 
include countermine operations, logistics, and border control (DOD, 1992). As the 
systems continue to evolve and successfully demonstrate their capabilities, the 
identification of more uses could occur in an effort to reduce the burden on manpower 
and to further eliminate unnecessary risk among the force. 
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3. 1993 Unmanned Ground Vehicle Master Plan 
The overall master plan for this year maintains the same purpose as the previous 
plans, but there are a few changes that come to the forefront early in the document. This 
UGVMP bluntly states that the tactical unmanned ground vehicle (TUGV) program, as it 
relates to supporting the infantry, is the primary focus of the whole UGV program. The 
document further explains that the TUGV is part of a system development strategy that 
focuses on the integration of UGVs with other land combat systems and forces on the 
battlefield. The second focus of the UGV program at this point is to support more niche 
and narrow requirements such as EOD, where automating human functions is desired. 
The engineer vehicle teleoperation capability (EVTC) is a new program in the 1993 
master plan and is covered in greater detail later in this section. The requirements that led 
to the solution for that year is shown in Table 7. 
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Table 7.   Requirements Articulation 1993 UGV Master Plan 
 
 
As mentioned in the 1992 UGVMP, the remote control reconnaissance monitor 
(RECORM) program is managed by the joint services EOD office, and this program is no 
longer visible in the 1993 UGVMP. One statement indicates that the RECORM 









Minefield Detection & Neutralization
NBC Detection and Laser Designation
Physical Security
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA)
Remote Mine Clearance 






Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicle (TUGV)
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA)
NBC Detection and Laser Designation
Rapid Runway Repair (RRR)/Robitic Evacuation Vehicle(Rev) (Initiated 1990)
Runway Repair (fix holes, remove debris,safe removal of personnel and hazardous areas)
Remote Ordnance Neutralization Device (ROND)/Remote Ordnance Neutralization System(RONS)(Initiated 1990)
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Mobile Detection Assessment Response System ‐ Exterior (MDARS‐E) (Initiated 1992)
Reduce manpower by patrolling exterior of buildings and compounds in day, night, hot, cold, wet & dry conditions
Engineer Vehicle Teleoperation Capability (EVTC) (Initiated 1993)
Remote Mine Clearance 
Breaching
Environmental Cleanup
*This year UGVs are categorized by size: 
Small ‐ TUGV, RONS, MDARS‐E
Medium ‐ EVTC 
Large ‐ REV
** Funding for RRR dissipated due to collapse of the Soviet Union ‐ RRR no longer required/Program Renamed REV
***Shift focus from cold‐war oriented plan to Desert Shield/Desert Storm
Reduction in Budget for TUGV
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The 1993 UGVMP is also the first sign of categorizing the UGVs by size. The 
TUGV, remote ordnance neutralization system (RONS), and mobile detection assessment 
response system-exterior (MDARS-E) are considered small UGVS. Potential armor and 
artillery UGVs are categorized as medium and the EVTC and robotic excavation vehicle 
(REV) are categorized as large UGVs.  
The 1993 UGVMP schedule for all UGV programs and the technology 
development programs that support maturation of component technologies is shown in 
Figure 20. This figure indicates the status (approved, draft, or potential) of each program. 
All “potential” category programs are without a schedule, with the exception of the REV. 
Since it is a spinoff of the rapid runway repair (RRR) and much of the previous program 
infrastructure was left in place, technology was transferred to the new requirement. 
 
Figure 20.  1993 UGV Program Schedule (from DOD, 1993) 
The planned funding changes for the TUGV, RRR/REV, and RONS is shown in 
Figure 20. In the 1992 version of this table, only three future years were projected; now 
four are present in the 1993 version. By analyzing program funding, it becomes apparent 
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that the TUGV is the primary focus of the UGV program as it receives the most funding; 
however, this does include the EVTC program funding as well. More money is also 
allocated to each future year than was planned in 1992 with all other program funding on 
the table remaining unchanged. 
Table 8.   1993 Planned Funding for 6.3B Development Programs ($M; from 
DOD, 1993)  
 
 
a. TUGV from 1992 to 1993 
The 1993 UGVMP states that the TUGV effort has expanded to include the 
sustainment of the UGVs developed over the past few years being utilized for testing 
(DOD, 1993). At this time, both the TUGV program and the MDARS-E program are 
working together to promote commonality between the two systems and to share 
technology development. It is worthwhile to mention that the MDARS-E does not receive 
support by the joint robotics program (JRP). 
In 1992, the only TUGV system mentioned was the surrogate teleoperated vehicle 
(STV) displayed in Figure 21. In this master plan, there are five other TUGV systems. 
The Teleoperated mobile all-purpose platform is shown in Figure 22, the teleoperated 
vehicle is shown in Figure 23, the surveillance and assessment robot for GI enhancement 
is shown in Figure 24, the Gecko is shown in Figure 25, and the teleoperated high 
mobility multi-wheeled vehicle is shown in Figure 26. 
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Figure 21.  Surrogate Teleoperated Vehicle (STV) (from DOD, 1992) 
 
Figure 22.  Teleoperated Mobile All-Purpose Platform (TMAP) (from DOD, 1992) 
 
Figure 23.  Teleoperated Vehicle (TOV) (from DOD, 1992) 
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Figure 24.  Surveillance and Assessment Robot for GI Enhancement (SARGE) 
(from DOD, 1992) 
 
Figure 25.  Gecko (from DOD, 1992) 
 
Figure 26.  Teleoperated High Mobility Multi-wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) 
(from DOD, 1992) 
 47
The 1992 TUGV program plan compared to the 1993 TUGV program plan is 
shown in Figure 27. In the 1992 UGVMP, Milestone II was planned for FY94 and 
Milestone III was projected toward the end of FY98. In 1993, Milestone II had shifted 
about three years to the right and Milestone III was no longer on the schedule, which 
projected out to FY98. The master plan also stated that EMD was planned to begin in 
FY97 and conclude in FY01. In the 1992 master plan, EMD was scheduled to being in 
FY95 and conclude in FY96. The schedule slippage is significant within this program. 
In 1992, 1,200 TUGVs were expected to be procured, but in the 1993 master plan, 




Figure 27.  1992 TUGV Schedule Compared to 1993 TUGV Schedule  
(from DOD, 1992, 1993) 
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From 1992 to 1993, the TUGV program schedule and funding displayed in Figure 
28 has also evolved, and the individual services’ funding obligation is no longer visible. 
In the 1992 master plan, OSD TUGV funding was only $6 million in FY94, and this was 
supposed to be the last year of OSD funding support to the TUGV program. From that 
point forward, it would be the services’ responsibility because the program was planned 
to be in the EMD phase by this point. In the 1993 master plan, the OSD funding was 
raised to $10 million in FY94 and OSD funding of the TUGV program was extended to 
FY97, which is the new planned date for EMD with service funding towards the program 
expected to resume during the EMD phase. 
 
 
Figure 28.  1992 TUGV Funding and Schedule Compared to 1993 TUGV 
Funding and Schedule (from DOD, 1992, 1993) 
 50
b. RONS from 1992 to 1993 
With RONS moved into the small UGV category in 1993, it makes more sense to 
arrange the presentation in order by category. The changes to the RONS schedule and 
program from 1992 to 1993 is shown in Figure 29. In the 1993 master plan, OSD funding 
for this program extended an additional year to FY95 and the services funding for FY93 
increased from $400,000 to $1.7 million. From a schedule standpoint, DT&E, OT&E and 




Figure 29.  1992 RONS Funding and Schedule Compared to 1993 RONS 
Schedule and Funding (from DOD, 1992, 1993) 
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c. RRR/REV from 1992 to 1993 
From 1992 to 1993, the RRR program changed to the robotic excavation vehicle 
(REV), but the collapse of the Soviet Union called for the RRR dissipation and the 
withdrawal of program funding. However, requirements for equipment to clear 
countryside and ranges of unexploded ordnance (UXO) emerged at this time. As a result, 
the technology developed under the RRR program in the DEMO I and II programs were 
transferred to the REV to meet this requirement.  
The picture shown in Figure 30 is the REV in 1993 and picture shown in Figure 
31 compares the 1992 RRR schedule to the 1993 REV schedule. The RRR program was 
converted into the REV program during this period, as the requirements changed based 
on the collapse of the Soviet Union. Much of the RRR data remained on the improved 
REV schedule, but overall, the program funding generally increased and the schedule 
slipped to the right. In 1992, the OSD funding of the RRR program was expected to 
terminate in FY94; instead, the FY94 increased funding by $100,000 and extended out to 
FY97 when Milestone II was projected. From FY93 to FY98, service funding increased 
in all years except FY96, where the funding decreased, and FY97 where the funding stays 
the same. 
 




Figure 31.  1992 RRR Funding and Schedule Compared to 1993 REV Funding 
and Schedule (from DOD, 1992, 1993) 
d. EVTC 1993 
The engineer vehicle teleoperation capability (EVTC) was a new program in the 
1993 master plan. It is basically a generic modular kit that can be installed on a variety of 
existing manned vehicles, allowing an operator to remotely control the vehicle from a 
distance, or from another vehicle (DOD, 1993). This kit can be overridden manually by 
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an operator and it can be used for remote mine clearance, breaching, environmental 
cleanup, and for many other undetermined and unimagined uses. 
There are requirements for this program on M1 and M60 tanks. The schedule is 
very raw and shows program initiation in FY93 and a time line with no milestones that 
extends through FY96. This is an operational requirement (OR) in the draft (D) stage so 
more information is expected in future editions if the program is more formally 
implemented. 
e. DEMOs I and II from 1992 to 1993 
DEMO I was concluded in April 1992. The change to the DEMO II program from 
1992 to 1993 is shown in Figure 32. In the 1993 UGVMP, all intermediate milestones for 
DEMO II shifted one year into the future, and the overall program was planned to 




Figure 32.  1992 DEMO II Program Schedule Compared to 1993 DEMO II 
Program Schedule (from DOD, 1992, 1993) 
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Despite the ongoing research in autonomous navigation, cross-country navigation 
remains elusive with an unfulfilled capability gap. 
f. Conclusion 
For the most part, there are significant changes to the funding of the UGV 
program. Schedules for each UGV program have shifted to the right; possibly as a result 
of poor program management, but more likely as a result of budget uncertainty, or the 
changing strategic landscape caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The document 
does state that the 1992 UGVMP was a cold-war oriented plan and more consideration 
for this technology must be placed on lessons learned from Desert Shield and Desert 
Storm. This change in strategy may also have been the catalyst that caused the drastic 
changes to each of the programs covered. 
The master plan stated that the reduction in future DOD budgets had a major 
impact on the overall UGV program plan. This budget reduction led to lack of funding 
for the TUGV EMD until FY97. It seems appropriate to develop new concepts to present 
to users to give them an idea about future weapon system opportunities. However, new 
regulations demand service and user requirements prior to the development of new 
concepts. “Moreover, future budgets will not allow new 6.3B programs to be initiated 
without a clear Service requirement” (DOD, 1993, p. 13). There must be a balance 
between the push of new ideas and the pull or demand from the user. This places a huge 
emphasis on effective and large-scale demonstrations of systems and capabilities. 
According to Geroski (2003), an inchoate demand exists when the end user verifies that a 
certain capability would be nice if it were available in the market to satisfy a need. 
Therefore, due to immature UGV technology, inchoate demand pulls out innovation and 
provides the direction for innovators to focus. Effectively, UGV users do not necessarily 
know what they need until they see something new and innovative. This creates a 
challenging balance in determining what system and capability should be developed. 
4. 1994 Unmanned Ground Vehicle Master Plan 
The 1994 UGVMP highlighted the goal of the joint robotics program (JRP), 
which is to field a family of first-generation UGVs for tactical operations and to 
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coordinate the integration of technology among various JRP projects. The master plan 
makes a point to delineate which organizations are responsible for the UGV programs 
listed under the current UGV program. 
Tactical UGV projects or TUGVs are the responsibility of the U.S. Army and 
USMC out of the Unmanned Ground Vehicles/Systems Joint Projects Office (UGV/S 
JPO). This office is also responsible for maintaining UGV requirements and the technical 
approaches being developed to meet said requirements. EOD projects are the 
responsibility of the Program Management Office for Explosive Ordnance Disposal. The 
development of the robotic excavation vehicle (REV) is carried out by the Air Force 
through the Airbase Systems Branch. Physical security projects are carried out by the 
Physical Security Equipment Management Office (PSEMO; DOD, 1994). In order to 
manage such a disbursement of agencies working on UGVs throughout the DOD, 
memorandums of agreement (MOAs) have been established to coordinate the sharing of 
technology and reduction in duplication efforts. The requirements that led to the solution 
for that year is shown in Table 9. 
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Table 9.   Requirements Articulation 1994 UGV Master Plan 
 
 
This master plan draws on the recent conflicts of Desert Shield and Desert Storm 
to further justify the importance of UGVs. The plan calls to attention the fact that if 
troops faced an immediate chemical weapons threat, then a demand for remotely operated 
mine-clearing tanks and autonomous guided weapons could showcase their effectiveness 
in these conflicts keeping friendly casualties to a minimum and setting a new standard for 
future conflicts. The document reminds the reader that UGVs are a force multiplier and 
that they are a solution to all of the previously mentioned requirements. 
Future recommended potential applications to increase combat effectiveness and 









Minefield Detection & Neutralization
NBC Detection and Laser Designation
Obstacle Detection
Physical Security
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA)
Remote Mine Clearance 





Lessons Learned Desert Shield/Desert Storm (chemical weapons)
UGV Solution
Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicle (TUGV)
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA)
NBC Detection and Laser Designation
Robitic Evacuation Vehicle(Rev) (renamed from RRR)
Runway Repair (fix holes, remove debris,safe removal of personnel and hazardous areas)
Remote Ordnance Neutralization Device (ROND)/Remote Ordnance Neutralization System(RONS)(Initiated 1990)
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Mobile Detection Assessment Response System ‐ Exterior (MDARS‐E) (Initiated 1992)
Reduce manpower by patrolling exterior of buildings and compounds in day, night, hot, cold, wet & dry conditions
Engineer Vehicle Teleoperation Capability (EVTC) (Initiated 1993)
Remote Mine Clearance 
Breaching
Environmental Cleanup
*Focuses on lessons learned for Desert Shield/Desert Storm 
**Chemical weapons, demand for remotely operated mine‐clearing tanks, autonomous guided weapons (force multiplier)
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neutralization, and breaching, explosive ordnance disposal, physical security, and 
operations in contaminated environments. Environmental restoration of existing and 
closed defense sites is another use for UGVs (DOD, 1994). These are all worthwhile 
applications, but there are already ongoing programs that address these needs in the 1994 
master plan. 
Figure 33 depicts the 1994 UGV program as a whole. Since 1993, very little has 
changed. The MDARS-E program has shifted Milestone II about one quarter further into 
the future. The EVTC program has added a Milestone 0 expectation in FY95 and 
Milestone I/II achievement in FY97. The 1993 plan had no planned milestones. Lastly, 
the REV program was only scheduled through FY95 in 1993, but this has been extended 
out through FY98 in the latest master plan. 
 
Figure 33.  1994 UGV Program Schedule (from DOD, 1994) 
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Planned funding for Advanced Systems Development (ASD) programs in 1994 is 
presented in Table 10. In 1993, the TUGV and EVTC funds were combined and in this 
year’s plan, the funds were separated and each program given its own line. Both the 
TUGV and EVTC program received increased FY94 funds compared to what was 
planned in the 1993 plan, but then planned funds were down for FY95 and FY96 
compared to the plan a year earlier. The REV program is the only other program with 
funding changes, demonstrating an increase in planned funds for FY95 and FY96 with all 
other years remaining the same. 
Table 10.   1994 Planned Funding for ASD Programs ($M; from DOD, 1994) 
 
 
a. TUGV from 1993 to 1994 
The document lists the prototypes that have been developed and tested over the 
past several years; it is slightly different from the prototypes mentioned the year prior. 
The robotic all-terrain vehicle, which is the latest TUGV displayed is shown in Figure 34. 
The following are the 1994 TUGV systems (no information is provided about the systems 
that were present in 1993 and not 1994):  
1. Surrogate Teleoperated Vehicle (STV) 
2. Surveillance and Assessment Robot for GI Enhancement (SARGE) 
3. Gecko 
4. HMMWV based Technical Test Bed (TTB) 
5. Robotic All-Terrain Vehicle (RATV) 
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Figure 34.  Robotic All-Terrain Vehicle (RATV) (from DOD, 1994) 
In all other prior year master plans, the TUGV program had its own enlarged 
schedule along with a separate schedule and funding table that displayed the OSD 
funding by year on the top funding row and the service funding on the lower row. This 
particular chart was eliminated in this year’s master plan for the TUGV, but it is present 
for all other programs that are listed in the ASD planned funding table. This is interesting 
because the TUGV is the main effort program of the JRP, so one would assume access to 
more readily available information about this program. 
Using the planned funding for ASD programs table, it is determined that TUGV 
funding increased during FY94 and is projected to decrease in FY95 and FY96 based on 
what was presented in the 1993 master plan. Figure 35 is the TUGV program schedule 
presented in 1994, which does not vary much from the 1993 program schedule. The only 
difference worth highlighting is a shift in the user evaluation schedule. In last year’s plan, 
user evaluations were scheduled from FY94 to FY96, and in this year’s plan, the 
evaluations are now planned to occur from FY95 to FY98. This is a significant shift, but 




Figure 35.  1994 TUGV Schedule (from DOD, 1994) 
b. RONS from 1993 to 1994 
Figure 36 compares the remote ordnance neutralization system (RONS) schedule 
and funding from 1993 to 1994. All milestones for this program have shifted to the right 
by about three months with the exception of the planned Milestone II decision in FY95, 
which remained intact. The OSD planned funding did not change in the past year, but the 
service level funding increases every year from FY93 to FY98. The most interesting 
development for this program over the past year lies in the change of total number of 
expected RONS’ acquisitions. In 1993, the plan was to acquire 200 total RONS’ systems. 
In the 1994 master plan, only 90 RONS are planned for acquisition. The Army plans to 
acquire 52, the Marine Corps plans to acquire 32, and the Navy and Air Force each plan 
to acquire three vehicles. Information is not present to confirm, but it is assumed that the 





Figure 36.  1993 RONS Funding and Schedule Compared to 1994 RONS 
Funding and Schedule (from DOD, 1993, 1994) 
c. REV from 1993 to 1994 
According to the 1994 UGVMP, the REV program has made significant technical 
progress in that the vehicle is now capable of conducting “highly accurate, autonomous 
navigation and positioning in a pre-mapped (including obstacles) environment such as an 
airfield or a bombing range” (DOD, 1994, p. 26). The near-term plan for this program is 
to demonstrate the system’s ability to autonomously remove/dispose of UXO. The 
program touts that “repetitive steps in the removal/disposal operation can be completed in 
70 percent of the time required by onboard, at risk, operators” (DOD, 1994). If the 
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demonstrations occur successfully, this is a significant achievement that could positively 
spill over to other UGV programs. 
This document paints a very clear picture of the REV program and ensures that 
the reader understands that the REV is a system of systems. This is an early indicator of 
UGV system complexity and the challenges related to integration as the program 
expands.  
The overall area clearance system will consist of a mobile control center, 
an Autonomous Tow Vehicle (ATV) carrying a sensor array that locates 
the buried ordnance to be cleared, a robotic marking vehicle that marks 
detected UXOs, and a robotic excavator. (DOD, 1994, p. 27)  
It is easy to view these vehicles as simple systems and to have difficulty 
understanding why autonomous operation cannot be readily achieved. When one looks at 
all of the components and interoperability that must occur within the system, it becomes 
more clear why achieving full autonomy is so complex. 
The REV schedule and funding presented in the 1994 master plan is shown in 
Figure 37. There are a few changes from the year prior worth mentioning. On the 
schedule, Milestone I/II has moved forward to one year earlier, from FY97 to FY96. In 
the 1993 schedule, Milestone III was planned for FY98 and in the latest master plan 
Milestone III is no longer visible and the time line has been extended through FY00. 
From FY95 to FY97, OSD funding was increased for this program and extended another 
three years to FY00. Funding from the services also increased in all years from FY94 to 
FY97, but funding in FY98 went down. 
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Figure 37.  1994 REV Funding and Schedule (from DOD, 1994) 
d. EVTC from 1993 to 1994 
In the 1993 master plan, the engineer vehicle teleoperation capability (EVTC) 
program did not have a schedule and the funding was lumped together in the TUGV 
program. In the 1994 document, the EVTC has its own schedule and the funding for the 
program is listed in planned funding for ASD programs presented in Table 10. Figure 38 
is the first schedule presented for this program. Milestones I/II are planned for FY97 and 
Milestone III is planned for FY00. OSD funding of this program extends through FY96 
since EMD will coincide with this funding taper and services assume the financial 
obligation of procurement. 
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Figure 38.  1994 EVTC Program Schedule (from DOD, 1994) 
e. DEMO II from 1993 to 1994 
The 1994 master plan asserts that the success of the DEMO II plan has led to a 
need for further efforts to get UGVs in the hands of operational units and users for system 
evaluation and to discover further UGV uses and advancements that are not currently 
under consideration. The document explains the importance of getting UGVs to units so 
that personnel can develop an appreciation of the systems. It is critical for units to 
develop an understanding of how UGVs work, particularly highly autonomous UGVs and 
how they will interact with manned systems (DOD, 1994). This evaluation, feedback, and 
analysis can serve as the foundation for follow-on research and development at the 
conclusion of DEMO II. 
The DEMO II schedule presented in the 1993 master plan has not changed at all 
in the past year, and in fact, DEMO A and DEMO B have concluded and are summarized 
in this document. The results of the two phases are presented in the following two 
paragraphs: 
The conduct of Demo A on 7 and 8 July 1993 successfully completed the 
first phase of Demo II. This phase integrated the basic mechanical and 
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electrical components, automotive controls, color and infrared visual 
sensors, GPS, INS, odometry, and intervehicle communication that 
provide the foundation for autonomous navigation. Demonstrated research 
software, such as autonomous path following based on model and neural 
net approaches, was ported to the remoted vehicle. Vehicles built for 
Demo II use HMMWV platforms and are denoted as Surrogate 
Semiautonomous Vehicles (SSVs). (DOD, 1994, p. 34) 
Demo B, conducted in late June 1994, completes Phase 2. It demonstrated 
basic map management functions, single vehicle mission planning, off-
road and on-road semiautonomous navigation, robust high-speed 
capability, landmark detection and identification, and rudimentary 
behavior for following rules on the road. (DOD, 1994, p. 34) 
At this time, DEMO II is 50% complete and expected to conclude in 1996 with 
the lofty goal of demonstrating autonomous capabilities on UGVs. DARPA is still the 
lead agency of this effort and the end results are expected to deliver significant results 
that can benefit both military and civilian applications. DEMO II extends beyond 
autonomy and also encompasses system architecture, RSTA, high performance 
computing, and communication links. 
f. MDARS-I and MDARS-E 1993 to 1994 
In the 1993 master plan, the mobile detection assessment response system-interior 
(MDARS-I) depicted in Figure 39, receives no mention and the mobile detection 
assessment response system-exterior (MDARS-E) program, depicted in Figure 40, was 
described as a potential program, although it was listed on the UGV program schedule in 
Figure 33. At that time, the MDARS-E receives classification as an Operational 




Figure 39.  Mobile Detection Assessment Response System Interior (MDARS-I) 
Mobile Platform (from DOD, 1995) 
 
Figure 40.  Mobile Detection Assessment Response System Exterior (MDARS-E) 
Mobile Platform (from DOD, 1996) 
The MDARS-I/E is a system that is designed to perform security inside and 
outside of military facilities such as large warehouses and depots. The system consists of 
multiple interior systems that patrol the facility and are controlled by one central control 
console. The system’s purposes are to prevent loss of DOD equipment, reduce risk to 
DOD personnel, and to reduce intensive manpower requirements associated with security 
patrolling of such facilities (DOD, 1994). The MDARS presents an opportunity to reduce 
manpower costs significantly at locations where it is utilized. It is also in the process of 
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sharing technology with the TUGV program to maximize the technology transfer 
between the two programs. The MDARS program is managed by the physical security 
equipment management office (PSEMO). 
In the 1994 master plan, the MDARS-I and MDARS-E are both presented in 
Appendix A of the document and each program has its own schedule. In this year’s UGV 
overall program schedule, presented in Figure 33, there is only the MDARS-E on the 
program schedule with no program funding data provided. Figure 41 depicts the 
MDARS-I program schedule. The key events that are planned for this system include 
Milestone I/II decisions in FY96 and Milestone III in FY98. The plan is to procure 48 
total MDARS-I systems at a rate of 12 systems per year from FY99 to FY02. The 
MDARS-E schedule is depicted in Figure 42 with Milestones I and II planned for FY97 
and Milestone III in FY99. The procurement plan calls for 18 total systems at a rate of six 
systems per year from FY00 to FY02. 
 
Figure 41.  1994 MDARS-I Program Schedule (from DOD, 1994) 
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Figure 42.  1994 MDARS-E Program Schedule (from DOD, 1994) 
g. Conclusion 
In just a few short years, the UGV program has expanded significantly with 
movement in the program schedules and funding over the years, confirming budget 
uncertainty predicted in earlier master plans. At this point, no programs are in the EMD 
phase, so no UGVs have been fielded to operational units. DEMO I has concluded and 
technology transferred to DEMO II, which exists as the ongoing technology maturation 
thrust for the UGV program. 
5. 1995 Unmanned Ground Vehicle Master Plan 
In this master plan, the goal of the JRP has changed and now aims “to develop 
and field a family of unmanned ground vehicle systems for a range of military 
applications in accordance with user requirements” (DOD, 1995, p. 1). This change 
focuses UGV systems development on user requirements; the document presents 
significant highlights for the program, covered in greater detail later in this section. The 
schedules for all programs shift to the right in this master plan, and one new program is 
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introduced by the name of joint architecture for unmanned ground systems (JAUGS). The 
requirements that led to the solution for that year is shown in Table 11. 
Table 11.   Requirements Articulation 1995 UGV Master Plan 
 
 
From the 1994 master plan to the 1995 master plan, there are significant changes 
to all programs on the UGV program schedule. The first noticeable change presented in 





Develop & Field family of UGVS for range of military applications IAW user requirements
Environmental Cleanup
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Firefighting, handling & loading of aircraft munitions, multiple UXO during clearing operations
Logistics
Minefield Detection & Neutralization
NBC Detection and Laser Designation
Obstacle Detection
Physical Security
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA)
Remote Mine Clearance 






Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicle (TUGV)
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA)
NBC Detection and Laser Designation
Robitic Evacuation Vehicle(Rev) (renamed from RRR)
Runway Repair (fix holes, remove debris,safe removal of personnel and hazardous areas)
Remote Ordnance Neutralization Device (ROND)/Remote Ordnance Neutralization System(RONS)(Initiated 1990)
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Mobile Detection Assessment Response System ‐ Interior/Exterior (MDARS‐I/E) (Initiated 1992)
Reduce manpower by patrolling exterior of buildings and compounds in day, night, hot, cold, wet & dry conditions
Added security inside military facilities such as large warehouses and depots
Engineer Vehicle Teleoperation Capability (EVTC) (Initiated 1993) (renamed VTC)
Remote Mine Clearance 
Breaching
Environmental Cleanup
Joint Architecture for Unmanned Ground Systems (JAUGS) (Initiated 1995) 
Develop common hardware/software open achitecture to ensure intraoperability (vehicle to vehicle)
Interoperability (data communications in command, control, communications, computers & intel (C4I) result in cost savings
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Instead, the name of the program is simply presented. The robotic excavation vehicle 
(REV) program has added the letter S, for System, to the end of its name. Milestones I/II 
shift at least one year into the future for all programs and the MDARS-E Milestone III 
shifts to the right by about one year as well. 
 
Figure 43.  1995 UGV Program Master Schedule (from DOD, 1995) 
Table 12 is the 1995 master plan funding for ASD programs and from the year 
prior there are numerous funding changes. The TUGV funding increases in all years 
except for FY96, where it is down. The VTC program experiences a decrease in funding 
in FY95 but then FY96 and FY97 are increased from the year prior. The REVS program 
also experiences a decrease in FY95 followed by four years of increased funding through 
FY99. Lastly, the RONS program receives increased funding in FY96 and FY97. 
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Table 12.   1995 Funding for ASD Programs ($M; from DOD, 1995) 
 
 
This master plan presents the first management structure for the entire UGV 
program and for the UGV/S JPO. The organizational structures are presented in Figures 
44 and 45. This graphical representation of the organizations gives a good understanding 
of the disbursement of each program throughout the DOD. 
 
Figure 44.  Management Structure for Unmanned Ground Vehicle Programs 
(from DOD, 1995) 
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Figure 45.  Unmanned Ground Vehicles/Systems Joint Project Office 
Organization (from DOD, 1995) 
a. TUGV from 1994 to 1995 
In the past year, several accomplishments were made within the tactical 
unmanned ground vehicle (TUGV) program. First, a formal operational requirements 
document (ORD) was approved by Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 
1995. Several vehicles were also delivered to serve as test vehicles and the SARGE 
vehicles were delivered to users to help develop concepts for operational employment of 
the system and to help refine the requirements. The delivered tactical test beds (TTBs) 
are intended for engineering development and for the integration of RSTA payloads. 
Lastly, Gecko UGVs were delivered for the purpose of developing and evaluating 
computer-aided vehicle teleoperation (DOD, 1995). In the 1994 master plan, there were 
five TUGV systems that were highlighted, and, at this time, the program focuses on the 
three aforementioned. There is no mention of the robotic all-terrain vehicle (RATV) in 
this document, but the surrogate teleoperated vehicle (STV) is discussed briefly. The 
STV was used during an evaluation in 1992 that was observed by the French and the 
French went on to purchase four STVs of their own (DOD, 1995). The plan does not 
specify whether the French purchased new STVs or STVs that the U.S. government once 
owned. In either case, the STV is not recognized as a focal system in the 1995 master 
plan. 
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The TUGV program schedule compared to the schedule in 1994 is shown in 
Figure 46. Milestone I for this program shifted about one year into the future and 
Milestone II moved more than a year further into the future. Additionally, user appraisals 
were previously scheduled for four years and this appears to be decreased by one year. 
 
 
Figure 46.  1994 TUGV Program Schedule Compared to 1995 TUGV Program 
Schedule (from DOD, 1994, 1995) 
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b. RONS from 1994 to 1995 
No major accomplishments for the RONS program were reported in this year’s 
master plan. For the second year in a row, the Army has reduced the number of planned 
systems from 90 to 88 total systems. The schedule for this program is presented in Figure 
47, and another slippage of key milestones into the future can be seen. The planned 
Milestone II date has shifted one year into the future from FY95 to FY96. The technical 
evaluation, operational evaluation, and Milestone III decisions all have also shifted one 
year into the future when compared to the schedule presented one year earlier. 
 
 
Figure 47.  1994 RONS Program Schedule Compared to 1995 RONS Program 
Schedule (from DOD, 1994, 1995) 
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c. REV/REVS from 1994 to 1995  
Equipping the robotic excavation vehicle system (REVS) with a sensor, 
successfully demonstrated the REV’s capability of removing buried UXO from known 
sites. Once able to navigate to the site and autonomously locate and extract the hazard, 
the REV could conduct and complete its mission. In the past year, an autonomous tow 
vehicle (ATV) was developed, and its purpose was to house the sensors that would locate 
the UXO. A first generation autonomous navigation system was developed for the REVS 
(DOD, 1995). In the coming year, through the support of DEMO II, the REVS would 
conduct a live test where the system would demonstrate its autonomous capability in an 
uncontrolled geological environment. The success of this program could provide 
significant advantages in the area of mine clearing and environmental restoration after the 
closure of DOD training areas. These systems will not only be useful to the DOD, but 
also to civilian contractors likely to conduct clearing operations as needed. 
The 1995 REVS program schedule is shown in Figure 48. The only notable 
change on this schedule from the year prior is that Milestone I/II has shifted about one 
and a half years into the future. 
 
Figure 48.  1995 REVS Program Schedule (from DOD, 1995) 
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d. EVTC/VTC from 1994 to 1995 
In the past year, the EVTC dropped the E for Engineering from its name, and it is 
now the vehicle teleoperation capability (VTC). At this time this kit was fitted onto a 
military issued five-ton truck with successful results. Based on this accomplishment, six 
more kits were delivered to the U.S. Army Engineer School so that the same conversion 
could be attempted on a mine detection vehicle. These kits were also successfully 
demonstrated on D-7G bulldozer and M-1 tank chassis (DOD, 1995). Because operating 
in a minefield or in the breach of a combat operation is one of the most dangerous places 
for a human to operate, this results in a significant capability on a large military vehicle. 
Furthermore, by being able to breach and reduce obstacles remotely, this advancement is 
seen as having a positive, desirable impact on modern combat if it can be successfully 
implemented within the force. 
While the accomplishments of this program are impressive, Figure 49 displays the 
schedule slippage of this program from what was planned the year prior. Milestones 0, I, 
and II have all shifted one year further into the future from what was previously planned. 
 
Figure 49.  1995 VTC Program Schedule (from DOD, 1995) 
e. DEMO II from 1994 to 1995 
DEMO II appeared to make some significant developments in the past year that 
could have huge impacts on future UGVs. DEMO C, the third phase of the program, was 
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completed and “it demonstrated control of two UGVs simultaneously, semiautonomous 
navigation, negative obstacle detection, and RSTA on the move” (DOD, 1995, p. 2). 
During this phase, a semiautonomous vehicle was controlled via a satellite 
communication link, and a technology transfer plan was developed to ensure that 
progress made in this program is transferred to other UGV programs in a timely manner 
(DOD, 1995). While these accomplishments are worthy of praise, the DEMO II program 
concludes at the end of 1996 and successful demonstration of highly autonomous 
operations is not yet discussed and appears to be a concept that will not be realized in the 
foreseeable future. 
f. MDARS-I/E from 1994 to 1995 
In the past year, an MDARS-E prototype was developed. The MDARS-I schedule 
from 1995 compared to the 1994 schedule is shown in Figure 50. Milestones II and III 
have slipped further to the right by about one year. The planned contract award and 
production have also shifted further right by about six months each. The production time 
line for 1994 was four years, but now it is a three-year plan. Finally, the quantity to be 
acquired is no longer presented, making it difficult to determine if the acquisition number 




Figure 50.  MDARS-I Schedule from 1994 Compared to MDARS-I Schedule 
from 1995 (from DOD, 1994, 1995) 
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The MDARS-E likewise experiences much of the same as its sister system. All 
milestones mentioned and key program events shift into the future by at least six months 
for each event. Figure 51 compares the 1995 MDARS-E schedule to the 1994 MDARS-E 
schedule. Again, the unit procurement removal from this schedule makes determination 




Figure 51.  1994 MDARS-E Schedule Compared to 1995 MDARS-E Schedule 
(from DOD, 1994, 1995) 
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g. JAUGS 1995 
In 1995, the joint architecture for unmanned ground systems (JAUGS) program is 
the newest addition to the list of UGV programs. This program is one of the JRP 
investment focuses moving into the future and its purpose is “to develop a common 
hardware/software open architecture to ensure interoperability (vehicle to vehicle) and 
interoperability (data communications in the command, control, communications, 
computers, and intelligence [C41] global domain) on UGV systems resulting in cost 
savings to the user” (DOD, 1995, p. 1). Since its inception, the JAUGS program has 
adopted a concept that ensures disciplined development that supports the program 
objective. The JAUGS schedule for 1995 only is shown in Figure 52. This program 
remains significant as efforts to standardize architecture become more prevalent, 
especially as technology rapidly evolves over time. 
 
Figure 52.  1995 JAUGS Schedule (from DOD, 1995) 
h. Conclusion 
The 1995 master plan effectively highlighted all of the accomplishments that each 
program made in the past year. A lot of technological progress is evident in the UGV 
program, but autonomous operations remain a long way off. Disconcerting, however, are 
changes to each of the program schedules over the past year. As the years go by, the 
milestones appear to move further into the future and delivery of systems to operational 
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units appear distant. Identifying delays in the schedules remains one of the goals of this 
paper and can be further investigated by looking at several unknowns such as budgetary 
issues beyond the control of the program managers, immature technology, and other less 
important issues not evident at this time. 
This document also highlighted some emerging UGV capabilities that have not 
been presented in other documents and that sound like reasonable uses for UGVs. One 
potential use of UGVs exists in the task of firefighting as well as the handling and 
loading of munitions of aircraft. Another potential use is a system that gathers multiple 
UXO during clearing operations. All of these uses provide an opportunity to remove 
humans from risk to accomplish a very relevant mission. 
6. Summary from 1991 to 1995 
The goal of this project is to track key programs that originate with the 
establishment of the overall Unmanned Ground Vehicles program. The following 
programs are the focus of this research: TUGV, RONS, REVS, EVTC, and MDARS. 
Analysis of program performance is presented after 1995, 2000, and 2004. The analysis 
concludes with a summary of the full program schedule and funding from 1991 to 2004. 
a. UGV Program Funding 1991 to 1995 
Figure 53 displays the overall UGV funding from 1991 to 1995. The TUGV 
funding trends upward each year, which lends credence to it being the premier program 
each year. REVS and RONS funding does not show a distinct pattern other than 
validating budget uncertainty. A reduction in funding leads to a slippage in schedule, 
which is not necessarily the fault of the program manager but prevents delivery of useful 
systems to users in a timely manner. 
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Figure 53.  UGV Program Funding Comparison FY 1991–1995  
(after DOD, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995) 
b. Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicle 1991 to 1995  
The change to the TUGV schedule from the first one presented in 1991 to the 
most recent presented in 1995 is shown in Figure 54. In 1995, Milestone I is not yet 
achieved and was originally planned for FY94 along with Milestone II in the 1991 master 
plan. Milestone II is now planned for FY98, which was the Milestone III date in the 1991 
plan. At this point, Milestone III is not present in the schedule. This suggests that in 1991, 
the DOD expected to field TUGVs to users in 1998 and now is uncertain when the 
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fielding will occur. While the schedule slips, the funding towards the TUGV program 
continues to rise as depicted in Figure 55. 
 
Figure 54.  TUGV Schedule Comparison 1991–1995 (after DOD, 1991, 1992, 
1993, 1994, 1995) 
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Figure 55.  TUGV Funding Comparison 1991–1995 (after DOD, 1991, 1992, 
1993, 1994, 1995) 
c. ROND/RONS from 1991 to 1995 
From 1991 to 1995 RONS experiences a schedule slippage of two years depicted 
in Figure 56 for Milestones II and III. Essentially, all scheduled activities slip about the 
same amount of time for this program. The funding depicted in Figure 57 rose 
significantly and stabilized for a few years, tapering off significantly in 1995. This is 
interesting because at this point in time, the program is not in Milestone II and must be 




Figure 56.  ROND/RONS Schedule Comparison 1991–1995 (after DOD, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995) 
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Figure 57.  ROND/RONS Funding Comparison 1991–1995 (after DOD, 1991, 
1992, 1993, 1994, 1995) 
d. RRR/REVS from 1991 to 1995 
The REVS experiences a similar situation as the TUGV. In 1991, this program 
was the RRR, but after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the requirement changed from 
runway repair to range clearance. Milestone II for the RRR was planned for FY94 and 
never occurred; the program became the REVS, and Milestone II is now planned for 
FY97. RRR had a planned Milestone III in FY97 but changed, and under the REVS 
program, Milestone III is no longer visible on the schedule as depicted in Figure 58. The 
program funding from 1991 to 1995, depicted in Figure 59, declined rapidly after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. A new demand for this program likely salvaged this 
technology and transformed it into a system to meet an emerging requirement. 
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Figure 58.  RRR/REV Schedule Comparison 1991–1995 (after DOD, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995) 
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Figure 59.  RRR/REV Funding Comparison 1991–1995  
(after DOD, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995) 
e. EVTC from 1994 to 1995 
The EVTC program is relatively new, so only two years of schedule and funding 
are presented, as depicted in Figures 60 and 61. In a short time, the schedule is impacted 
significantly as Milestones 0, I, and II both shift into the future by more than one year. 
Basically, Milestone 0 is not achieved at this point in time. The funding appears to be 
stable, so the challenged schedule is likely attributed to technology hardships associated 
with making a man-operated vehicle functional in an unmanned mode. 
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Figure 60.  EVTC/VTC Schedule Comparison 1995–1996 (after DOD, 1994, 1995) 
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Figure 61.  EVTC/VTC Funding Comparison 1994–1995  
(after DOD, 1994, 1995) 
f. MDARS-E from 1994 to 1995 
The MDARS-E program was first reported in 1994, so only two years of schedule 
information is provided. No funding data for MDARS-E is available or presented in any 
of the present or future master plans. Milestones II and III slipped one year into the future 
from the 1994 to the 1995 master plan, as depicted in Figure 62. The 1994 master plan 
presented production unit quantities but was not carried to the 1995 master plan. 
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Figure 62.  MDARS-E Schedule Comparison 1994–1995 (after DOD, 1994, 1995) 
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g. DOD and UGV Funding Comparison 1991–1995 
While conducting research, an assumption was made that UGV funding would 
align with the DOD budget. It was believed that if the DOD budget increased, UGV 
funding would increase, or if the DOD budget decreased, UGV funding would also 
decrease. After analyzing Figure 63, it was determined that no correlation exists between 
the DOD and UGV budget. During several years, the budgets are inverse of each of each 
other, meaning that one is increasing while the other is decreasing. This chart is displayed 
at each summary and at the conclusion of the analysis to present the two funding charts 
from 1991 to 2004. The researchers’ assumption is that the UGV budget is based on its 
level of priority against all other budget activities. As a researcher interested in the topic, 
it is easy to assume that unmanned systems are very important and the top priority, but in 
the eyes of key military leaders, other areas may require a larger share of the funding 
based on the current threat. 
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Figure 63.  DOD and UGV Funding Comparison 1991–1995 (after DOD, 1991, 
1992, 1993, 1994, 1995; usgovernmentspending.com, n.d.) 
It is evident in the first five years of the UGV program that the schedule for each 
program slipped further into the future than was originally planned. The challenge for 
program managers is the program budget can change from year to year and a reduction in 
funding to a program could result in an adjustment to the schedule, further into the future 
when funding is cut. The funding charts depict the unpredictable nature of funding each 
year, with the exception of the TUGV program, which increases funding each year, 
though its schedule slips further into the future. This leads into the final point to consider: 
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unmanned technology is new and complex and far from a mature technology. Schedules 
can easily slip when technology is not developed at the rate that was expected. 
Technology also does not develop at the expected rate when funding for R&D is cut. This 
is a concept that can affect any DOD program, especially when the technology is cutting 
edge and immature. 
B. 1996 MASTER PLAN THROUGH 2000 MASTER PLAN 
In Section B, the research identifies each UGV program mentioned in the master 
plans from 1996 to 2000, and conducts a comparative analysis of the schedule and 
funding of each program. The purpose of the research is to identify adjustments to the 
overall schedule and funding while examining program growth in terms of new systems 
and UGV program funding. The section concludes with an analysis of schedule and 
funding from 1996 to 2000 on programs that continued through the years observed. 
1. 1996 Unmanned Ground Vehicle Master Plan 
From 1995 to 1996 no new programs were added, but the DEMO II program was 
concluded with the results explained in greater detail later in this section. At this time, 
U.S. forces were also deployed to Bosnia and the need for unmanned mine clearance 
became a requirement that the UGV program was able to fulfill. The VTC program 
quickly elevated in status as this capability proved its effectiveness in real world 
situations. The TUGV program dropped the letter G from its name, and it is now referred 
to as the tactical unmanned vehicle (TUV) in this master plan. The requirements that led 
to the solution for that year is shown in Table 13. 
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Develop & Field family of UGVS for range of military applications IAW user requirements
Environmental Cleanup
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Firefighting, handling & loading of aircraft munitions, multiple UXO during clearing operations
Logistics
Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT)
Minefield Detection & Neutralization
NBC Detection and Laser Designation
Obstacle Detection
Physical Security
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA)
Remote Mine Clearance 
TUGV ‐ Supporting the Infantry
UXO Emerged
Threat/Conflict
Lessons learned in Bosnia 
UGV Solution
Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicle (TUGV) renamed Tactical Unmanned Vehicle (TUV)
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA)
NBC Detection and Laser Designation
Robitic Evacuation Vehicle(Rev) (renamed from RRR)
Runway Repair (fix holes, remove debris,safe removal of personnel and hazardous areas)
Remote Ordnance Neutralization Device (ROND)/Remote Ordnance Neutralization System(RONS)(Initiated 1990)
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Mobile Detection Assessment Response System ‐ Interior/Exterior (MDARS‐I/E) (Initiated 1992)
Reduce manpower by patrolling exterior of buildings and compounds in day, night, hot, cold, wet & dry conditions
Added security inside military facilities such as large warehouses and depots
Vehicle Teleoperation Capability (VTC) (Initiated 1993) (renamed from EVTC)
Remote Mine Clearance 
Breaching
Environmental Cleanup
Joint Architecture for Unmanned Ground Systems (JAUGS) (Initiated 1995) 
Develop common hardware/software open achitecture to ensure intraoperability (vehicle to vehicle)
Interoperability (data communications in command, control, communications, computers & intel (C4I) result in cost savings
Unmanned Ground Vehicle Technology Enhancement and Exploitation (UGVTEE)
*Unmanned mine clearance became requirement from lessons learned in Bosnia (focus on TUV program)
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Even though the UGV program did not add any new projects, there were some 
notable changes to the overall program schedule. Figure 64 compares the 1995 UGV 
master plan schedule to the 1996 schedule. The TUV schedule had minimal changes, 
with only Milestone II shifting about one quarter further into the future. All other UGV 
programs experienced significant schedule shifts in the past year. The most noteworthy 
shift is the VTC program moving several milestones ahead of the previously planned 
schedules. This is in response to the conflict in Bosnia and demand for unmanned mine 
clearance support. The RONS, REVS, and MDARS-I/E programs all experienced shifts 




Figure 64.  1995 UGV Program Master Schedule Compared to the 1996 UGV 
Program Master Schedule (from DOD, 1995, 1996) 
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The change in funding from 1995 to 1996 for all key programs tracked and 
funded by OSD and the services is shown in Table 14. The TUV program funding is up 
for the current year, FY96, but then it declines from FY97 to FY01, deviating from what 
was previously planned. This is likely tied to the increased funding for the VTC program 
that is gaining momentum based on the situation in Bosnia. VTC funding almost doubles 
each year from FY96 to FY01. OSD funding for this program was set to expire in FY98 
according to the 1995 master plan, but this has since been extended to FY02. There are 
minor changes to the REVS and RONS funding compared to what was planned the year 
prior, and this information is covered in greater detail in each program’s respective 
section. 
Table 14.   Funding for ASD Programs in 1995 Compared to Funding for 




a. TUGV/TUV from 1995 to 1996 
In years prior, the TUV program was composed of multiple UGV systems. This 
group of systems has been reduced, and the primary focus lies within the surveillance and 
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assessment robot for GI enhancement (SARGE), the tactical test bed (TTB), HMMWVs, 
and the Gecko. In the past year, five SARGE vehicles were delivered to 3rd Infantry 
Division at Fort Benning, GA for user familiarization and evaluation. The Gecko 
demonstrated its ability to conduct remote reconnaissance at a military operations in 
urban terrain (MOUT) village (DOD, 1996). When the systems were delivered, key 
personnel were trained on the functionality of the systems. Key personnel then 
recommended possible implementation methods of the systems within the force. The 
systems were then utilized by Soldiers conducting training operations with feedback 
utilized for system improvements and requirements refinement. 
The 1996 master plan states to expect requirements from the armor and artillery 
communities in the near future (DOD, 1996). At face value, it appears that the role of the 
TUV expanded beyond the infantry community to the armor and artillery branches as a 
system designated for infantry RSTA. However, in its current state, it seems difficult to 
determine if the TUV is received well by the infantry community, and the technology 
may see a shift to other areas of the Army.  
Figure 65 depicts the 1996 TUV schedule planned through FY99. On January 26, 
1996, the TUV achieved Milestone I. Milestone II has shifted about one quarter further 
into the future, but EMD has moved almost two years into the future from what was 
planned last year. 
 
Figure 65.  1996 TUV Program Schedule (from DOD, 1996) 
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As mentioned earlier, the planned funding of the TUV program has decreased for 
all years except for the current year. It appears to be a common trend that TUV funding 
for the current year seems higher than what was planned the year prior. The TUV funding 
may see a decrease due to the increased need for the VTC in support of operations in 
Bosnia, or because the program is not meeting the needs of the users in the infantry 
community. This may also reflect a function of operating in a period of time when the 
DOD budget shows reduction and unpredictability. UGV program funding compared to 
DOD funding is presented in this paper to analyze funding trends of the program against 
the big picture funding of the military at large. 
b. RONS from 1994 to 1996 
In the past year, the RONS program completed developmental testing of the 
program’s advanced development model (ADM). The RONS program schedule changes 
from 1994 to 1996 is shown in Figure 66. The Milestone II decision shifts about nine 
months into the future from what was planned the year prior. In preparation of Milestone 
II, a study conducted to determine further development of the system’s ADM will cease 
with upgrades focused on the system’s remote control transporter currently fielded with 
the units (DOD, 1996). While Milestone II was delayed, Milestone III and the 
Operational Evaluation were shifted to occur about one year earlier from what was 
planned in 1995. DT&E is also predicted to occur earlier than last year’s plan. These 
shifts in the RONS program schedule are interesting because this is essentially what the 





Figure 66.  Changes to RONS Program Schedule from 1994 to 1996  
(from DOD, 1994, 1995, 1996) 
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c. REVS from 1995 to 1996 
Since the last report, the REVS program has made some notable progress. 
Obstacle avoidance technology that was developed in the DEMO II program was 
completed and currently incorporated into the REVS program. Also, an automated 
ordnance excavator (AOE) used in a live demonstration successfully found buried UXO, 
dug up the UXO, and removed the UXO from active military ranges (DOD, 1996). As 
mentioned in the 1995 section, the REVS is a technology that is sought after by industry 
since many contractors play a significant role in the removal of UXO from locations 
previously used as ranges by the U.S. military. Based on this demonstration, the first 
stage of technology transfer to industry appears ready to occur. 
Figure 67 is the 1996 REVS program schedule. In the REVS schedule presented 
in 1995, Milestone I/II were easy to distinguish on the schedule, but is not very 
prominent on the 1996 schedule. It has either shifted so far into the future, beyond FY00, 
or it is depicted as the MCM ACTD triangle on this schedule and has shifted about one 
year into the future from what was previously planned. The live site demonstrations have 
been extended an additional two years on the 1996 schedule and the REVS test, analyze 
and fix portion has been extended by one year. Lastly, the transition of REVS technology 
has slipped one year further into the future in one year’s time. 
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Figure 67.  1996 REVS Program Schedule (from DOD, 1996) 
d. VTC from 1995 to 1996 
Of all UGV programs, the VTC program seems to have made the largest impact 
in the past year due to the operations in Bosnia. First, the program achieved Milestone 0 
in July 1996. Second, variants of the VTC system developed by the UGV/S JPO and the 
Office of Science and Technology for Special Operations Forces were fitted to M-60 
turretless tanks, and successfully used in countermine operations in Bosnia. Lastly, a 
VTC variant for the HMMWV was built, demonstrated, and delivered to support the 
Program Manager of Mine, Countermine, and Demolitions (MCD; DOD, 1996). This 
appears as a huge success story for UGVs. The VTC also successfully accomplished its 
mission in Bosnia, as the UGVs detonated several mines during clearance operations. 
During these missions, the operator was located in a separate vehicle unexposed to 
danger when the mines detonated. The biggest challenge remains the limited number of 
VTCs available to units deployed in Bosnia. 
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The VTC program schedule in 1996 compared to the schedule in 1995 is shown in 
Figure 68. The key take away is that the Milestone I/II decision and EMD phase has 
moved almost one year ahead of where it was planned in 1995. The Milestone III 
decision has moved ahead by about two years. The use of this system in Bosnia appears 
to serve as the driving force behind the push to complete the schedule faster than planned 
and could also explain more funding allocation planned for the VTC program. 
 
 
Figure 68.  1995 VTC Program Schedule Compared to 1996 VTC Program 
Schedule (from DOD, 1995, 1996) 
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e. DEMO II from 1995 to 1996 
DEMO C and DEMO II successfully concluded as planned in June 1996. This 
program successfully demonstrated various technology advancements that support the 
evolutionary development of UGVs and the technology transfer envisioned at the 
beginning of the program.  
DEMO II demonstrated the potential operational value of an integrated set 
of technologies for a UGV scout that increases the survivability of forces 
engaged in high risk missions, provides commanders with new tactical 
options, and allows effective integration into the manned force structure. 
(DOD, 1996, p. 30)  
One of the major goals following this program is the transference of this 
technology to users in the military and civil sector for various uses. The DEMO I and II 
programs were the biggest contributor to the technology development seen throughout 
the UGV program and this aggressive schedule forced innovation beyond current 
availability. 
While highly autonomous operations have not reached achievement to date and it 
is difficult to say when this may occur, enormous strides in supervised autonomous 
operations have resulted. The DEMO II program made a key decision to involve Soldiers 
in a live training demonstration, which was key to stimulating the user for further 
operational uses and to refine requirements. Several developments from this program 
have been transferred to the various UGV programs mentioned in the previous sections 
and this technology continues to mature. The document refers to the technology 
development and transfer as the unmanned ground vehicle technology enhancement and 
exploitation (UGVTEE) program. This is the continuation of the DEMO I and II 
programs and is the next logical step for continued technology development. “The 
UGVTEE program for the next five years entails three integrated thrusts: concerted 
technology development and transfer, next-generation unmanned vehicle platform 
integration and demonstration, and near-term JPO technology insertion” (DOD, 1996, 
p. 35). The aggressive DEMO II program served as a forcing function that delivered 
results. It made sense for another developmental program with an aggressive time line to 
emerge with hopes of achieving further technology gains. 
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f. MDARS-I/E from 1995 to 1996 
In the past year, the MDARS-E prototype vehicle was developed and successfully 
completed its demonstration. Additionally, this program completed what is called a 
concept formulation package, which consists of tradeoff determination (TOD), tradeoff 
analysis (TOA), best technical approach (BTA), and cost and operation effectiveness 
analysis (COEA; DOD, 1996). Little is known about the funding of this program, and the 
amount of units procured has not appeared in the last few master plans. 
The 1996 MDARS-I schedule compared to what was presented in 1995 is shown 
in Figure 69. The schedule seems to slip further into the future each year that a new 
schedule is presented. In the past year, Milestones II and III have each shifted about six 
months to one year further into the future. This effects other portions of the schedule as 
well as the contract award, EMD, and production are also moved further into the future 




Figure 69.  MDARS-I Program Schedule from 1995 Compared to MDARS-I 
Program Schedule from 1996 (from DOD, 1995, 1996) 
The situation is almost identical for the MDARS-E schedule which is presented in 
Figure 70. Milestones II, III, contract award, EMD, and production have all shifted 




Figure 70.  1995 MDARS-E Program Schedule Compared to 1996 MDARS-E 
Program Schedule (from DOD, 1995, 1996) 
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Even though the MDARS-I/E schedule shows signs of slipping into the future, the 
value of such a system receives attention by not only the military, but also the 
government and the civil sector. There are valuable uses for this technology outside of 
the military that could lead to a larger research and development effort, nationally and 
globally.  
The MDARS program has major dual-use potential both for other 
Government agencies and for commercial use. The DOE has expressed an 
interest in both the MDARS-I and MSARS-E. J.C. Penney and Glaxo 
Pharmaceuticals are currently implementing an inventory control 
capability using MDARS-I. (DOD, 1996, p. 29)  
This is an interesting development particularly from the standpoint of R&D. As 
more corporations see the value of unmanned systems, the R&D funding pool grows and 
creates opportunities for advanced technology maturation or breakthroughs. The more 
that UGVs are accepted and implemented, the more attention the development of 
technology receives and this leads to a virtuous development cycle. 
g. JAUGS from 1995 to 1996 
In last year’s master plan, a one-year joint architecture for unmanned ground 
systems (JAUGS) schedule was presented. Although an updated and refined version was 
expected in this year’s plan, the JAUGS program schedule does not appear in this master 
plan and is only briefly discussed. The plan states that a working group developed the 
initial requirements for the JAUGS program and an additional group worked with 
industry partners to gain feedback and recommendations related to JAUGS architecture 
and requirements (DOD, 1996). There is not a formidable plan presented for the future of 
JAUGS, so JAUGS significance seems difficult to assess at this time. 
h. Conclusion 
Prior to this master plan, there had not been an opportunity to utilize UGVs in a 
combat situation. The conflict in Bosnia served as the first opportunity for the UGV 
program to prove its worth in real-world situations. This is likely what reshaped the 
funding of the TUV program, which was the main effort of the UGV program. The VTC 
schedule also changed to achieve the program’s milestones at a faster pace and further 
 112
monitoring of funding and schedules conducted indicated how program priorities can 
change during times of conflict compared to what was planned prior to the conflict. 
The conclusion of DEMO II marks the end of a well-structured and aggressive 
technology development program with measurable and significant advancements since 
DEMO I. Programs of a similar nature are the key to the UGV program’s future success. 
2. 2000 Joint Robotics Master Plan 
During the data collection portion of this project, no master plans from 1997, 
1998, and 1999 could be found. When the FY00 master plan was found, the name of the 
plan was changed from unmanned ground vehicle master plan to joint robotics program 
(JRP) master plan. The requirements that led to the solution for that year is shown in 
Table 15. 
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Develop & Field family of UGVS for range of military applications IAW user requirements
Environmental Cleanup
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Firefighting, handling & loading of aircraft munitions, multiple UXO during clearing operations
Logistics
Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT)
Minefield Detection & Neutralization
NBC Detection and Laser Designation
Obstacle Detection
Physical Security
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA)
Remote Mine Clearance 
Small, lightweight, man‐portable UGV to be used for Recon urban environment & other terrain (Infantry/Armor)
TUGV ‐ Supporting the Infantry
UXO
Threat/Conflict
Unmanned mine clearance, lessons learned in Bosnia and Kosovo (peacekeeping mission)
UGV Solution
Tactical Unmanned Vehicle (TUV) renamed Family of Tactical Unmanned Vehicles (FTUV)
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA)
NBC Detection and Laser Designation
Robitic Evacuation Vehicle(Rev) renamed Robotic Ordnance Clearing System (ROCS) 
Runway Repair (fix holes, remove debris,safe removal of personnel and hazardous areas)
     ‐ All‐Purpose Robotic Transport System (ARTS) ‐ clear paths on ranges or minefields (ARTS‐FP)‐ clearance of large UXO or potential IEDs
     ‐ Active Range Ordnance Mapping System (AROMS)
     ‐ Automated Ordnance Excavator (AOE) (1996)
Remote Ordnance Neutralization System(RONS)(Initiated 1990)(renamed from Remote Ordnance Neutralization Device (ROND)
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Basic UXO Gathering System (BUGS) (initiated 2000) (RONS+FUTV+REVS)
Part of the RONS program salvaged and merged with parts from the REVS and TUV to create BUGS
man‐portable, EOD support UGV. 
Mobile Detection Assessment Response System ‐ Interior/Exterior (MDARS‐I/E) (Initiated 1992)
Reduce manpower by patrolling exterior of buildings and compounds in day, night, hot, cold, wet & dry conditions
Added security inside military facilities such as large warehouses and depots
Vehicle Teleoperation Capability (VTC) (Initiated 1993) renamed Vehicle Teleoperation (VT) Program
Remote Mine Clearance 
Breaching
Environmental Cleanup
Joint Architecture for Unmanned Ground Systems (JAUGS) (Initiated 1995) 
Develop common hardware/software open achitecture to ensure intraoperability (vehicle to vehicle)
Interoperability (data communications in command, control, communications, computers & intel (C4I) result in cost savings
Robotic Combat Support System (RCSS) (initiated 2000) (REVS + VT)
Unmanned Ground Vehicle Technology Enhancement and Exploitation (UGVTEE)
*Small robots being tested and experimented to determine usefullness to the warfighter. Concept mixed parts of RONS and appears to be 
beginning of Packbot and Talon Robitic systems
**Groups of UGVs by class & size is reintroduced: very small (bug size) platforms, man‐portable, medium, and full size robotic vehicles
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In just a few short years, many significant changes to the overall program occurred 
and deserve greater attention in this section. Some of the most notable changes include the 
naming convention of the system programs. The programs shown in Figure 71 display how 
the names have changed and evolved over the past three years. The corresponding program 
in 2000 is directly across from its predecessor in 1996. New programs are listed in Figure 
71. The TUV program is now the family of tactical unmanned vehicles (FTUV). Parts of 
the RONS program were salvaged and merged with parts from the REVS and TUV 
programs to create the basic UXO gathering system (BUGS) program. The REVS program 
still exists as it was and is now called robotic ordnance clearing system (ROCS). The VTC 
program is now the vehicle Teleoperation (VT) program. There is also the emergence of a 
new program called robotic combat support system (RCSS), which appears to have evolved 
from REVS and VTC technology. 
 
Figure 71.  Program Names from 1996 to 2000 
The MDARS-I/E program is the only program that has not changed its name since 
program inception. Under the UGVTEE program, a new technology development 
program was created and it is called DEMO III. Ideally, this program delivers results that 
are as impactful as the DEMO II program. 
The change to the master schedule for all programs from 1996 to 2000 is shown 
in Figure 72. Generally, all schedules have slipped further into the future compared to 
what was planned in 1996. The MDARS-I is now added to the schedule for the first time 
to accompany the MDARS-E program. Most notable is the fact that the FTUV does not 




Figure 72.  1996 UGV Master Schedule Compared to 2000 UGV Master 
Schedule (from DOD, 1996, 2000) 
 116
Table 16 compares the program funding changes from 1996 to 2000. For the most 
part, all programs have increased funding, with the FTUV receiving less funding than 
originally planned. MDARS funding is also visible for the first time in a master plan. 
Table 16.   1996 UGV Program Funding Compared to 2000 UGV Program 





a. TUV/FTUV from 1996 to 2000 
In previous master plans, the family of tactical unmanned vehicles (FTUV) 
received the main focus of unmanned ground programs, but this appears to have shifted 
in the latest master plan. Information on the FTUV appears limited and shows no sign of 
a schedule for this program anywhere in the plan. The overall funding to this program 
also shows drastic cuts, down to a mere $2 million in FY99. In 1996, over $10 million of 
funding was allocated for this program. Basically, all funding planned in 1996 is 
significantly lower for FTUV in 2000. 
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One interesting point raised in the 2000 JRP master plan identifies the 
consideration of a requirement by the infantry and armor schools, for a small, 
lightweight, man-portable UGV used for reconnaissance missions in urban environments 
and in other terrain (DOD, 2000). These small robots are being tested and experimented 
on to determine their usefulness to the warfighter. This concept mixed with parts of the 
RONS program appears to reflect the beginning of how the PackBot and Talon robotic 
systems became the systems known today. 
Under the FTUV program, the SARGE system remains the vehicle of choice. The 
master plan describes SARGE as a platform that is useful for testing new ideas and 
configurations while serving as the system that allows for modularity in support of future 
improvements (DOD, 2000). This system has been the primary system for many years 
and does support the evolutionary strategy associated with the overall UGV program 
strategy. 
The last point worth mentioning with the FTUV program is that the program is 
considering a change to the structure of the FTUV program. This idea to group UGVs by 
class or size has been seen before as the master plan describes “a family of TUVs that 
may include very small (bug size) platforms, man-portable versions, and medium to full 
size (e.g., M-1 tanks) robotic vehicles” (DOD, 2000, p. 23). A similar class convention 
has been done before and was abandoned by the program office. There is value to having 
distinct classes and sizes to the UGVs, but there is also a point when so many changes 
can lead to confusion and could possibly be detrimental to a program. A class size by 
weight to the overall UGV program seems the most appropriate choice to promote 
consistency or standardization throughout all services. 
b. REVS/ROCS from 1996 to 2000 
In the 2000 master plan, each program under ROCS is clearly delineated and 
explained. It is now understood that ROCS is a significant program with three separate 
programs under this listing. “The robotic ordnance clearing system (ROCS) program is 
currently composed of the following developments: the all-purpose robotic transport 
system (ARTS), the active range ordnance mapping system (AROMS), and the 
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automated ordnance excavator (AOE)” (DOD, 2000, p. 28). Overall, the systems in the 
program remain quite similar but signs of advancement do exist. The AOE served as one 
of the featured systems in the 1996 master plan. As the capabilities that make up the 
AROMS were in exploration in the earlier master plan, it can now be seen how they have 
come to fruition in a specific system. 
The ARTS while not a formally named system in 1996 yielded developed named 
programs. The ARTS is broken up into two different systems with capabilities discussed 
in the past. The ARTS/active range clearance (ARC) model is designed to clear paths on 
ranges or mine fields so that EOD personnel can safely travel after the UGV clears. The 
ARTS/force protection (F-P) is for more focused clearance of large UXO or potential 
IEDs. The system can also be remotely operated from up to 5 km away and multiple tools 
can be affixed to the system to accomplish a variety of tasks. The 2000 master plan states 
that the ARTS is currently being procured and fielded. Thirteen ARTS/F-P units and Five 
ATRS/ARC units have been fielded at various locations around the globe (DOD, 2000). 
This is a sign of the success, demand and usefulness of this program.  
The 1996 schedule for the REVS and ROCS (seen in Figure 73) programs were 
not very informative and did not specify program milestones. The ROCS schedule clearly 
displays each system and the intended outcomes, but the big picture status of the overall 
program is difficult to determine. Table 17 compares the funding that was planned for the 
REVS program in 1996 against what is planned for the ROCS program in 2000. The 
funding appears to have stayed on track, with very small changes overall from what was 
planned a few years ago. The schedule depicts accomplishments that align with delivery 





Figure 73.  1996 REVS Schedule Compared to 2000 ROCS Schedule  
(from DOD, 1996, 2000) 
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Table 17.   1996 REVS Funding Compared to 2000 ROCS Funding  





c. VTC/VT from 1996 to 2000 
The vehicle teleoperation (VT) program, classified as a non-major acquisition 
program according to the master plan, still appears to be the top UGV program overall. 
According to the 2000 document, this program is on an accelerated time line. It has 
accelerated due to combat experience in Bosnia, which allowed the technology to quickly 
mature and support technology development for multiple platforms simultaneously. 
These platforms include HMMWVs, M1 tanks, M60 tanks and D7Gs (DOD, 2000). The 
latest platforms under consideration for this application belong to the engineer family of 
clearance vehicles. These vehicles include the T3 bulldozers, the DEUCE and M9 ACE 
earth movers. 
While the 2000 joint robotics program master plan (JRPMP) describes this as a 
program with an accelerated schedule, a comparison of the 1996 to the 2000 plan shows 
that the schedule has slipped further into the future in the current plan. The comparison of 
the program schedules in the years mentioned is shown in Figure 74. The small business 
innovative research (SBIR) was broken into three phases in 1996 with Phase 3 
concluding in FY98. In the 2000 master plan, Phase 2 was extended into FY98, and 
Phase 3 has been extended to the end of the planned schedule out to FY01. Milestone I/II 
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did occur in 1997 as it was planned in 1996, but in the 1996 plan, Milestone III was 




Figure 74.  1996 VTC Schedule Compared to 2000 VT Schedule  




Table 18 compares the funding planned in the 1996 master plan against what was 
planned in the 2000 master plan. The amounts planned for FY99 and FY00 in 1996 have 
actually doubled in the 2000 master plan. From FY01 and forward, the funding is aligned 
with what was planned in 1996, but it would not be surprising for these figures to 
increase as the year of execution draws near. Only JRP funding was considered in 2000 
because more detailed data about program funding was not available in the 1996 master 
plan. 





Overall, the VT program is delivering products with results that can be measured. 
This system is proven in combat which makes it more attractive to other platforms that 
the services use. At this point, the system requires an operator to control it from another 
vehicle, but building upon this to a more semiautonomous and autonomous role is 
expected. 
d. UGVTEE/DEMO III from 1996 to 2000 
In the 1996 master plan, the UGVTEE program concluded DEMO II was very 
successful in technology development for UGVs. The future schedule for the UGVTEE 
depicted the sole goal of continued technology maturation and transfer into systems 
within the program, particularly systems conducting reconnaissance in the FTUV 
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program. The 1996 master plan also stated goals under UGVTEE of night mobility, 
increased speeds on improved surfaces and over rough terrain, increased obstacle 
detection and avoidance, with the ultimate goal of achieving supervised autonomous 
operations (DOD, 1996). These are good intentions and a great follow up to the DEMO II 
program, but a more structured, aggressive technology development program was once 
again needed. The UGVTEE program schedule as depicted on the overall UGV schedule 




Figure 75.  1996 UGVTEE Schedule Compared to 2000 DEMO III Schedule 
(from DOD, 1996, 2000) 
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In 1996, there was dedicated funding to the UGVTEE program presented in the 
master plan, but it is not tied to a visible timetable with milestones. The DEMO III 
funding presented in the 2000 master plan is shown in Table 19. The Army has been 
designated as the responsible service for the DEMO III program, which is why the JRP 
funding expires in FY01 and the Army funding increases significantly for the remainder 
of the program. The new schedule and dedicated funding provide the structure necessary 
to force aggressive developments for this complicated technology. 
Table 19.   DEMO III Funding (from DOD, 2000) 
 
 
“Demo III is a multiyear program designed to develop, assess, and demonstrate 
new robotic technologies and address specific troop-identified operational limitations” 
(DOD, 2000, p. 43). The DOD and industry contractors have developed four 
experimental unmanned vehicles (XUV) that will serve as the program’s test bed 
platforms. The XUV is shown in Figure 76. These vehicles will undergo annual test and 
evaluation by engineers and ultimately, a culminating six-month user appraisal will 
conclude the DEMO III program in 2002. The users will provide constant feedback to 
allow for continued improvements to the technology. This also requires the vehicles to be 




Figure 76.  XUV Picture (from DOD, 2002) 
DEMO III has three main goals.  
1) Cross-country maneuver over vegetated terrain at speeds of up to 20 
mph during daylight, 10 mph at night or in moderately inclement weather, 
and at speeds of up to 40 mph when driving on road. 2) Weight under 
2,500 pounds and be V-22 transportable. 3) Perform RSTA operations 
commensurate with the scout mission. (DOD, 2000, p. 45)  
The RSTA mission is considered to be one of the most complex military tasks and 
the most complicated task for a UGV to perform. Completion of these goals will be a 
lofty task with a large reward if achieved. 
Since there is a gap in the data collected for this project, DEMO III is already 
underway with DEMO IIIA completed in September 1999. Soldiers successfully operated 
two test bed XUVs in conjunction with manned scout vehicles. The focus of the exercise 
was on a vehicle operator’s ability to control semi-autonomous vehicles. The operators 
were able to plan and execute missions for two XUVs from a single unit interface. The 
vehicles also drove off-road at speeds up to 10 mph during daylight conditions (DOD, 
2000). There is still plenty of work ahead for this program, but early successes exist. It 
seems that the forced structure and aggressive goals have yielded the best results. 
Although there are failures in this program, the push to increase and mature technologies 
are quickly realized according to results presented in the master plan. 
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e. MDARS-I/E from 1996 to 2000 
Overall, the MDARS-I/E program appears to progress well and the program 
schedule has stabilized over the past few years. The highlighted tests accomplishments in 
the master plan include navigational path following, movement over various terrain 
types, security functions, and autonomous functions (DOD, 2000). The MDARS-I 
schedule from 1996 compared to the MDARS-I schedule from 2000 is shown in Figure 
77. Milestone II occurred as planned but Milestone III did shift one year further into the 
future. The 2000 master plan also includes the MDARS-I funding which was not present 
in the 1996 master plan. JRP funding for the program is planned to expire in FY01 when 
it will be continued by physical security equipment (PSE). The MDARS-I funding plan 




Figure 77.  1996 MDARS-I Schedule Compared to 2000 MDARS-I Schedule 
(from DOD, 1996, 2000) 
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Table 20.   MDARS-I Funding (from DOD, 2002) 
 
 
The MDARS-E program saw its Milestone II slip from FY99 in the 1996 plan to 
FY00 in the 2000 plan. Milestone III planned for FY01 in 1996 is now planned for FY02 
in the 2000 master plan. The slippage of schedule pushed the EMD contract award back 
by one year and has shifted production one year further into the future as well. This data 
is presented in Figure 78. Like the MDARS-I, the MDARS-E funding is presented in the 




Figure 78.  1996 MDARS-E Schedule Compared to 2000 MDARS-E Schedule 
(from DOD, 1996, 2000) 
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Table 21.   MDARS-E Funding (from DOD, 2002) 
 
 
The MDARS-I/E have successfully demonstrated their ability to patrol inside and 
outside of facilities, in an autonomous fashion. The environments are highly structured 
which makes autonomous operation possible, and while employing this technology 
autonomously in a dynamic and changing environment is still a far reach, there is a lot of 
potential. Technology development and maturation in DEMO III should assist with 
progressing to the next level. 
f. RONS + FTUV + REVS = BUGS from 1996 to 2000 
Basic UXO gathering system (BUGS) is a system developed from technologies of 
many other systems in the UGV program. Remote ordnance neutralization system 
(RONS) is probably the largest contributor to this program; it is a Navy-based program 
and its primary function is EOD based. The picture of the BUGS system which looks 
very similar to the RONS system from 1996 is shown in Figure 79. The off-road and 
autonomous capabilities of this system are derived from the FTUV program and the gains 
made in the desire to conduct the reconnaissance mission on any terrain. Lastly, the 
BUGS system gains technology from the robotic excavation vehicle system (REVS) 
program that was designed to search areas, identify, dig up, and remove UXO from 
ranges and mine fields. 
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Figure 79.  Picture of BUGS (from DOD, 2002) 
The BUGS system is a man-portable, EOD supported UGV.  
The system consists of a semiautonomous reconnaissance platform and 
several man-portable, expendable autonomous vehicles. The 
reconnaissance platform can detect and localize surface UXO and 
download information to small robots. The latter then goes to the target 
area location, performs a close-in search, reacquires the target, and 
performs BIP (Blow in Place) or PUCA (Pick Up and Carry Away) 
operations before proceeding to the next target. (DOD, 2000, p. 25)  
EOD operators then utilize one control unit and essentially release a swarm of 
BUGS to conduct reconnaissance of a large area. Once detected, the larger BUGS unit 
similar in appearance to the RONS will deploy to the UXO and neutralize the object. 
Although derived from many other programs and technologies, this is a brand 
new program with a basic schedule. The BUGS schedule with Milestone 0 planned for 
FY02 and Milestone I planned for FY04 is shown in Figure 80. Again, as a young 
program, it is still a concept at this time. The funding for the BUGS program which 
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consists of JRP funding primarily from FY99 to FY01, at which point the Navy assumes 
some funding responsibility from FY01 through FY05 is shown in Table 22. 
 
Figure 80.  Bugs Schedule (from DOD, 2002) 
Table 22.   BUGS Funding (from DOD, 2002) 
 
 
The 2000 master plan states that sensors stand as the biggest challenge for this 
program. “Detection of small UXOs and obstacles from a small inexpensive platform is 
challenging. Current efforts focus on collecting data on small, inexpensive sensors 
capable of meeting requirements” (DOD, 2000, p. 26). This further shows the overall 
technological challenges the UGV program faces as it places higher value on the DEMO 
III program and other technology advancement programs. If not realized, technological 
gains and many good ideas can fail to evolve into delivered systems. 
g. REVS + VT = RCSS from 1996 to 2000 
Although the robotic combat support system (RCSS) did not exist in the 1996 
master plan, it is technically viewed as a new program and appears to have developed 
from the VT and REVS programs. The mini-flail, a system referenced in 1996 in the 
vehicle teleoperation capability (VTC) program, is the main RCSS system discussed in 
the 2000 master plan. Other developments in the RCSS program call for larger vehicles 
with characteristics similar to vehicles previously mentioned in the REVS program. 
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Developed for use by SOF personnel, the mini-flail systems were successfully 
utilized in Bosnia to proof areas for anti-personnel mines as well as create lanes for 
dismounted troops and lightweight vehicles. The larger systems in the RCSS program 
that have REVS roots are expected to remove UXOs from large areas, clear airfields, 
assist with urban breaches and to clear lanes for dismounted personnel (DOD, 2000). 
The RCSS program schedule is shown in Figure 81. Because this is a new 
program that merged from other programs, it makes more sense to show this schedule 
independently. The RCSS funding planned for the 2000 master plan is shown in Table 
23. Interestingly, the overall program funding groups the VT and RCSS program together 
under Engineer UGVs as seen in Table 16. The master plan, however, breaks out the 
funding separately for each program with RCSS funding at about 15% of all Engineer 
UGVs funding. 
 
Figure 81.  RCS Schedule (from DOD, 2002) 
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The UGV master plans from 1997 to 1999 were unattainable for this project. In 
just a few short years, significant changes to the program occurred, particularly to the 
structure and naming convention of the programs. As technology developments and new 
requirements arise, new programs are created that stem from many other programs in the 
portfolio. 
For the most part, schedules slipped further into the future than planned in 1996. 
Funding plans also changed, especially toward programs deemed essential to offering 
Bosnian support. During this time, the operational environment continues to shape the 
priority of programs as seen as the VT and RCSS gain the most traction due to the 
capabilities they provide for warfighters in Bosnia. The creation of the DEMO III 
program is possibly the most significant addition to the program. Historically, the greatest 
gains appear to have come from DEMO I and DEMO II so much of the same is expected 
for this aggressive technology development program. 
3. Summary from 1996 to 2000 
The program funding presented in Figure 82 is based on planned funding from the 
1996 UGV master plan and 2000 JRP master plan. The most significant funding change 
is to the FTUV program as funding is slashed by more than 50% between FY99 and 
FY00. ROCS funding is generally stable in all years. The conflict in Bosnia and the 
demand for VT is reflected in the increase funding to this program in almost every year 
presented. The funding for RONS appears to increase substantially, but is based off 
service funding from the 1996 master plan, which is planned for system procurement for 
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each service. Funding for fielding is expected to be higher than funding for R&D. All 
other programs primarily show R&D funding. 
 
Figure 82.  UGV Program Funding Comparison 1996–2000  
(after DOD, 1996, 2000) 
a. FTUV from 1996 to 2000 
The 2000 JRPMP does not present a schedule for the FTUV so it is assumed that 
the schedule is unchanged since the last one presented in the 1996 UGVMP. The program 
appears to have fallen in priority as the war in Bosnia creates unexpected demands for 
other UGVs from the warfighter. In the 1996 master plan, funding for the FTUV was 
planned to be in excess of $10 million per year from FY98 to FY02. The actual funding 
presented in the 2000 master plan shows that the funding was cut drastically for this 
program. Without the 1997–1999 master plans, it is difficult to determine if the program 
actually received the amount of money shown in the 1996 master plan. The planned 
funding for FY99 was most likely impacted for the FTUV, since it is the first year when 
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VTC program funding rises significantly. The FTUV schedule change between 1996 and 
2000 is shown in Figure 83. The funding change in the same time period is shown in 
Figure 84. 
 
Figure 83.  FTUV Schedule Comparison 1996–2000 (after DOD, 1996, 2000) 
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Figure 84.  TUGV/FTUV Funding Comparison 1996–2000  
(after DOD, 1996, 2000) 
b. RONS from 1996 to 2000 
In the 1996 UGVMP, the RONS schedule depicted a planned Milestone III date in 
FY99 and was actually accomplished on schedule. At this point in time, the program is in 
initial operational capability (IOC) and full rate production is ongoing. Future 
information on this program is aimed at production quantity and improvements to the 
system fielded in future increments. As previously stated, the funding for RONS jumps 
significantly once it achieves Milestone III because individual services began 
procurement of RONS systems and is more expensive than the R&D portion of funding. 
The RONS schedule change between 1996 and 2000 is shown in Figure 85. The funding 




Figure 85.  ROND/RONS Schedule Comparison 1996–2000  
(after DOD, 1996, 2000) 
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Figure 86.  ROND/RONS Funding Comparison 1996–2000  
(after DOD, 1996, 2000) 
c. REVS/ROCS from 1996 to 2000 
As stated, REVS became ROCS between 1996 and 2000. Under ROCS four 
major systems are prevalent: ARTS/ARC, ARTS/F-P, AROMS, and AOE. The REVS 
and ROCS schedules presented in Figure 87 are more challenging to interpret, but it is 
determined that the ARTS system is a success under this program. Success is defined as 
delivered capability to the users in a timely manner. Based on the 1996 master plan, an 
assumption was made that Milestone III would occur in FY98. Through analysis of the 
2000 master plan, it is determined that the ARTS/ARC and ARTS/F-P achieved this 
milestone. The baseline is complete and prototype deliveries are depicted in the FY98 
and FY99 timeframe. From 1996 to 2000, the funding depicted in Figure 88 is relatively 
stable. This is interesting because the funding did not increase significantly with the 
production and delivery of systems to users like it did with the RONS program. This may 
mean that the system is inexpensive, or that it simply required a conversion of an already 
existing system. Funding under this program now includes production for ARTS variants 
and R&D for AROMS and AOE. 
 141
 
Figure 87.  RRR/REV/ROCS Schedule Comparison 1996–2000 (after DOD, 1996, 2000) 
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Figure 88.  RRR/REV/ROCS Funding Comparison 1996–2000  
(after DOD, 1996, 2000) 
d. VTC/VT from 1996 to 2000 
The VT program is interesting because it becomes the highest priority program 
from 1996 to 2000 due to the conflict in Bosnia. The funding for this program increases 
as more vehicles are outfitted with the technology to meet the warfighter’s needs. The 
vehicle performed well in combat and proved its value in a combat environment by 
reducing warfighter’s exposure to risk. However, the master plans discuss the need for 
schedules accelerate but instead the schedule slips. The VT schedule slip from 1996 to 
2000 is shown in Figure 89. Milestones I and II shift by less than a year but a significant 
shift in Milestone III in noted from FY98 to FY01. This is not indicative of high priority 
and full rate production on an accelerated time line. The VT funding changes between 
1996 and 2000 is shown in Figure 90. 
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Figure 89.  EVTC/VTC/VT Schedule Comparison 1996–2000 (after DOD, 1996, 2000) 
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Figure 90.  EVTC/VTC/VT Funding Comparison 1996–2000  
(after DOD, 1996, 2000) 
e. MDARS-E/I from 1996 to 2000 
Both the MDARS-E/I schedules experience slippage in multiple categories. The 
MDARS-E schedule is presented in Figure 91 and the MDARS-I schedule is displayed in 
Figure 92. For both programs, Milestones I, II and III shift one year further into the future 
than what was originally planned in 1996. Overall, this is not a huge schedule slip over a 
five-year period, compared to other program schedules. Based upon the information 
presented in 2000, production of this program should begin soon. MDARS funding is not 




Figure 91.  MDARS-E Schedule Comparison 1996–2000  
(after DOD, 1996, 2000) 
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Figure 92.  MDARS-I Schedule Comparison 1996–2000  
(after DOD, 1996, 2000) 
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The UGV program as a whole is on an interesting path. The FTUV, supposedly 
the premier program in the portfolio, has yet to produce a fielded system between 1991 
and 2000. However, the RONS EOD system and the ARTS/ARC and ARTS/F-P under 
the ROCS program quietly progress along and deliver fielded robots to users in the force. 
The VT program, which is designated as the key program due to the conflict in Bosnia 
does receive more funding, but the schedule shows milestone slippage. 
Overall, two of the systems covered in the summary achieved full rate production 
and it occurs in two unlikely and less glamorous programs in the master plans. 
Interestingly, both fielded systems have a very niche capability within the EOD 
community and among Engineers for range clearance. For the most part, these systems 
are also simply remotely controlled by operators. This further proves that fielding semi-
autonomous and fully autonomous systems is extremely difficult and likely far from 
reality anytime in the near future. Users appear comfortable with remote controlled 
UGVs and are a good way to push the technology into the force for future acceptance on 
a larger scale. The more these systems are seen among the force, the greater chance of 
pull factors that will help accelerate UGV implementation into further military 
applications. 
f. DOD and UGV Funding Comparison 1996–2000 
From 1996 to 2000, the DOD budget and UGS funding are almost aligned, 
meaning that if one raises the other rises and if one falls, the other falls. A comparison of 
the two budgets between 1996 and 2000 is shown in Figure 93. The correlation is 0.64, 
which indicates there is some correlation, but this is only a five-year measured period. 
This is a different observation when compared to the budgets from 1991 to 1995. Perhaps 
as the UGS program becomes more stable, it becomes a staple in the DOD budget and is 




Figure 93.  DOD and UGV Funding Comparison 1996–2000 (after DOD, 1996, 







C. 2001 MASTER PLAN THROUGH 2004 MASTER PLAN 
In Section C, the research identifies each UGV program mentioned in the master 
plans from 2001 to 2004, and conducts a comparative analysis of the schedule and 
funding of each program. The purpose of the research is to identify adjustments to the 
overall schedule and funding while examining program growth in terms of new systems 
and UGV program funding. The section concludes with an analysis of schedule and 
funding from 2001 to 2004 on programs that continued through the years observed. 
1. 2001 Joint Robotics Program Master Plan 
The 2001 JRPMP presents several changes to the naming conventions of 
programs that existed in the 2000 JRPMP, with three new programs added in the latest 
addition. The JAUGS program, once again presented in this master plan, was not 
mentioned in the 2000 master plan, and thought to be cancelled. The elimination of the 
DEMO III program remains the biggest surprise in this plan. While not directly addressed 
as cancelled, the program schedule and funding are not present. There are other 
technology advancement programs, but they are not a direct replacement or name change 
of DEMO III. Surprisingly, the FTUV program no longer exists in this master plan, and 
the program aimed at creating reconnaissance systems has been reduced to one system, 
and now an independent program, called the Gladiator. The Gladiator is later referred to 
as a tactical unmanned ground vehicle (TUGV). The requirements that led to the solution 
for that year is shown in Table 24. 
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Develop & Field family of UGVS for range of military applications IAW user requirements
Environmental Cleanup
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Firefighting, handling & loading of aircraft munitions, multiple UXO during clearing operations
Logistics
Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT)
Minefield Detection & Neutralization
NBC Detection and Laser Designation
Obstacle Detection
Physical Security
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA)
Remote Mine Clearance 
Small, lightweight, man‐portable UGV to be used for Recon urban environment & other terrain (Infantry/Armor)




Afghanistan ‐ Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF‐A)
Continued peacekeeping operations in the Balkins (Bosnia & Kosovo)
UGV Solution
Family of Tactical Unmanned Vehicles (FTUV) renamed Gladiator
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) small to medium sized, highly mobile UGV with capability to conduct scout
suveillance missions and to carry various mission payloads for a specific task. 
Robotic Ordnance Clearing System (ROCS) 
Runway Repair (fix holes, remove debris,safe removal of personnel and hazardous areas)
     ‐ All‐Purpose Robotic Transport System (ARTS) ‐ clear paths on ranges or minefields (ARTS‐FP)‐ clearance of large UXO or potential IEDs
     ‐ Active Range Ordnance Mapping System (AROMS)
     ‐ Automated Ordnance Excavator (AOE) (1996)
Remote Ordnance Neutralization System(RONS)(Initiated 1990)(renamed from Remote Ordnance Neutralization Device (ROND)
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Basic UXO Gathering System (BUGS) (initiated 2000) (RONS+FUTV+REVS)
Part of the RONS program salvaged and merged with parts from the REVS and TUV to create BUGS
man‐portable, EOD support UGV. 
Mobile Detection Assessment Response System ‐ Interior/Exterior (MDARS‐I/E) (Initiated 1992)
Reduce manpower by patrolling exterior of buildings and compounds in day, night, hot, cold, wet & dry conditions
Added security inside military facilities such as large warehouses and depots
Vehicle Teleoperation (VT) Program renamed Standardized Robotic System (SRS) 
Remote Mine Clearance 
Breaching
Environmental Cleanup
Joint Architecture for Unmanned Ground Systems (JAUGS) (Initiated 1995) 
Develop common hardware/software open achitecture to ensure intraoperability (vehicle to vehicle)
Interoperability (data communications in command, control, communications, computers & intel (C4I) result in cost savings
Robotic Combat Support System (RCSS) (initiated 2000) (REVS + VT)
Unmanned Ground Vehicle Technology Enhancement and Exploitation (UGVTEE) DEMO III CANCELED
Man‐Portable Robotic System (MPRS) (initiated 2001)
Tasks associated with MOUT (e.g., building clearing, tunnel and sewer rceconaissance, under vehicle inspection, and EOD operations.
     ‐ Light‐Weight Equipment Reconnaissance System (LERS); URBOT and Matilda
Robotic Acquisition through Virtual Environments & Networked Simulations (RAVENS) (initiated 2001)
Stakeholders can log onto a computer and participate in collaborative events
Intelligent Mobility Program (initiated 2001)
Improve UGVs ability to travers off‐road terrain
     ‐ T3 Vehicle & Omnidirectional Inspection System (ODIS)
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Figure 94 compares the 2000 JRP master schedule to the 2001 master schedule. 
For most of the programs that were present in last year’s plan, the schedules have slipped 
further into the future; this is covered in more detail later in this section. Table 25 
compares the 2000 master plan funding with the 2001 master plan funding for the overall 
UGV program. The changes in the funding are not drastic, but are analyzed in greater 
detail in each program’s respective section. 
 
Figure 94.  UGV Program Master Schedule (from DOD, 2001) 
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Table 25.   UGV Program Funding Table (from DOD, 2001) 
 
 
a. FTUV/Gladiator from 2000 to 2001 
As stated earlier, the FTUV program, while no longer represented in the 2001 
master plan, has been reduced to one system called the Gladiator, now a named program. 
“The Gladiator is a teleoperated/semi-autonomous, small to medium sized, highly mobile 
UGV with, initially, the basic capability to conduct scout/surveillance missions and to 
carry various mission payloads for specific tasks” (DOD, 2001, p. 21). Essentially, this is 
a continuation of the FTUV/TUGV program, but on a smaller scale, and with fewer test 
bed platforms. The document does acknowledge the SARGE and STV systems from the 
past and how they have led to the development of the Gladiator. 
The scout mission still remains a significant challenge for UGVs, and this has 
plagued the successful delivery of systems at full rate production. The hopes for this 
system are no different from past systems and will likely challenge the available 
technology. Ultimately, the Gladiator will do what a Marine can do with the expectation 
that the Gladiator can operate in day and night conditions across a variety of terrains, 
including the MOUT environment. The system is expected to conduct target acquisition, 
breaching, direct fire, reconnaissance, obscuration, counter sniper operations, and serve 
as a communications relay (DOD, 2001). These are challenging and lofty expectations for 
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any UGV system. Considering this is one of the longest ongoing concepts in the UGV 
realm, success is not expected at this point in time.  
While this is a new program, it is still a spinoff of the FTUV program. There was 
not an FTUV schedule in the 2000 master plan, so it seemed appropriate to compare the 
current Gladiator schedule with the last known TUV schedule which was presented in 
1996. Figure 95 compares the 1996 TUV schedule with the 2001 Gladiator schedule. If 
the Gladiator is a continuation of this program, then Milestone II/B has shifted about four 
years further into the future. Table 26 compares the 1996 TUV funding with the 2000 
FTUV funding and 2001 Gladiator funding. The funding for the new program is 
significantly lower, especially compared to what was programmed in 1996. This may be 
attributed to the growth in other programs in support of operations in Bosnia, or it could 
be related to the failure to achieve success in performing the scout mission. The TUV 
mission, considered the main effort at one point in time, now seems to slip further down 




Figure 95.  1996 TUV Schedule Compared to 2001 Gladiator Schedule (from 
DOD, 1996, 2001) 
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Table 26.   Comparison of 1996 TUV, 2000 FTUV and 2001 Gladiator 






b. ROCS/RACS from 2000 to 2001 
The 2001 master plan does an excellent job of breaking down this program into 
distinguishable parts. The JRP master schedule does not display the robotics for agile 
combat support (RACS) schedule because the program is really four separate systems, 
each with their own schedule and funding, and all focused on the removal of UXO and 
defeating IEDs. 
The RACS program is organized in four major activities: (1) development 
of the ARTS for UXO clearance and neutralization of large terrorist IEDs, 
(2) development and integration of advanced robotic technologies onto 
existing platforms, (3) development of an ARC system for explosive 
ordnance disposal on Air Force ranges, and (4) research and development 
for the next generation of EOD tools. (DOD, 2001, p. 33) 
While there is more detail and a clear breakdown of each system in the 2001 
master plan, the schedules presented still do not indicate milestones that are typical of 
most programs. This has been a consistent theme for this program over the past several 
years. The JRP master schedule in 2000 did display each system, but the funding for each 
system was lumped together. The schedule and funding for the 2000 ROCS program is 
displayed in Figure 60 and Table 10. 
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Overall, the funding for the RACS program is trending downward in future years, 
compared to what was planned in the 2000 master plan, but the amount is not very 
significant. It is not possible to compare system funding at this time, but it is possible in 
future master plans. 
The 2001 RACS schedule and funding does provide greater detail and insight into 
each system but, the naming convention of events on each system schedule has changed 
since the 2000 master plan, making it confusing and difficult to track the progress of the 
overall program and each system. Figure 96 and Table 27 depict the schedule and 
funding for the all-purpose robotic transport system (ARTS) system. Figure 97 and Table 
28 show the schedule and funding for the advanced robotic systems (ARS) systems. 
Figure 98 and Table 29 present the active range clearance (ARC) system schedule and 
funding. Lastly, Figure 99 and Table 30 show the schedule and funding for the next 
generation-force protection robotics system (NG-FPRS) system. 
 
Figure 96.  ARTS Schedule 2001 (from DOD, 2001) 
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Table 27.   ARTS Funding 2001 (from DOD, 2001) 
 
 
Figure 97.  ARS Schedule 2001 (from DOD, 2001) 




Figure 98.  ARC Schedule 2001 (from DOD, 2001) 
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Figure 99.  NG-FPRS Schedule 2001 (from DOD, 2001) 
Table 30.   NG-FPRS Funding 2001 (from DOD, 2001) 
 
 
c. VT/SRS from 2000 to 2001 
In the past year, the name of the VT program changed to standardized robotic 
system (SRS). The concept remains the same, vehicles with the SRS applique can be 
controlled through teleoperation with a remote control from another vehicle or the ability 
to employ semi-autonomous control if used on a pre-determined path. This program 
remains the main thrust of the UGV program. Ongoing maintenance and support also 
continues for M60 and M1 tanks in Bosnia and Kosovo with more Abrams nominated for 
this upgrade, but the numbers not presented. The SRS has also been installed for 
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operational testing on several engineer vehicles to include the interim vehicle-mounted 
mine detector (IVMMD), the Meerkat, the mine hunter/killer (MH/K) and an 
experimental version on the T3 bulldozer (DOD, 2000). The UGVs with SRS, 
particularly in Bosnia and Kosovo, continue to prove their value as several hundred 
mines are cited as being neutralized by these systems. Without the direct statement, it is 
assumed that this technology is greatly appreciated by service members as it removes 
them from direct harm during detonations. 
Figure 100 compares the 2000 VT schedule with the 2001 SRS schedule with 
Phase 3 of the program extended one year further into the future. Milestone III has shifted 
one year further to FY02, compared to FY01, in contradiction to what was planned in the 
2000 JRPMP. This move also sets back production by one whole year. Table 31 
compares the funding of the program from 2000 to 2001 with planned funding for this 
program reduced from the prior year’s plan. This is either a function of a declining 




Figure 100.  2000 VT Schedule Comparison to 2001 SRS Schedule  




Table 31.   2000 VT Funding Compared to 2001 SRS Funding  





d. MDARS-I/E from 2000 to 2001 
In the past year, “the MDARS-I pre-production prototype system was fabricated. 
The MDARS-E completed technical feasibility testing of the full system in a field 
environment. It also demonstrated technical feasibility of navigation, obstacle avoidance, 
intrusion detection, product inventory, and lock reading capabilities” (DOD, 2001, pp. 6–
7). The technological progress for this program each year was significant, but the 
schedule is constantly challenged possibly as a result of a declining budget that forces 
rescheduling or due to the challenges associated with this advanced technology. 
Figure 101 compares the MDARS-I schedule from 2000 to the 2001 schedule. 
Milestone III, which is the marker next to LRIP in the 2001 schedule has slipped from 
FY01 to FY02 also pushing back the system production. Table 32 compares the funding 
of MDARS-I from 2000 to 2001; interestingly, the funding increases in all years from 
what was planned in 2000. The program also receives JRP funding for two more years 
than previously planned. It also appears that the successful technology demonstrations 





Figure 101.  2000 MDARS-I Schedule Compared to 2001 MDARS-I Schedule 







Table 32.   2000 MDARS-I Funding Compared to 2001 MDARS-I Funding 





Figure 102 compares the 2000 MDARS-E schedule with the 2001 MDARS-E 
schedule. For just a one-year span, the schedule slippage is significant. Milestone I/II 
shifts one year into the future along with the EMD contract award and the EMD time 
period doubles from what was planned a year earlier. Most significant is the three-year 
shift further in time of Milestone III which was planned for FY02 in the 2000 JRPMP to 
FY05 in the 2001 JRPMP. Table 33, however, compares the funding for MDARS-E from 
2000 to 2001 and indicates that the program funding actually increases and also receives 




Figure 102.  2000 MDARS-E Schedule Compared to 2001 MDARS-E Schedule 
(from DOD, 2000, 2001) 
Table 33.   2000 MDARS-E Funding Compared to 2001 MDARS-E Funding 




e. BUGS from 2000 to 2001 
The 2001 JRPMP does a great job of explaining the BUGS program in greater 
detail, and it also presents some tangible results in autonomous operation for UGVs. 
Essentially there are two BUGS systems in development. The simpler of the two versions 
was produced and tested by the Navy to conduct random searches. One operator remains 
at a control unit and sends out seven vehicles to search randomly and autonomously 
within a given boundary, while avoiding obstacles and other vehicles. If a UXO is 
discovered, the system brings the UXO to a designated location. 
The second version of the system, produced by a contractor, is called a designated 
search system and is considered to be the more complicated version. Much like the Navy 
version, this system requires one operator at a control unit to deploy up to five vehicles to 
conduct autonomous clearance of a prescribed area. The key difference is that these 
robots build a dynamic UXO map of the searched area. 
While the robots do conduct autonomous operations, this can only exist in a 
structured environment. As the 2001 JRPMP states, “Full autonomy is the goal; truly 
autonomous robots operating purposefully in unstructured environments currently do not 
exist” (DOD, 2001, p. 31). Full autonomy is still very challenging, even after 10 years 
working on this technology. Even so, the fact that this technology has been successfully 
demonstrated is a large achievement and the results of this will carry forward to many 
other programs in a useful manner. 
Much like the other programs in this year, the schedule for BUGS shifts further 
than was planned the year prior. Figure 103 compares the 2000 schedule with the 2001 
BUGS schedule. In all other programs, the milestones were depicted as I, II, and III. This 
is also the first time that milestones are seen as letters. In the 2001 plan, Milestone A is 
planned for FY03 instead of FY02. Milestone B has shifted almost two years into the 
future from FY04 to FY06. Table 34 compares the funding from 2000 to 2001 and the 
overall program funding trends downward in future years compared to what was planned 




Figure 103.  2000 BUGS Schedule Compared to 2001 BUGS Schedule (from 
DOD, 2000, 2001) 
Table 34.   2000 BUGS Funding Compared to 2001 BUGS Funding (from 





f. RCSS from 2000 to 2001 
According to the 2001 JRPMP, the use of the mini-flail in the program’s success 
led to requirements that now exceed the system’s capabilities. “RCSS will replace the 
mini-flail’s anti-personnel (AP) mine neutralization capability and will also be capable of 
accepting other mission modules” (DOD, 2001, p. 4). Not much else is reported on this 
program in the past year. With the decision to produce a needed system to meet emerging 
requirements, a significant shift in the program schedule occurs. 
FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07
JRP 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.0 1.5 1.0 1.2
Navy 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.0 1.5 1.5
Total RDTE 1.1 1.5 1.4 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.5 2.7
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Figure 104 compares the RCSS schedule from 2000 to the 2001 RCSS schedule. 
Milestone A has shifted one year further into the future compared to what was planned 
last year. Milestones B, C, and production have all shifted two years further than what 
was planned in the 2000 JRPMP. The funding comparison of RCSS between 2000 and 
2001 is shown in Table 35. Overall funding has also been cut by about 50% and with no 
planned funding projected beyond FY02. 
 
 
Figure 104.  2000 RCSS Schedule Compared to 2001 RCSS Schedule (from 
DOD, 2000, 2001) 
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Table 35.   2000 RCSS Funding Compared to 2001 RCSS Funding (from 





g. MPRS 2001 
Man-portable robotic systems (MPRS) is one of the new programs in the 2001 
JRPMP. The document states that  
there is a rapidly growing interest in small, man-portable robotic systems 
to perform a variety of tasks that are high risk to humans. These include 
tasks associated with MOUT (e.g., building clearing, tunnel and sewer 
reconnaissance and under vehicle inspection), and EOD operations. 
(DOD, 2001, p. 23)  
There are two systems under the MPRS program, in a sub-program called light-
weight equipment reconnaissance system (LERS); URBOT and Matilda. These systems 
are intended to be carried individually by one Soldier, or disassembled by two Soldiers. 
They are expected to provide 4–12 hours of continuous operations and be semi-
autonomous (DOD, 2001). Both systems carry a host of cameras and sensors to give 
users visibility about what is going on at the site of investigation. 
The URBOT depicted in Figure 105 is a tracked vehicle with an OCU that the 
operator can wear as a backpack. It has a wire and control pendant coming from the pack 
that allows the operator to control the robot when within visible range. One key note is 
that the URBOT employs software architecture from the MDARS and JAUGS program. 
 169
 
Figure 105.  Picture of the URBOT System (from DOD, 2001) 
The Matilda system depicted in Figure 106 is also a tracked UGV with planned 
uses in an urban environment (inside and outside) and in field environments. “The system 
provides users with reconnaissance, surveillance, and under-vehicle inspection 
capabilities. The platform is also capable of carrying a variety of payloads and tools” 
(DOD, 2001, p. 25). The vehicle is controlled with an OCU that is stored in a case and 
requires the use of a joystick. 
 
Figure 106.  Picture of the Matilda System (from DOD, 2001) 
Figure 107 depicts the first LERS schedule with a time line of six years to achieve 
Milestone C. While certainly attainable, it is based on past performances of other 
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programs, with a schedule expected to slip further to the right over the next few years. 
The first round of funding for the MPRS program is shown in Table 36. Only three years 
of funding are planned at this time. The funding also appears to be relatively significant 
considering the size of the systems and the fact that they are using technology developed 
by other programs.  
 
Figure 107.  LERS Schedule 2001 (from DOD, 2001) 
Table 36.   MPRS Funding 2001 (from DOD, 2001) 
 
 
h. RAVENS 2001 
Robotic acquisition through virtual environments and networked simulations 
(RAVENS) is another new program in the 2001 JRPMP. In the most basic terms, 
RAVENS allow stakeholders to log onto a computer and participate in collaborative 
events to promote shared understanding of various UGV programs. “RAVENS provides 
members of the JRP, users, and developmental and operational test centers with a robust 
environment to conduct tests, experiments and analyses using a ‘stay at home’ concept” 
(DOD, 2001, p. 53). Figure 108 displays a theoretical model used to explain the concept 
of RAVENS. Figure 109 is a graphic that gives the reader an idea of what it is like to be 
logged into the RAVENS portal during a collaborative event. The funding for RAVENS 
is depicted in Table 37, as the overall funding table for all 2001 UGV programs. 
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Figure 108.  Model of the RAVENS Program 2001 (from DOD, 2001) 
 
Figure 109.  Graphical Depiction of RAVENS Concept (from DOD, 2001) 
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Table 37.   RAVENS Funding 2001 (from DOD, 2001) 
 
 
i. Intelligent Mobility Program 2001 
The intelligent mobility program is another new program in 2001 and it seems to 
have the closest relationship to DEMO III with perhaps a small remnant of that program. 
“The primary objective is to improve the intrinsic and operational mobility of UGVs 
through the development and demonstration of novel running gear configurations using 
intelligent control systems and artificial intelligence” (DOD, 2001, p. 49). The ultimate 
goal of this program is to improve UGVs ability to traverse off-road terrain. This 
program consists of two systems: the T3 vehicle and the omnidirectional inspection 
system (ODIS). 
As a test platform, the T3 is essentially different hardware components and 
software applications that can be plugged into the vehicle and played with to record the 
results and make corrections. Successful combinations can be used on other UGV 
platforms to see the effects and results. 
The ODIS’s primary purpose is to maintain a low profile and inspect under 
vehicles. This system has a military and civil application, particularly with police 
departments. Agencies or corporations where security is vital may also be good 
candidates for this technology. 
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There is no schedule for this program in the 2001 JRPMP, but there is a funding 
table which is displayed in Table 38. Funding for this program is planned for no less than 
$2 million in any year and is planned out through FY07. This is a significant amount of 
funding and the time frame is far off enough that significant results are expected. 
Table 38.   IMP Funding 2001 (from DOD, 2001) 
 
 
j. JAUGS 2001 
The JAUGS program was visible in previous master plans and there was a one-
year schedule for the JAUGS program in 1995. This is a JRP initiative to develop 
architecture for the UGV domain. “It is component-based, message-passing architecture 
that specifies data formats and methods of communicating among computer nodes” 
(DOD, 2001, p. 49). The goal of JAUGS is to ensure that there is open architecture in the 
UGV program. Each new technology must adhere to the Joint Technical Architecture for 
the long-run financial and technical benefit of the program. The JAUGS program does 
not have a schedule in the 2001 JRPMP but the funding table is depicted in Table 39. 
Funding is planned for threes at this point in time. The second version of the JAUGS 
standards was published in 2000 and more versions are expected as long as the program 
continues. 
Table 39.   JAUGS Funding 2001 (from DOD, 2001) 
 
 
k. RONS 2001 
The last time RONS appeared in a master plan was in 1996 when it was on 
schedule to achieve Milestone III in early FY99 and initial operational capability (IOC) 
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in late FY99. The 2001 JRPMP gives an update on RONS and shows that the program 
achieved Milestone III in 1999 and began full rate production. The system was deployed 
in support of operations in Kosovo for use by EOD personnel. The number of systems 
that have already been delivered to each service and the number of systems planned for 
each service is shown in Table 40. Table 41 depicts the RONS procurement funding by 
service and year. Figure 110 is a picture of what the system and control unit look like 
after production. 
Table 40.   RONS Systems Delivered and Planned 2001 (from DOD, 2001) 
 
 





Figure 110.  Picture of a Full Rate Production RONS System (from Project 
Manager Close Combat Systems, n.d.) 
Overall, this is a success story for UGV programs. This is the only one of two 
programs so far that has attained full rate production. The program appears to be on track 
for continued success and is likely the program to inspire the PackBot and Talon robots. 
In this master plan, the RONS system is called the MK 2 MOD 0 which is similar to the 
naming convention that the PackBot and Talon fall under today. 
2. 2003 Joint Robotics Program Master Plan 
During the data collection portion of this project, no document was found that 
covers the UGV program during the year 2002. The document may have been written, 
but it is not located with any agencies, where the other documents were collected. The 
2003 JRPMP is an interesting document because it has many new events to consider in 
conjunction with the program. The military continues to conduct operations in the 
Balkans and is engaged in the war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. The FCS program is 
directly mentioned in the document and plays a large role in several system programs and 
the overall direction of the UGV program. The requirements that led to the solution for 
that year is shown in Table 42. 
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Develop & Field family of UGVS for range of military applications IAW user requirements
Environmental Cleanup
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Firefighting, handling & loading of aircraft munitions, multiple UXO during clearing operations
Logistics
Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT)
Minefield Detection & Neutralization
NBC Detection and Laser Designation
Obstacle Detection
Physical Security
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA)
Remote Mine Clearance 
Small, lightweight, man‐portable UGV to be used for Recon urban environment & other terrain (Infantry/Armor)




Afghanistan ‐ Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF‐A)
Iraq ‐ Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (2003‐2012)
Continued peacekeeping operations in the Balkins (Bosnia & Kosovo)
UGV Solution
Family of Tactical Unmanned Vehicles (FTUV) renamed Gladiator
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) small to medium sized, highly mobile UGV with capability to conduct scout
suveillance missions and to carry various mission payloads for a specific task. 
Robotic Ordnance Clearing System (ROCS) 
Runway Repair (fix holes, remove debris,safe removal of personnel and hazardous areas)
     ‐ All‐Purpose Robotic Transport System (ARTS) ‐ clear paths on ranges or minefields (ARTS‐FP)‐ clearance of large UXO or potential IEDs
     ‐ Active Range Ordnance Mapping System (AROMS)
     ‐ Automated Ordnance Excavator (AOE) (1996)
Remote Ordnance Neutralization System(RONS)(Initiated 1990)(renamed from Remote Ordnance Neutralization Device (ROND)
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Basic UXO Gathering System (BUGS) (initiated 2000) (RONS+FUTV+REVS)
Part of the RONS program salvaged and merged with parts from the REVS and TUV to create BUGS
man‐portable, EOD support UGV. 
Mobile Detection Assessment Response System ‐ Interior/Exterior (MDARS‐I/E) (Initiated 1992)
Reduce manpower by patrolling exterior of buildings and compounds in day, night, hot, cold, wet & dry conditions
Added security inside military facilities such as large warehouses and depots
Vehicle Teleoperation (VT) Program renamed Standardized Robotic System (SRS) 
Remote Mine Clearance 
Breaching
Environmental Cleanup
Joint Architecture for Unmanned Ground Systems (JAUGS) (Initiated 1995) 
Develop common hardware/software open achitecture to ensure intraoperability (vehicle to vehicle)
Interoperability (data communications in command, control, communications, computers & intel (C4I) result in cost savings
Robotic Combat Support System (RCSS) (initiated 2000) (REVS + VT)
Unmanned Ground Vehicle Technology Enhancement and Exploitation (UGVTEE) DEMO III CANCELED 
Man‐Portable Robotic System (MPRS) (initiated 2001)
Tasks associated with MOUT (e.g., building clearing, tunnel and sewer rceconaissance, under vehicle inspection, and EOD operations.
     ‐ Light‐Weight Equipment Reconnaissance System (LERS); URBOT and Matilda
Robotic Acquisition through Virtual Environments & Networked Simulations (RAVENS) (initiated 2001)
Stakeholders can log onto a computer and participate in collaborative events
Intelligent Mobility Program (initiated 2001)
Improve UGVs ability to travers off‐road terrain
     ‐ T3 Vehicle & Omnidirectional Inspection System (ODIS)
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In FY03, Congress appropriated an additional $24 million in funding to the UGV 
program to “expeditiously test, produce, and field technologically mature robots and 
other unmanned vehicles for use in combat” (DOD, 2003, p. 10). The use of UGVs in the 
war on terror by service members has resulted in positive feedback and increased demand 
for more systems. The systems offer Soldiers the ability to search areas, conduct 
reconnaissance, and neutralize IEDs with standoff that significantly reduces risk.  
In the past few years, the UGV portfolio has grown significantly. Most of the 11 
programs reported in the 2001 JRPMP still remain in place and there are more new 
programs, bringing the total number to 13 programs in 2003. Another portion is likely 
related to the success of UGV programs like RONS and ARTS which are in full rate 
production and in the hands of end users. The demand for more systems is expected as 
more and more UGV systems are seen and utilized by warfighter users. 
In the latest master plan, the UGVs have been broken down by weight class. The 
classes include: small (light), small (medium), small (heavy), and large. Figure 111 is a 




Figure 111.  UGV Program Systems by Weight Class 2003 (from DOD, 2003) 
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Figure 112 compares the 2001 JRP Master Milestone Schedule with the 2003 JRP 
Master Milestone Schedule. Five of the programs that were active in 2001 have slipped 
further into the future than what was planned earlier. The MDARS-I program Milestone 
C has been moved ahead of schedule by two years. The combined operations battlefield 
robotics asset (COBRA) Milestone B moved ahead by one year but its Milestone C 
slipped right by one year. The RONS and ARTS systems are still in full rate production 
and all signs point to the program transitioning to sustainment. Six programs reveal their 
schedules for the first time, including JAUS, which was mentioned in 2000, but no 
schedule was presented. Table 43 compares the overall UGV program funding from 2001 
to 2003. All programs that were represented in the 2001 JRPMP see greater funding in 
FY02 compared to what was planned in 2001. For most programs listed in 2001, there 
was no planned funding for FY03. The funding that was planned for FY03 for MDARS-
E in 2001 has doubled and the RONS procurement funding has tripled. A new trend 
observed in this master plan is that funding for all programs is only listed for the year 
prior and the current year. A future years defense plan (FYDP) is not presented for any 
programs. There is no explanation for this change, but it may be possible that funding 




Figure 112.  2001 UGV Master Schedule Compared to 2003 UGV Master 
Schedule (from DOD, 2001, 2003) 
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Table 43.   2001 UGV Program Funding Compared to 2003 UGV Program 





a. Gladiator from 2001 to 2003 
The Gladiator is the USMC tactical unmanned vehicle (TUV) of choice and is a 
system that has evolved from lessons learned in the SARGE and STV system programs. 
The USMC believes that robotic technology has matured enough that this system can 
make significant contributions to the force. While the force may have a desire to utilize 
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this system, the overall robotic reconnaissance program has not yielded any fully fielded 
systems. This program has been in existence since the first master plan and systems 
continually change as schedules push further to the right. Figure 113 compares the 2001 
Gladiator schedule with the 2003 Gladiator schedule. In two years, the schedule has 
slipped significantly. The Milestones B and C decisions that were planned in 2001 have 
now shifted about one-and-a-half years further into the future in the new plan. FY03 
funding for this program was not planned in 2001, but there is $2.9 million of JRP 




Figure 113.  2001 Gladiator Schedule Compared to 2003 Gladiator Schedule 
(from DOD, 2001, 2003) 
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b. RACS from 2001 to 2003 
In the 2003 JRPMP, the robotics for agile combat support (RACS) program 
consists of four systems, each presented individually. The systems include ARTS, ARS, 
ARC, and remote detection, challenge, and response system (REDCAR). The all-purpose 
robotic transport system (ARTS) program is a carryover from previous master plans and 
this program is in full rate production. Through FY02, 42 operational ARTS have been 
fielded and there are another two systems that are designated for test purposes. There is a 
contract in place to acquire 20 more ARTS systems (DOD, 2003). Figure 114 depicts a 
schedule for all components of the program. Each component has its own milestones to 
achieve and there are a total of eight ongoing improvements in this schedule. The ARTS 
procurement that was planned in 2001 has increased in the 2003 plan. The ARTS 
program also consumes about 70% of the total RACS funding each year. 
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Figure 114.  ARTS Program Schedule 2003 (from DOD, 2003) 
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The active range clearance (ARC) is the second system program under the RACS 
program. This is also a carryover from the 2001 master plan and it was referred to as 
advanced ordnance excavator (AOE). The ARC is a program that has been in 
development for many years. It is basically a Caterpillar brand excavator that is designed 
to travel a target area, locate deep buried ordnance, dig up and move the ordnance to a 
safe location while the operator observes at a safe distance. “The development path for 
this technology is a four-step process: (1) automated digging; (2) independent boom/stick 
motion; (3) independent machine mobility, and (4) independent work planning and 
analysis” (DOD, 2003, p. 100). The fact that this development has been ongoing for so 
many years raises concern. It appears that this task is presented as a simple matter, but the 
technology is not mature enough to sufficiently complete the mission. Figure 115 
compares the 2001 ARC schedule with the 2003 ARC schedule. The 2003 schedule has 
Milestone A planned for 2004 and Milestone B in 2006. The funding for this program is 
challenging to pinpoint. In the 2001 master plan, there was specific funding for the AOE 
program, but the 2003 plan only shows RACS funding and ARTS funding. It is known 
that ARTS consumes about 70% of the program funds so the other 30% is shared 
between the ARC, ARS and REDCAR programs. The researchers’ assumption is that 




Figure 115.  2001 ARC Schedule Compared to 2003 ARC Schedule  
(from DOD, 2001, 2003) 
The advanced robotic system (ARS) is a program under RACS that was presented 
in the 2001 master plan. In the 2001 plan, this system was not explained very well but the 
2003 master plan does a good job of closing this gap. The primary effort of the ARS is to 
“develop common architecture designs for autonomous vehicle technologies that focus on 
vehicle mobility, speed, and control, as well as multi-vehicle operations and marsupial 
control” (DOD, 2003, p. 109). Based upon the language used in this document, it appears 
that the BUGS program, which was in the 2001 plan but not the 2003 plan, has been 
transferred into this program. “The Marsupial Control effort serves to extend the sensing 
and manipulation capabilities beyond what the larger vehicle can accomplish. Systems 
such as MATILDA, ANDROS, TALON, Mark VI, URBOT and other remotely operated 
platforms are being integrated onto the ARTS” (DOD, 2003, p. 110). Figure 116 presents 
a big picture overview of the Marsupial Control concept which basically allows one 
larger UGV to transport and control several smaller UGVs in a prescribed area. The 2001 
ARS schedule was not as developed as the 2003 schedule. Figure 117 compares the two 
schedules and the updated schedule now presents milestones; Milestone A is planned for 
2004 and Milestone B at the very end of 2007. Again, the funding for this program is 
unknown, much like the ARC program funding. 
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Figure 116.  Marsupial Concept 2003 (from DOD, 2003) 
 
 
Figure 117.  2001 ARS Schedule with 2003 ARS Schedule  
(from DOD, 2001, 2003) 
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In 2003, the remote detection, challenge, and response system (REDCAR) 
program is the latest edition to the RACS program. This is an Air Force program aimed at 
utilizing UGVs for force protection instead of humans. This program has characteristics 
similar to the MDARS-I/E program and the document states that technology is being 
shared with this program and the Gladiator program. “REDCAR will use at least three 
different robotic platforms: (1) a surveillance platform; (2) an engagement platform, and 
(3) a small-scale platform for limited access areas” (DOD, 2003, p. 105). This program 
seeks to augment or replace security personnel on Air Force installations and with units 
that may be forward deployed. The MDARS program appears to be successfully 
accomplishing the security task associated with the program, but the schedule does slip 
regularly. The REDCAR program should be able to achieve technical success, but the 
schedule and funding will likely be the challenge for this program. One other challenge 
will be with the engagement portion of the system as leaders are unlikely to give up 
decision making authority to a system at this point in time. Figure 118 is the first 
REDCAR schedule; Milestone A is planned for FY05 and Milestone B for FY07. 
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Figure 118.  REDCAR Program Schedule 2003 (from DOD, 2003) 
c. SRS/CRS from 2001 to 2003 
The SRS program name was changed to common robotic system (CRS) since the 
last JRPMP in 2001. The document states that the name change was executed to better 
align with and reflect the program’s acquisition strategy. This acquisition strategy is not 
presented, but the name has changed multiple times for this program, and perhaps this 
does offer an explanation to the numerous name changes in all UGV programs. The 
master plan does state that common robotic kits (CRKs) will be fielded and developed, 
but this is not a huge change from the word standardized associated with SRS. In the past 
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two years, all M60 Panther systems that were operational in Bosnia and Kosovo have 
been replaced by M1 Panther systems (DOD, 2003). Figure 119 compares the schedule 
between SRS in 2001 and CRS in 2003. A large slip can be seen in the schedule for 
Milestone C, from a planned date in late 2002 to late 2005. This is a two-and-a-half-year 
change to the schedule. Table 44 presents the funding comparison of the program 
between the 2001 and 2003 JPRMP. The JPR funding that was planned in 2001 has 
increased significantly in 2001, almost 100%; previously, Army funding was not planned 
for this program beyond FY00, but now Army funding for FY02 and FY03 is seen. The 
schedule appears to slip further to the right and the funding continues to increase before 




Figure 119.  2001 SRS Schedule Compared to 2003 CRS Schedule  




Table 44.   2001 SRS Funding Compared to 2003 CRS Funding  





d. MDARS-I/E from 2001 to 2003 
Since the last report, there have not been major changes or breakthroughs in this 
program, yet one piece of information emerged that was not presented in earlier editions. 
The MDARS system is expected to control a mix of 32 interior and exterior systems 
simultaneously. This is a large number of systems, and demonstrates the complexity and 
magnitude of this program. The MDARS name has not changed since its inception, and it 
continues with incremental developments, although the schedule does move further to the 
right almost every time this program is analyzed. In the last two years, the MDARS-I 
program conducted logistics demonstrations for inventory control in warehouses. The 
program also initiated preparatory steps for a Milestone C decision. Figure 120 compares 
the schedule for MDARS-I from 2001 to 2003 which shows Milestone C and LRIP 
shifting one year into the future compared to what was planned in 2001. The funding 
change for MDARS-I in the same period is shown in Table 45. The funding that was 
planned for FY02 in 2001 has decreased by about 85%, and the FY03 funding planned in 




Figure 120.  2001 MDARS-I Schedule Compared to 2003 MDARS-I Schedule 
(from DOD, 2001, 2003) 
Table 45.   2001 MDARS-I Funding Compared to 2003 MDARS-I Funding 






MDARS-E is on a different path than the interior system and is projected to 
achieve Milestone C later than its counterpart. In the past two years, the exterior system 
did award a contract to General Dynamics for system development and demonstration 
(SDD) and General Dynamics began production of the SDD prototype (DOD, 2003). 
Figure 121 compares the MDARS-E schedule from 2001 to the 2003 schedule and it can 
be seen that its planned Milestone C in FY05 has shifted to FY06 in the most recent 
JRPMP. The significant funding change for MDARS-E in the same period is shown in 
Table 46. The funding that was planned for FY02 in 2001 has increased by about 150%, 
and the FY03 funding planned in 2001 jumps by about 300%. 
 
 
Figure 121.  2001 MDARS-E Schedule Compared to 2003 MDARS-E Schedule 
(from DOD, 2001, 2003) 
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Table 46.   2001 MDARS-E Funding Compared to 2003 MDARS-E Funding 





e. RCSS from 2001 to 2003 
In 2001, the JRPMP informed readers that the mini-flair system will be replaced 
by another system in the RCSS program due to requirements that exceed the mini-flail’s 
capabilities. This is obviously a longer-term plan since the 2003 JRPMP reports that six 
additional mini-flails have been acquired in the past two years; they are reserved for 
contingency operations (DOD, 2003). There is not a lot of significant progress reported 
on the new system or the program but a much clearer description of the system’s 
expectations are presented. The new system’s “missions may include: (1) wire breaching; 
(2) dispensing of obscurants; (3) emplacing demolitions; (4) sweeping runways, and (5) 
creating access lanes through buildings or other antipersonnel obstacles” (DOD, 2003, p. 
77). One system key performance parameter (KPP) is that it must be able to operate 
through line-of-sight (LOS) out to 300 m. The vehicle will come with a standard issue of 
various tools that can be swapped based upon the mission set. This system is designed to 
conduct some of the most dangerous jobs; the ones that can result in the highest number 
of casualties, particularly during full-spectrum operations. This program has experience 
some of the smallest schedule change in the last two years; comparing the schedule and 
funding graphically is not necessary. The schedule presented in 2001 is almost identical 
in the 2003 JRPMP, Milestone C shifts right by about one quarter, which is not very 
significant. The funding planned for FY02 in 2001 has increased in the latest plan and 
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FY03 funding was never presented so the figure of $5.7 million in the 2003 master plan 
is a new projection. 
f. MPRS/COBRA from 2001 to 2003  
The combined operations battlefield robotics asset (COBRA) program is 
classified as a Soldier UGV or SUGV and is one of the UGV programs aligned with the 
Army future combat systems (FCS) program (DOD, 2003). In 2001, this program was 
called MPRS and included the URBOT and Matilda UGV systems. Since that report, 20 
URBOTs and Matildas have been delivered to Afghanistan in support of Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF). These small, man-portable systems are likely carried in a pack 
or vehicle on combat patrols and deployed to search caves, culverts, and to inspect 
suspicious items on roads, paths, or even in buildings. Figure 122 compares the 2001 
MPRS schedule with the 2003 COBRA schedule which shows Milestone B acceleration 
in the latest edition by one year, and Milestone C moving almost one year further into the 
future. Table 47 compares the 2001 MPRS funding with the 2003 COBRA funding; with 
an increase of about 75% in the 2003 plan compared to what was planned in 2001. No 
funding was planned for FY03 in the 2001 master plan, but the 2003 plan shows planned 




Figure 122.  2001 MPRS Schedule Compared to 2003 COBRA Schedule (from 
DOD, 2001, 2003) 
Table 47.   2001 MPRS Funding Compared to 2003 COBRA Funding (from 




g. Intelligent Mobility Program (IMP) from 2001 to 2003 
The IMP was presented in the 2001 master plan, but not much information was 
presented while the 2003 JRPMP gives some good background on this program. The key 
focus of this program is to achieve “Mobility metrics including: (1) endurance; (2) speed; 
(3) gap crossing dimensions; (4) side slope traversal; (5) soft soil traction, and (6) 
payload carrying capability” (DOD, 2003, p. 94). This program gained immediate 
popularity following the events that occurred on September 11, 2001. The ODIS system 
was utilized at various military installations to quickly search under vehicles at the entry 
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points. As this program develops, more uses for the ODIS and T4 system jointly are 
being realized. Technology development in other programs is leading this program 
towards a marsupial system approach. The T4 may become the mother or host system 
that drives around and deploys ODIS systems where appropriate. The document also 
discusses the idea of the MDARS-I/E systems operating as the host marsupial vehicle 
that also deploys ODIS vehicles in warehouses and around facilities where the larger 
UGVs cannot inspect.  
In the 2001 JRPMP, there was not a schedule presented for the IMP. Figure 123 is 
the first schedule presented for this program. Due to the infancy of this program, no 
milestones are presented at this time. The 2001 plan does set aside funding for this 
program, and Table 48 compares the 2001 projections with the 2003 plan. FY02 funding 
that was planned in 2001 is down by 200% in the latest version and FY03 funding in the 
2003 plan is up by about 50% compared to what was planned in 2001. 
 
Figure 123.  IMP Schedule (from DOD, 2003) 





h. JAUGS/JAUS from 2001 to 2003 
The 2001 JAUGS program was not very descriptive about its purpose, but the 
2003 JRPMP does a nice job of better explaining the joint architecture for unmanned 
systems (JAUS) program. In short, “JAUS will specify the data and message format 
interfaces to allow for rapid technology transfer” (DOD, 2003, p. 36). In the 2001 plan, 
there was no schedule for this program and readers learned that a Version 2.0 of the 
program was released. Figure 124 displays the 2003 JAUS program schedule with five 
focus areas: reference architecture specification, domain model, JAUS working group 
SOP, demonstration and validation, and commercial standards (DOD, 2003). As this 
program progresses, newer versions of each focus area will be released for stakeholders 
to adhere to in the arena of UGVs. Planned funding for this program has slightly 
increased in FY02 compared to what was planned in 2001 and there is now a planned 
fund for FY03 to the tune of $800,000. This information was not available in the 2001 
plan. The ultimate goal of this program is to promote open architecture so that the DOD 
and other stakeholders do not get “locked into” the solution provided by one vendor or 
system and to ensure that technology can easily be transferred to other UGVs. 
 
Figure 124.  JAUS Program Schedule 2003 (from DOD, 2003) 
i. RONS from 2001 to 2003 
As a reminder, RONS is in full rate production and many UGVs have already 
been delivered to all military services. Not surprisingly, operations in Iraq and 
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Afghanistan, coupled with increased usage of IEDs by the enemy, have made this a 
useful system to the service members. However, the procurement numbers actually tell a 
different story. Table 49 compares what was delivered and planned in 2001 against what 
was delivered, on order, and planned in 2003. All services have actually reduced their 
objective in the past two years, except the Marines, who have increased their orders of 
the RONS by 18 systems. This may be a case of higher than planned costs for each 
system. Procurement funding for FY02 actually increases by about 275% compared to 
what was planned in 2001. Service specific procurement funding was not presented in 
2001 so a comparison of overall program funding was conducted. In the 2001 JRPMP, no 
RONS procurement funding was planned for FY03, but there is funding to support the 
additional eight systems that are planned by the Army and Air Force. One other 
interesting note discovered in the 2003 master plan is that all of the accessories that can 
be connected to a RONS become a cost burden to the individual units that are fielded by 
the system. This additional equipment is not included with systems that are procured. 
Table 49.   2001 RONS System Procurement Compared to 2003  




j. MTRS (EOD Man Transportable Robotic System 2003 
The MTRS program is quite possibly the most well-known and popular program 
in the UGV portfolio. This is because the PackBot made by iRobot and Talon made by 
Foster-Miller fall under this program. In FY01, users from all four military services 
conducted an analysis of alternatives (AOA) and recommended a strategy where 
commercial items are modified, acquired, used, and evolutionary improvements are made 
over time. MTRS was initially designated as an abbreviated acquisition program; the 
steps were also initiated to make this a formal acquisition program (DOD, 2003). Though 
the 2003 JRPMP does not directly state it, it is assumed that combat operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan are the driving force behind this push to fill a capabilities gap. The gap 
appears to be a small system that can be carried by one to two people, have manipulators 
to conduct work, be quickly deployed, and be able to provide adequate standoff from 
hazardous explosives. 
Figure 125 is a picture of the Talon (left), a 100-lb tracked vehicle and PackBot 
(right), a 40-lb tracked vehicle, from the 2003 JRPMP (DOD, 2003). The EOD technician 
controls the system with an OCU and can deploy the system using wireless 
communications; alternatively, a cable can be connected from the OCU to the robot to 
form a tethered connection. Each system has a control arm that can be manipulated to 
pick up items and cameras to conduct reconnaissance. 
 
Figure 125.  Picture of Talon (left) and PackBot (right; from DOD, 2003) 
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It makes sense to quickly highlight some key events to demonstrate how quickly 
an acquisition program can produce results given the right conditions. In FY01 the AOA 
was conducted. In May 2002, proposals were solicited to vendors. In June and July 2002, 
the proposals were reviewed and evaluated. In October 2002, two contracts were 
awarded, one to iRobot Corporation and one to Foster-Miller, Inc. A production approval 
will occur and the government plans to exercise a contract option that yields 250 units 
over a three-year period with commitments for system support and continuous 
evolutionary improvements (DOD, 2003). By February 2003, seven Talons and two 
PackBots were delivered. This is a lot of progress within a two-year period and 
demonstrates how quickly items can go from requirement to delivery. This same process 
will prove a future challenge as it relates to the sustainment phase of this program. 
Figure 126 is the first schedule presented for the EOD MTRS program. While not 
elaborate, it serves as a good starting point. The MTRS milestone marker depicted in the 
second quarter of 2005 is believed to be Milestone 0, when the program will formally 
initiate. Table 50 is the first EOD MTRS funding chart. The Navy assumes most of the 
funding for this program, as it generally does with EOD based UGV programs such as the 
RONS. 
 
Figure 126.  First MTRS Schedule (from DOD, 2003) 
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Table 50.   First MTRS Funding Schedule (from DOD, 2003) 
 
 
k. RF (Robotic Follower ATD; Advanced Technology Demonstration) 
2003 
The RF ATD program has roots that stem from the DEMO III+ program with 
deeper applications that support other initiatives. The primary purpose of RF ATD is to 
provide near-term technologies to UGV systems that are in development under the Army 
future combat systems (FCS) program.  
The gist of this program is that there is a lead Soldier or vehicle that carries a 
piece of equipment that gathers information and transmits it back to the follower vehicle. 
The follower UGV then operates semi-autonomously and travels the path of least 
resistance, placing minimal workload on any humans. Practical applications and uses for 
this program include “(1) ruck carrier; (2) supply platoon; (3) non-line-of-sight 
(NLOS)/beyond line of sight (BLOS) fire, and (4) rear security” (DOD, 2003, p. 95). 
This program will be demonstrated on XUVs in the DEMO III+ program. Two troop 
carrier vehicles can demonstrate convoy operations, where the vehicles follow at high 
speeds but within LOS of lead vehicles. The multifunction utility/logistics equipment 
(MULE) will also be used to demonstrate this technology in support of dismounted 
troops in rugged terrain, as speed slows. 
Figure 127 depicts the first RF ATD program schedule on record. There are no 
formal milestones presented on the schedule, but a contract was awarded in FY01 for this 
program. The first experiment is planned for FY03 so results of this experiment are 
expected in the next master plan. Experiment II is planned for FY05 with no funding data 
provided anywhere in the 2003 JRPMP. 
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Figure 127.  RF ATD Program Schedule (from DOD, 2003)  
l. CAT (Crew Integration and Automated Test Bed) ATD 2003 
The CAT ATD is a new program in the 2003 JRPMP. “The purpose of the CAT 
ATD is to demonstrate the crew interfaces, automation, and integration technologies 
required to operate and support future combat vehicles” (DOD, 2003, p. 98). If 
successful, this program will result in highly sophisticated FCS vehicles that are manned 
by two individuals with the ability to control up to 10 unmanned systems. This is 
currently being tested on Bradley fighting vehicles (BFV) and Stryker vehicles, but will 
transition to vehicles being developed in the FCS program.  
The key drivers to this program’s success are driving aids and automation 
technologies (DOD, 2003). The profile of this program is not very detailed, but it appears 
that the two-man vehicle will serve as the command and control (C2) node for a variety 
of UGVs and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that are expected to conduct 
reconnaissance, direct fire engagements, and perform other routine missions executed by 
 206
warfighters. This seems to be a lofty and challenging goal considering that highly 
autonomous operations are not achievable at this point in time. Another risk is the 
vulnerability of a vehicle with only two crew members potentially operating too far from 
the support of the manned force. 
Figure 128 depicts the first CAT ATD schedule presented in the 2003 JRPMP. 
This schedule is similar to that of the RF ATD program. The contract has already been 
awarded and experiment I is planned for FY03 and experiment II in FY05. No funding 
for this program is presented anywhere in the 2003 master plan. 
 
Figure 128.  CAT ATD Program Schedule (from DOD, 2003) 
m. NGEODRCV (Next Generation EOD Remote Controlled Vehicle) 2003 
This is a new program in the 2003 JRPMP. It is a collaborative effort that links 
together many organizations within the government, industry, and academia to advance 
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existing technology and develop state-of-the-art technology for the future. The program 
structure and members involved is shown in Figure 129. The Air Force Research 
Laboratory is the overall lead for this program. 
 
Figure 129.  NGEODRCV Program Structure (from DOD, 2003) 
This program does have a specific strategy which “involves exploiting the 
capabilities, proven technologies, and innovative ideas from government institutes, 
industry, academia, and international partnerships” (DOD, 2003, p. 102). The idea is to 
use open architecture to ensure that technology can be easily and affordably transferred 
between multiple programs. The focal points of the research include EOD tools, lighter 
power generation, lighter material to make robots, and sensor advances (DOD, 2003). 
This concept exists within the DOD through the joint architecture for unmanned systems 
(JAUS) program, but this is an excellent opportunity to gain industry-wide sharing 
among many entities outside of the DOD, but that have a vested interest in UGV 
technology development. 
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Figure 130 presents the first NGEODRCV program schedule. Milestone A is not 
expected until late in 2006, and Milestone B is planned for late 2008. The program 
funding shared among three different organizations, one of which is the JRP is shown in 
Table 51. 
 
Figure 130.  NGEODRCV Program Schedule (from DOD, 2003) 




In two years’ time, the UGV program grew significantly in terms of numbers of 
programs and in terms of funding towards the overall program. Almost all programs from 
the 2001 JRPMP remained in place or became part of another program. In addition, two 
new programs were added to the portfolio. The BUGS program, which seemed to 
disappear, was actually merged with the ARS system program under RACS. 
During this period, the U.S. military is now involved in combat operations in the 
Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The complexities of the modern battlefield pose new and 
dynamic threats to warfighters that demand UGV support to reduce unnecessary exposure 
to risk. In past editions of the master plan, the CRS program was the major push based on 
 209
the demand for teleoperated mine clearance vehicles in Bosnia and Kosovo. The current 
threat in Afghanistan and Iraq calls for the clearance of caves, urban terrain, and 
reconnaissance/neutralization of IEDs. The trend also appears to be shifting towards 
UGVs that support the EOD technician, such as the man transportable robotic system 
(MTRS). 
There are a lot of programs running simultaneously and in some regards the 
efforts appear redundant. The advantage to multiple programs, however, is that successful 
technology can be shared with other programs, especially through the emphasis created 
by the JAUS program. Open architecture and collaboration among government, 
academia, and industry will result in shared R&D costs, technology maturation, 
technology breakthroughs, and ultimately, reduced life cycle costs. 
The UGV program has certainly grown in size and there appears to be increased 
demand for UGVs by warfighters and even civilian agencies. However, many of the 
programs continue to display schedule slippage with each new master plan, and few 
programs achieve full rate production. Funding appears to be on the rise, which is 
expected with a larger portfolio; however, even programs that are in full rate production 
are experiencing cost growth for less units when a basic comparison is done between 
previous plans. It appears that this technology simply has a high cost, especially because 
it is not mature. 
3. 2004 Joint Robotics Program Master Plan 
The 2004 JRPMP is the last of its kind; beyond this, the term master plan no 
longer exists in the UGV world and will be replaced by a document called a road map. 
This is also the end of individual program schedules and funding. At best, there is a UGV 
program master schedule and master funding table. 
In the last year, the overall UGV portfolio has grown again. This year, there are 
three new programs that have not been seen in previous master plans. Additionally, a new 
system is present under the RACS program, called the STORK. This brings the total 
number of systems under RACS up to five. 
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The document reports that Congress appropriated another $12 million on top of 
the $24 million that was added the year prior. This money is designed to sustain current 
systems and accelerate program objectives (DOD, 2004). The 2004 JRPMP points out 
that the war in Iraq has transitioned from full spectrum to stability operations and that 
warfighters face a significant improvised explosive device (IED) threat. This threat has 
resulted in increased demand for UGVs; 162 new UGV systems are on their way into 
various theaters of operation at the time this report was written (DOD, 2004). The goal of 
the JRP is to get useful technology and systems into the hands of users as quickly as 
possible. This sounds like the foundation of massive deliveries of robotic systems via 
joint urgent operational needs statements (JUONS) requests. 
Figure 131 compares the 2003 and 2004 JRP master milestone schedule. One 
immediate standout is that the combined operations battlefield robotics asset (COBRA) 
program is no longer present on the schedule, and this section determines the status of 
COBRA. Each program’s schedule is covered in greater detail below. Table 52 compares 
the overall UGV program funding from 2003 to 2004. Surprisingly, only three programs 
show any funding changes from what was planned the year prior; joint service EOD, all-
purpose robotic transport system (ARTS), and next generation EOD remote controlled 
vehicle (NGEODRCV). The specifics of the changes are covered under each program’s 
section. Figure 132 compares the summary of JRP weight classes chart from 2003 to the 
latest version in 2004. Many of the systems have changed weight class in the past year. 
Some systems are lighter, which may be a result of the NGEODRCV program. Some 
systems are heavier, which could be explained by the adding of capabilities to the 




Figure 131.  2003 UGV Master Schedule Compared to 2004 UGV Master 
Schedule (from DOD, 2003, 2004) 
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Table 52.   2003 UGV Program Funding Compared to 2004 Program Funding 








Figure 132.  2003 JRP UGV Weight Class Compared to 2004 JRP UGV Weight 
Class (from DOD, 2003, 2004) 
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a. Gladiator from 2003 to 2004 
In the past year, the Gladiator TUGV has been deployed to two Marine battalions 
where tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) were developed by the warfighter for 
this system. The 2004 JRPMP explains well the true purpose of the Gladiator. It is now 
known that the system is designed to support dismounted troops on the battlefield. The 
only issue with this is that the Gladiator is large and classified by JRP as a small 
(medium) system and its weight is 1600 lbs. While it likely provides great support to 
dismounts, the dismounts cannot return the favor. The system would require another 
vehicle for recovery if it were disabled. Figure 133 is the latest picture of the Gladiator 
system; it gives a good idea of the size of the UGV. 
 
Figure 133.  Picture of Gladiator (from DOD, 2004) 
The Gladiator system will now consist of the base unit, an operator control unit 
(OCU) and one of four mission payload modules (MPM). The four MPMs include “Anti-
personnel/obstacle breaching system (APOBS), joint chemical agent detector (JCAD), 
light vehicle obscurant smoke system (LVOSS), and non-lethal area denial and crowd 
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control weapons, and lethal direct fire weapons” (DOD, 2004, p. 5–8). Based on the 
mission at hand, the Marines can choose which payload will best accomplish the mission.  
A comparison of the 2003 and 2004 Gladiator program schedule and funding was 
conducted with surprising results. In the last year, there was no change to either. This is 
the first time that the schedule and funding for this program have gone unchanged when 
two consecutive years are compared. This is a good sign that this program is running 
smoothly and that a TUGV may actually get fielded to an operational unit in the near 
future. 
b. RACS (ARTS, ARC, ARS, REDCAR, STORK) from 2003 to 2004 
The all-purpose robotic transport system (ARTS) system is in full rate production 
but there is much to report on this program. In the 2003 JRPMP there were only eight 
ARTS components on the program schedule, each with their own milestone. In the 2004 
JRPMP, there are 11 components: seven of the eight original remain and four new 
components are added. Figure 134 compares the 2003 ARTS program improvements to 
the 2004 ARTS program improvements. Of all components carried over from last year, 
two have actually adjusted the schedule to achieve production one year earlier than 
expected. The two components are the improved water cannon mount and the articulated 
remote manipulator system. Two components also fell behind schedule by at least one 
year for the alternate control system and greater than one year, but time unknown, for the 
water cutter. The funding that was planned for FY03 in the 2003 master plan has dropped 
significantly in the latest edition. A comparison of the 2003 and 2004 ARTS funding is 
shown in Table 53 and depicts an 80% reduction in funding for FY03 compared to what 




Figure 134.  2003 ARTS Schedule Compared to 2004 ARTS  
(from DOD, 2003, 2004) 
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Table 53.   2003 RACS/ARTS Funding Compared to 2004 ARTS Funding 





Aside from the program troubles with the schedule and funding, there seems to be 
an accountability of systems issue in the 2004 master plan. In 2003, it was reported that 
there were 42 ARTS delivered and 20 more planned for delivery for a total of 62 systems. 
A change in procurement is not uncommon, but the numbers in 2004 do not add up 
correctly. The 2004 plan states that 46 ARTS have been delivered through FY03 and an 
additional two ARTS are designated as test systems. The master plan then states that 30 
more systems will be produced and delivered for a total of 72 ARTS by FY05. This does 
not add up correctly; the numbers actually add up to 78 total ARTS (DOD, 2004). Either 
this breakdown is poorly explained and the numbers are misinterpreted, or there is a typo 
in the total system count. 
Active range clearance (ARC) is the second system under the RACS program and 
not a lot of information is presented about this program in the 2004 JRPMP. In fact, there 
is nothing significant to report besides the schedule change. Figure 135 compares the 
2003 ARC schedule with the 2004 ARC schedule. The 2004 schedule shows more detail 
for each schedule activity, but there is also a slip in the overall schedule. Milestones A 
and B have shifted one year further into the future than originally planned. Milestone C is 
unchanged and is still planned for FY09.  
In the robotics for agile combat support (RACS) program, funding is shown for 
RACS as a whole and for ARTS, but never for the other individual systems. Last year, 
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ARTS accounted for about 70% of the total program funding and this year it only 
accounts for 20%. Since there are five systems in RACS, the assumption is that each 
program receives 20% of funding. 
 
 
Figure 135.  2003 ARC Schedule Compared to 2004 ARC  
(from DOD, 2003, 2004) 
Advanced robotic systems (ARS) is the third system under the RACS program. 
Much like the ARC program, nothing significant is reported within the last year. Figure 
136 compares the 2003 ARS schedule with the 2004 ARS schedule. The only significant 
change to the schedule is a shift of Milestone A from FY04 to FY05 in the past year. It is 
apparent that more detail has gone into the latest schedule, and the activities are based on 
a time line. As reported under the ARC system, it is believed that the ARS constitutes 





Figure 136.  2003 ARS Schedule Compared to 2004 ARS Schedule  
(from DOD, 2003, 2004) 
Remote detection, challenge, and response system (REDCAR) is the fourth 
system in the RACS program. In the 2003 JRPMP, this was a new system and limited 
information about the program was available. This year, the 2004 JRPMP explains the 
technical aspect of REDCAR. “REDCAR will use at least three different robotic 
platforms: (1) a surveillance platform, MDARS; (2) an engagement platform, REDCAR 
SCOUT; and (3) a small-scale platform for limited access areas” (DOD, 2004, p. 6-22). 
The goal is for REDCARS to work with the MDARS program, most likely for the 
established security aspects of autonomous operation in controlled environments. Air 
Force installations will be similar to the environments where MDARS currently operate. 
The second system that REDCAR will work with as it develops is the PackBot. This is 
most likely because the PackBot is small and can fit under spaces below 30 in. tall, which 
is a prerequisite for the small system in the REDCARS program (DOD, 2004). The 
PackBot also has an arm that can manipulate objects and open doors and a camera that is 
organic to the system. 
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It appears that as the system grows in level of aggressiveness, the more capability 
it develops. The systems are characterized as small, surveillance, and engagement 
capable. The small system will be slow and deployed for investigation of specific targets. 
The surveillance vehicle is planned to travel up to 15 miles per hour across various 
terrain, and employ strobe lights, a speaker/microphone, and a non-lethal weapon. The 
engagement vehicle is planned to travel at speeds of up to 40 miles per hour across 
various terrain, and it will have all features of the surveillance vehicle plus infrared and 
color cameras, a human decoy system, and a lethal weapon (DOD, 2004). As previously 
stated, the engagement platform of this system does not seem feasible at this point in 
time. Manual override for engagements will likely be required for many years to come. 
The REDCAR schedule paints a positive picture for this program. In the past 
year, no changes to the schedule are observed; and all milestones remain where they were 
planned the year prior. The 2003 schedule listed more activities that were not filled out, 
and this year many of the activities were eliminated. No funding information is available 
for this particular system. It is assumed to receive 20% of the RACS budget. 
Project STORK is the fifth and final RACS program. It is a new addition to the 
2004 RACS program. The gist of this program is that an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 
delivers a UGV to a designated area via parachute, and the UAV serves as a 
communication relay to extend the coverage area of the UGV, beyond what can be 
achieved with an OCU. The 2004 master plan states that in a 2003 demonstration, the 
STORK was able to serve as a relay for a UGV that was located 26 km from its OCU. No 
schedule or funding information is presented for the STORK in the 2004 JRPMP. 
c. CRS from 2003 to 2004 
In the past year, there have not been any major breakthroughs with the common 
robotic system (CRS) program, but the system will be fitted to a new vehicle. The new 
CRS capable vehicle is called the ground standoff mine detection system (GSTAMIDS). 
The main demand for this program remains primarily in the clearing of mine fields. The 
system also has the ability to support in breach operations, but no information is provided 
that discusses the CRS and its use in Afghanistan or Iraq. With the increase of IEDs in 
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Iraq and the constant use of military supply routes (MSR), it is surprising that this vehicle 
is not used heavily for clearance operations.  
Figure 137 compares the 2003 CRS program schedule with the 2004 CRS 
program schedule. Milestone C and Contingency Prototypes slip about nine months 
further into the future than what was planned in 2003. However, the remainder of the 
schedule is unchanged. This adjustment appears to make sense as this adjustment of 
Milestone C lines up with the start of full rate production. The funding that was planned 




Figure 137.  2003 CRS Schedule Compared to 2004 CRS Schedule  
(from DOD, 2003, 2004) 
d. MDARS from 2003 to 2004 
In the past year, MDARS I/E have been reduced to simply MDARS. It appears 
that the interior program was cancelled and the emphasis is now on the exterior system. 
The system will still conduct interior patrols but the need for two separate systems that do 
almost the same task was redundant. The 2004 JRPMP reports that the first pre-
production MDARS was delivered for testing and demonstration. In addition to security 
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at military installations and depots, future modifications will target security at ports, 
ammunition supply points, forward operational bases (FOBs), and logistical bases (DOD, 
2004). As previously mentioned, the MDARS program will work with the REDCAR 
program; this will support MDARS’ intention of providing lethal and non-lethal 
responses on future models. 
Figure 138 compares the MDARS-E schedule from 2003 with the MDARS 
schedule of 2004. The schedules are identical and there are no delays to what was 
planned the year prior. This further supports the claim that the MDARS-I program was 
dissolved and rolled into MDARS-E. The MDARS-I program did have a planned 
Milestone C in FY03. So unless it is in full rate production, and not discussed in the 2004 
plan, the assumption is that MDARS-I has dissolved. The funding that was planned in the 




Figure 138.  2003 MDARS-E Schedule Compared to 2004 MDARS Schedule 
(from DOD, 2003, 2004) 
e. RCSS from 2003 to 2004 
The robotic combat support system (RCSS) program is experiencing significant 
change from what was reported last year. “As a result of the War on Terrorism and the 
ongoing activities in Afghanistan and Iraq, the need for a RCSS type asset was elevated 
to URGENT status” (DOD, 2004, p. 4-3). The Robotic Systems Joint Projects Office (RS 
JPO) recognized that the program schedule from 2003 would prevent the agency from 
filling this need for the warfighter. The RS JPO and user community decided jointly to 
change the program strategy to one where a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) system is 
acquired with fielding beginning in FY04. This option allowed the RS JPO to 
immediately procure and deliver systems to the users, particularly in Iraq. The COTS 
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system is called the DOK-ING MV-IV and is a UGV that is produced in Croatia. “The 
DOK-ING MV-IV system is currently in use in Croatia (32 systems total). The MV-IV 
has a high reliability rate and has undergone multiple tests, all of which were successful” 
(DOD, 2004, p. 4-4). The system itself is manufactured in Croatia, but many of the 
subsystems are produced by companies like Sony and Caterpillar, which can support 
larger scale procurement. 
Figure 139 compares the 2003 RCSS program schedule to the 2004 program 
schedule after the change in acquisition strategy. The key highlights include the removal 
of Milestone C from the 2004 schedule and the removal of a full rate production plan. 
The funding that was planned for FY03 is unchanged from what was planned a year 
earlier, but it appears that the program may go over budget based upon the reduced 
number of deliveries from 2003 to 2004. Table 54 compares the number of systems 
scheduled for delivery in each year. Overall, 111 less systems are set to be delivered in 
future years. Either the numbers demanded are down or the price of each unit is so much 




Figure 139.  2003 RCSS Schedule Compared to 2004 RCSS Schedule  
(from DOD, 2003, 2004) 
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Table 54.   2003 RCSS Systems to be Delivered Compared to 2004 Plan (from 
DOD, 2003, 2004) 
 
 
f. IMP from 2003 to 2004 
In the past year, a few notable events have occurred for the intelligent mobility 
program (IMP). First, the omnidirectional inspection system (ODIS) system completed its 
continental United States (CONUS) testing at various installations. Next, the underbellies 
of vehicles were successfully inspected with images appearing on a monitor for 
observation and finally, the next phase for the ODIS is to undergo testing in Iraq at 
vehicle check points, in a real-world mission. There are also 20 ODIS systems in 
production with delivery expected within the next year (DOD, 2004). Other research is 
ongoing within the program to improve UGV mobility overall, develop the marsupial 
concept, and to continue to measure payloads between various systems through the use of 
JAUS open architecture. The IMP schedule and funding from 2003 has not changed at all 
in the past year. 
g. JAUS from 2003 to 2004  
The 2004 JRP MP does an effective job of further explaining the joint architecture 
for unmanned systems (JAUS) program because it is very technical in nature. In short, 
“JAUS is a common language enabling internal and external communication between 
unmanned systems” (DOD, 2004, p. 4-6). The master plan then proceeds to list the five 
reasons that the JAUS program was developed: (1) To reduce overall life-cycle costs, (2) 
Because in early UGVs, each subsystem was built from scratch, (3) JAUS leads to 
performance gains, (4) Rapid technology advancements could not be inserted into 
existing UGVs, and (5) Issues preventing interoperability and multi-vehicle control 
(DOD, 2004). Each year the JAUS schedule adds more and more information, which is 
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seen as a positive because so many stakeholders appear to support this program. Figure 
140 compares the 2003 JAUS schedule to the 2004 JAUS schedule. The only slip to the 
schedule is Version 3.0 of Domain Model, which shifts one year further into the future. 
However, much more detail about program activity is listed with clear milestones 
presented. The program funding did not change in the past year. 
 
 
Figure 140.  2003 JAUS Schedule Compared to 2004 JAUS Schedule  
(from DOD, 2003, 2004) 
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h. RONS from 2003 to 2004 
In the past year, a PC-based prototype, RONS, was produced and delivered for 
test and evaluation purposes. This is part of the RONS modernization program strategy. 
The 2004 JRPMP loosely addresses the S-Curve in regards to the RONS system. 
“Experience with the earlier RCT (Remote Control Transporter) suggested that the 
RONS would quickly fall behind the technology/capability ‘curve’ without a process in 
place to identify, develop (if necessary), test, and implement improvements in a timely 
manner” (DOD, 2004, p. 4-11). Based on this industry analysis, there are 26 ongoing 
improvements for the RONS program. This suggests exploitation of the current 
technology with incremental improvements until a major technological breakthrough 
occurs that makes this technology obsolete. 
Table 55 compares RONS system procurement data from 2003 to 2004. Since the 
last JRPMP, 86 more systems have been delivered to users, and the overall objective 
shows an increase by seven systems. The Navy and Army also both increased their 
overall objective, and, according to this plan, only three more total systems will be 
delivered to the Army; this will conclude the planned fielding of this system. It appears 
that upgrades to the system will continue to go out to the force as they are completed.  
Table 55.   2003 RONS System Procurement Compared to 2004 RONS 




In 2003, the JRP funded $800,000 towards RONS RDT&E. In 2004, this number 
rose to $2.1 million. This was not forecasted in the 2003 plan, but there is a FY04 
forecast of $3.3 million RDT&E funding for RONS. This funding is also shared with the 
EOD MTRS program which includes the Talon and PackBot systems. The detailed 
breakdown of funding is under the MTRS section. 
i. MTRS from 2003 to 2004 
The approach to the MTRS program is an interesting strategy. The plan calls for 
the delivery of a core system immediately to EOD technicians in Afghanistan and Iraq 
and a plan to continually upgrade the systems based on user feedback. The DOD 
demonstrates progressive thinking in the open architecture approach it is taking. “The 
vehicle will incorporate industry standard communication ports to enable interoperability 
with various sensors in future system upgrades that will enhance the reconnaissance 
capabilities of the MTRS” (DOD, 2004 p. 5-12). This is representative of the success of 
the JAUS and NGEODRCV programs that promote interoperability and transfer of new 
technology between systems.  
Foster-Miller, Inc. and iRobot Corporation were both awarded contracts based on 
best value. In the past year, each vendor delivered a performance specifications 
verification model (PVSM) of their proposed systems. After testing of the PSVM, a 
decision will be made to continue with each contractor or not (DOD, 2004). 
Figure 141 compares the 2003 MTRS schedule with the 2004 MTRS schedule. 
All activities from the 2003 figure remain on schedule and the 2004 schedule goes into 
greater detail, giving a confident impression that production will begin in FY05. The 
funding that was planned for this program in the 2003 JRPMP is unchanged, but it is now 
understood that this funding is shared with the continuous improvement program from 
the RONS program. The specific allocation to the MTRS program in FY03 was $1 
million, which is about 47% of the allocated funds. The FY04 planned funding for RONS 
and MTRS is $3.3 million; based on the FY03 allocation we predict that $1.57 million 




Figure 141.  2003 MTRS Schedule Compared to 2004 MTRS Schedule  
(from DOD, 2003, 2004) 
j. RF ATD from 2003 to 2004 
The 2004 JRPMP presents interesting updates regarding the RF ATD program. 
From a hardware standpoint, the dismount OCU was designed and developed and the 
system/software integration onto the Stryker and experimental unmanned vehicle (XUV) 
platforms was completed (DOD, 2004). This is tangible progress and is positive news for 
the FCS program. From a test and evaluation standpoint, the Stryker conducted high-
speed following on an improved road using LOS. The XUV conducted low-speed 
following of dismounted troops across field terrain (DOD, 2004). A convoy mission was 
conducted with vehicles in the program and the multifunction utility/logistics equipment 
(MULE) conducted a dismounted support mission. In both missions, the systems 
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demonstrated a TRL (Technology Readiness Level) of 6 (DOD, 2004). According to the 
DOD 5000.2-R, this means a 
system/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a relevant 
environment: Representative model or prototype system, which is well 
beyond that of TRL 5, is tested in a relevant environment. It also 
represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated readiness. 
Examples include testing a prototype in a high-fidelity laboratory 
environment or in simulated operational environment. (DOD, 2002, p. 
204)  
This is an aggressive technology development program that could lead to an 
extremely useful capability to the DOD in the near future. 
Figure 142 lays out the RF ATD demonstration schedule for each mission that is 
planned under this program. This schedule looks similar to the DEMO II schedule that 
was presented in earlier master plans. The RF ATD overall program schedule remains 
unchanged from what was presented in 2003 and no program funding details are 
presented in 2004. 
 
Figure 142.  RF ATD Program Schedule (from DOD, 2004) 
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k. CAT ATD from 2003 to 2004 
The CAT ATD program’s primary purpose is to develop technology in support of 
the FCS program. The main thrust is to develop a system on a Bradley infantry fighting 
vehicle (IFV) or Stryker vehicle that allows the vehicle to be manned by two operators 
while conducting a host of military missions. “Technologies to be investigated include 
both traditional SMI technologies (e.g., helmet-mounted displays, head trackers, 
panoramic displays, speech recognition, 3D audio, etc.) and robotic technologies (e.g., 
intelligent driving decision aids, semi-autonomous driving, automated route planning, 
etc.)” (DOD, 2004, p. 6-10). This program appears to be high in the design and concept 
phase of the project. This capability is also advanced, and the software development for 
this program must be a significant undertaking. Effectively managing this program will 
require a schedule with oversight of numerous activities, which was lacking in the first 
schedule published in 2003. Figure 143 compares the CAT ATD schedule from 2003 to 
the current schedule in the 2004 JRPMP. The current schedule provides much more detail 
for the listed activities and the naming convention from last year’s schedule has changed 
noticeably. Success in this program could change the way the United States fights future 




Figure 143.  2003 CAT ATD Compared to 2004 CAT ATD Schedule (from 
DOD, 2003, 2004) 
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l. NGEODRCV from 2003 to 2004 
There are no specific accomplishments to report on this program in the last year. 
However, Figure 144 compares the program schedule from 2003 with the 2004 program 
schedule. The 2003 program schedule went out to 2009 and displayed Milestone B, while 
the 2004 schedule only displays out to 2006 and does not display any events beyond 
Milestone A. More activity detail is provided in the 2004 schedule, but there are no firm 
markers to indicate hard dates. Table 56 compares the 2003 funding with the 2004 
funding. The actual funding for FY03 in the 2004 master plan is greater than what was 
planned the year prior. This is because the technical support working group (TSWG) 
funding is up by half a million dollars more than what was originally planned. The $2 
million provided by JRP is actually OSD physical security equipment money and was 
planned for FY03 in the 2003 master plan but was not represented on that year’s 
NGEODRCV funding table. 
 
 
Figure 144.  2003 NGEODRCV Schedule Compared to 2004 NGEODRCV 
Schedule (from DOD, 2003, 2004) 
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Table 56.   2003 NGEODRCV Funding Compared to 2004 NGEODRCV 





m. ART STO (Armed Robotic Technology, Science & Technology 
Objective) 2004 
ART STO, the first of three new programs in the 2004 JRPMP aims to “develop, 
integrate, and demonstrate the technology required to achieve advanced autonomous 
capabilities for the Objective Force, specifically the ARV (Armed Robotic Vehicle)” 
(DOD, 2004, p. 6-11). Essentially, the goal of the program is to continue to develop 
advanced autonomous capabilities so that the ARV can be an effective combat vehicle. 
The 2004 JRPMP states that by 2006 the STO will demonstrate TRL 5 and by 2008 will 
demonstrate TRL 6 (DOD, 2004). Up to this point, highly autonomous operations in 
unstructured environments has been the biggest challenge for UGVs and while this 
program has good intentions, the technology may not support this goal anytime in the 
near future. The master plan does not say when this technology may be ready. Figure 145 
displays the first program schedule for ART STO, with no firm milestones presented for 




Figure 145.  ART STO Program Schedule (from DOD, 2004) 
n. HRI STO (Human-Robot Interaction, Science & Technology Objective) 
2004 
HRI STO is the second new program in the 2004 JRPMP. In short, this program 
aims at developing common user interfaces for unmanned ground and air systems. The 
idea is that a Soldier should be able to recognize an unmanned system control unit and 
have a general idea of how to use it, even without any experience on the system. Part of 
this push is to allow more unmanned systems into the force that are not military 
occupational specialty (MOS) specific. Essentially, Soldiers take time from their regular 
jobs to operate unmanned systems. This problem is, however, further compounded when 
the Soldier must spend time trying to figure out how to work the controls for each new 
system. HRI STO aims to create commonality. Figure 146 is the first HRI STO program 
schedule presented in 2004. Much like the ART STO, there are not a lot of firm dates on 
the schedule at this time. No funding for this program appears in the master plan. 
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Figure 146.  HRI STO Program Schedule (from DOD, 2004) 
o. NUSE2 (National Unmanned Systems Experimentation Environment) 
2004 
NUSE2 is the third and final new program presented in the 2004 JRPMP. NUSE2, 
a continuation of the robotic acquisition through virtual environments & networked 
simulations (RAVENS) program, concluded in 2003. While RAVENS was a beneficial 
program, it did not include many key stakeholders involved in NUSE2. This program 
harnesses all military unmanned communities (air, ground, surface, and underwater), 
academia, industry, and other R&D efforts (DOD, 2004). The ultimate goal of this 
program is to publish standards that are accepted across the unmanned system’s 
community and result in the following benefits: reduced program cost, reduced risk, 
accurate schedules, focused R&D efforts, interoperability, prevented stove piping, 
conserved resources, and leveraged technology to the end user incrementally as 
technology matures (DOD, 2004). All of these efforts can lead to a virtuous cycle where 
the warfighter constantly receives the latest technology, accomplished at an affordable 
price. This program does not have FY03 funding, but there is $3.7 million in planned 
funding for FY04. 
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p. Conclusion 
The UGV program’s increasing demand for systems due to the conflicts in the 
Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq proves for interesting shifts. The warfighters appear to 
favor UGVs, and Congress acknowledges this by appropriating more money to the UGV 
program. The war in Iraq and increased IED threats are also shaping acquisition strategies 
that put commercial systems in the hands of warfighters more quickly, but with what 
appears to be less planning on the back end. 
Year after year, the UGV program grows in number of programs and in the 
amount of money allocated to the programs. From 2003 to 2004, the program schedules 
and funding appeared to be the most stable compared to any other years. There are some 
assumptions why this is happening. First, the war in Iraq is generating more funding to 
programs, which allows program managers to accomplish what was planned. Second, the 
severity of being engaged in multiple conflicts has led to stricter program oversight 
which results in staying on schedule and on budget. Third, in some cases, the programs 
are looking for commercial solutions, and the schedules are not actively managed for the 
time being while alternate methods to rapidly field new equipment are explored. It could 
also be a combination of these factors or others that have not been considered. 
This is the last version of what is known as the master plan. From here forward, 
the DOD produced documents called road maps. The research concludes in 2004 due to 
the drastic change in reporting between a master plan and a road map. Road maps do not 
display individual program schedules and they do not include program funding tables. 
4. Summary from 2001 to 2004 
From 2001 to 2004, the UGV program funding is presented as concept and 
technology development (CTD; Figure 147), and engineering and manufacturing 
development (EMD; Figure 148) funding. The CTD and EMD categories were compared 
against each other and is shown in Figure 149. In the period covered, funding rises in 
both categories each year except for FY02 when CTD funding decreases by about $1 
million. This can be attributed to new programs added to the portfolio, higher 
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prioritization of UGVs in the DOD budget, and increased demand from users as the U.S. 
military engaged in combat on multiple fronts. 
 
Figure 147.  Concept and Technology Development (CTD) Funding Comparison 
2001–2004 (after DOD, 2001, 2003, 2004) 
 
 
Figure 148.  Engineering and Manufacturing Development Funding Comparison–
2004 (after DOD, 2001, 2003, 2004) 
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Figure 149.  Concept and Technology Development and Engineering 
Manufacturing Development Funding Comparison (after DOD, 
2001, 2003, 2004) 
a. FTUV/TUGV from 2001 to 2004 
There was a gap in TUGV schedules from 1996 to 2003; when both schedules are 
compared, the outlook for the program does not look positive, as depicted in Figure 150. 
Milestone II/B shifts from FY98 to FY02 and Milestone C is planned for FY04. The 
positive aspect from this report is that the schedule did not change from 2003 to 2004, 
which is the first time that a TUGV schedule experienced no slippage. In Figure 151, the 
TUGV/Gladiator funding is significantly reduced compared to years past, but in 2004 the 
funding rises substantially. The USMC endorses the program completely and believes the 
technology is mature enough for the system to accomplish capabilities never achieved 
before in a TUGV program. 
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Figure 150.  TUV/Gladiator Schedule Comparison with Schedule Slippage 1996–
2004 (after DOD, 1996, 2001, 2003, 2004) 
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Figure 151.  TUGV/FTUV/Gladiator Funding Comparison 2001–2004 (after 
DOD, 2001, 2003, 2004) 
b. RONS from 2001 to 2004 
The RONS program is probably the most successful program in the time period 
covered in this research. The program achieved full rate production in FY99 and units are 
available for use by the warfighter. The schedule in Figure 152 depicts the transition to 
sustainment and continuous improvements to the system since its fielding. The funding in 
Figure 153 appears sporadic, but is this way based on the number of systems procured 
each year. FY02 and FY04 are years where more systems are purchased. FY01 and FY03 
are likely years where there is limited procurement or where R&D is ongoing in support 
of improvements to the fielded increment. 
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Figure 152.  ROND/RONS Schedule Comparison 2001–2004 (after DOD, 2001, 2003, 2004) 
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Figure 153.  ROND/RONS Funding Comparison 2001–2004 (after DOD, 2001, 
2003, 2004) 
c. ROCS/RACS from 2001 to 2004 
Until 2004 the RACS schedule was difficult to decipher, but was determined that 
the ARTS achieved full rate production in FY01. The other two systems depicted in the 
2001 schedule continue to slip further into the future. In the 2004 master plan, there are 
three systems under RACS; all plan to achieve Milestone A in FY05, which is at least a 
two-year slippage when compared to the 2001 master plan. Earlier RACS schedules do 
not clearly display common acquisition milestones, so in some cases, the milestones are 
assumed. Logically, the schedule has slipped, considering no events were planned for 
FY05 in the 2001 master plan as depicted in Figure 154. RACS funding is inconsistent 
over the past few years. The RACS program grew in size in the period analyzed and is 
now four programs under RACS, each demanding independent funding. The ARTS 
system is in the procurement phase and is more costly than R&D. This may help explain 
the large increase in funding to the program in FY04 as depicted in Figure 155. 
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Figure 154.  ROCS/RACS Schedule Comparison 2001–2004 (after DOD, 2001, 2003, 2004) 
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Figure 155.  RRR/REV/ROCS/ARTS Funding Comparison 2001–2004  
(after DOD, 2001, 2003, 2004) 
d. VT/CRS from 2001 to 2004 
CRS became the top program during the conflict in Bosnia, which was supposed 
to accelerate the schedule to deliver more systems to users at a faster pace. Instead, 
Milestone C shifts almost four years further into the future between 2001 and 2004, 
which makes the priority of this program questionable, as depicted in Figure 156. The 
funding fluctuates significantly during this time period, but in FY01 and FY03 the 
program receives a generous portion of the UGV budget as depicted in Figure 157. This 
may be the result of a formal fielding of older system variants, but is not reported in the 
master plan, so this is an assumption. 
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Figure 156.  EVTC/VTC/VT/SRS/CRS Schedule Comparison 2001–2004  
(after DOD, 2001, 2003, 2004) 
 
Figure 157.  EVTC/VTC/VT/SRS/CRS Funding Comparison 2001–2004  
(after DOD, 2001, 2003, 2004) 
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e. MDARS-E/I from 2001 to 2004 
In Figure 158 MDARS-E generally stays on schedule during the period analyzed. 
From 2001 to 2004, Milestone III shifts one year further into the future than originally 
planned. In a four-year span it is not poor performance for cutting-edge technology. 
 
Figure 158.  MDARS-E Schedule Comparison 2001–2004  
(after DOD, 2001, 2003, 2004) 
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MDARS-I does not display the same success as the exterior program. From 2001 
to 2004 the schedule experiences significant shifts into the future, as depicted in Figure 
159. Milestone II/B moves from FY98 in the 2001 JRPMP to FY01 in the 2004 JRPMP. 
Milestone III/C shifts from FY02 to FY06. These are significant shifts that are not 
explained and cannot be good for the overall program. This program is based on vehicles 
conducting autonomous security within a facility, and the technology may have been too 
advanced at the time, causing the program to update the schedule to align with a more 
likely time frame in which the technology would be mature. 
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Figure 159.  MDARS-I Schedule Comparison Illustrates Milestone Slippage 
2001–2004 (after DOD, 2001, 2003, 2004) 
f. DOD and UGV Funding Comparison 2001–2004 
During the years measured, the correlation between the DOD budget and the 
UGV budget is 0.67, but a correlation of 0.80 or higher would be more significant. The 
UGV budget in Figure 160 fluctuates substantially, even with military conflicts on 
multiple fronts. Again, this may be an indicator that UGVs are not high on the U.S. 
military list of priorities. Undoubtedly, UGVs are seen as important assets; however, they 
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are still not fully integrated into the force and possibly face resistance from leaders that 
prefer a human being on the ground to accomplish the mission. 
 
Figure 160.  DOD and UGV Funding Comparison 2001–2004 (after DOD, 2001, 
2003, 2004; usgovernmentspending.com, n.d.) 
D. SUMMARY OF MASTER PLANS FROM 1991–2004 
The goal of this section is to summarize all of the data presented in the first 14 
years of UGVs within the DOD. Figure 161 depicts UGV funding from 1990 to 2005 and 
provides a snapshot showing the challenges that create hardships for UGV programs in 
the period examined. From 1990 to 1998, UGV funding for category 6.3 (advanced 
technology development) fluctuated but generally rose. In 1999, 6.3 funding dropped 
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significantly but 6.4 (advanced component development and prototypes) started and 
overall UGV funding generally rose, but not at a rate that indicates high prioritization 
within the DOD. The year 1999 is also the same year that the RONS program achieved 
Milestone C and began full rate production. One key observation about funding during 
the R&D phase is that regardless of whether funding is cut or not, programs still 
experienced schedule slippage. 
 
Figure 161.  UGV Funding 1990–2005 (from DOD, 2005) 
1. TUGV from 1991 to 2004 
The first program summarized is the tactical unmanned ground vehicle (TUGV) 
program. This program was first presented in the 1991 master plan and continues through 
the 2004 master plan as depicted in Figure 162. Overall, the program does not appear to 
be a success. A quick glance of the first TUGV schedule in the 1991 master plan shows 
Milestone III/C planned for FY98. This milestone shifted further into the future in almost 
every other master plan examined. The schedule presented in the 2004 plan shows a 
Milestone C IPR planned for FY04. In 14 years, no TUGVs achieved Milestone C or full 
rate production.  
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This program is not necessarily a failure; many technologies and advancements 
developed from this program were transferred to other programs in the portfolio. Simply 
stated, the RSTA mission still remains extremely complex and difficult for UGVs. To 
successfully complete the RSTA mission, UGVs must function autonomously in 
unstructured environments. Achieving full autonomy requires a major technological 
breakthrough and it is difficult to predict when this may occur. Programs similar to the 
DEMO I, II, and III programs that are sponsored by DARPA and other advanced research 
agencies create the best opportunities for this breakthrough to happen.  
In the early years, a significant portion of UGV funding went to this program. The 
researchers’ assumption is that the lack of delivery of systems to end-users hurt the 
program. The program constantly pushed the system, but users did not appear to demand 
the TUGV for Infantry or RSTA missions. This is an advanced technology that will likely 
face resistance from leaders and warfighters upon integration. Integration is the best way 
to gain acceptance and will lead to the pull factors that allow new technologies to 
flourish. Ultimately, this is a repetitive cycle of push, pull, integration, and adaptation. 
The overall TUGV program funding from 1991 to 2004 is shown in Figure 163. 
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Figure 162.  TUGV/TUV/FTUV/Gladiator Schedule Comparison Illustrates 
Milestone Slippage 1991–2004 (after DOD, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 
1995, 1996, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004) 
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Figure 163.  TUGV/TUV/FTUV/Gladiator Funding Comparison 1991–2004 
(after DOD, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 2001, 2003, 2004) 
2. RONS from 1991 to 2004 
RONS is the second of three programs that began in the 1991 master plan. From a 
formal acquisition standpoint, this is probably the most successful UGV program in the 
portfolio. Figure 164 compares RONS’ schedules from 1991 to 2004. The first program 
schedule in 1991 planned for Milestone III/C achievement in FY98. In the 1995 master 
plan, the schedule displayed a schedule slip and a planned Milestone III/C decision in 
FY00. Further research verified that the program actually achieved Milestone III/C in 
FY99. Ultimately, the program schedule recovered and over the span of eight years, only 
slipped one year off from the original master plan.  
The schedule not only recovered, but the program delivered 243 systems to users 
in the field. This was the first UGV program to achieve full rate production, which is a 
significant amount of UGVs delivered for this period of time. Funding for the program 
was sufficient in the first few years of the program, but then experienced a significant 
budget cut for four years from FY95 to FY98, as depicted in Figure 165. This may be 
why the program schedule began to shift further into the future. The funding increased 
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significantly in FY99, the year that production began, and fluctuated based upon the 
amount of systems acquired in each year. 
It is important to note that the RONS program is a niche program that supports 
EOD. The demand from users for this program is quite apparent and appears to pull the 
program to success even when funding was cut significantly; the program managed to 
fight its way into the hands of users. 
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Figure 164.  ROND/RONS Schedule Comparison Illustrates Milestone Slippage 




Figure 165.  ROND/RONS Funding Comparison 1991–2004 (after DOD, 1991, 
1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 2001, 2003, 2004) 
3. RACS from 1991 to 2004 
RACS is the last of the three original programs from the 1991 master plan. The 
original program name was RRR. This was the second program in the portfolio to 
achieve Milestone III/C, which occurred in 2001. In Figure 166, the program experienced 
schedule challenges and did not achieve the original planned production date of FY97 
from the 1991 master plan. The original system, an excavator, was not the system that 
became the fielded product. The ARTS system, a much smaller vehicle with a standard 
plow and a variety of attachment tools to accomplish various missions, was the system 
that eventually made it to the warfighter.  
Like the RONS program, this program serves a niche community: the EOD and 
Engineer range clearance community. This system is used to clear war zones or old target 
ranges of UXO. It allows the operator to deploy a robot to conduct digging, moving, and 
neutralization of munitions from a safe distance. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the need arose to clear large training areas and the DOD and contractors became 
interested in this piece of equipment. These are pull factors, which allowed the program 
to survive and prevail. The change in the demand situation salvaged this UGV program 
and system to meet the needs of users in a different capacity. The platforms evolve based 
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on user demand relative to the current threat. Currently, four systems reside in the RACS 
program; three are based upon the need to clear ranges and the latest program, known as 
REDCAR, is designed to provide security of bases and other facilities with the ability to 
lethally engage adversaries with organic weapon systems. Again, the demand pulls 
technology from an existing platform to meet this requirement. From a warfighter 
function standpoint, all capabilities in the RACS program fall under Force Protection, 
generally serving a defensive function.  
From 1991 to 2001, the program received modest funding that fluctuated year 
after year. From 2002 to 2004, the funding for this program, as depicted in Figure 167, 
increased significantly; this increase can likely be attributed to the achievement of full 
rate production. The money required to acquire the system is significantly higher than the 
R&D costs. Additionally, the program grew in terms of number of systems, and 
generally, with more systems comes more funding. 
At this point in time, the technology is limited to remote control by an operator or 
semi-autonomous deployment by an operator. The system can receive very structured 
map data, which commands the system to search and clear within the boundaries of a 
specified area. The machine is capable of picking up discovered UXO and moving it to a 
designated area where reduction operations are initiated. 
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Figure 166.  RRR/REV/ROCS/RACS Schedule Comparison Illustrates Milestone 
Slippage 1991–2004 (after DOD, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 
1996, 2001, 2003, 2004) 
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Figure 167.  RRR/REV/ROCS/RACS Funding Comparison 1991–2004 (after 
DOD, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 2001, 2003, 2004) 
4. CRS from 1994 to 2004 
The CRS program, which began as the EVTC program in 1994 has an interesting 
history and serves as a great example of unexpected demand resulting from changing 
requirements. From 1994 to 1995, the program experienced an immediate schedule slip 
and appeared that further schedule slippage would occur again in the future. However, 
the United States became engaged in the Bosnian conflict in 1995, and immediately this 
program became the highest priority among UGV programs. It became a high priority 
primarily due to the pull factors from the warfighters in Bosnia. The warfighters 
demanded a solution to clear safe lanes through the minefields for the passage of 
mounted convoys and dismounted patrols. 
As the demand for the capability arose, the schedule for this program in Figure 
168 accelerated as EVTC systems arrived and were installed on Engineer vehicles in 
Bosnia. Program funding in Figure 169 more than doubled from 1996 to 1998, and the 
systems proved their value on the battlefield. Hundreds of mines were cleared with the 
use of the EVTC kits on vehicles typically driven by human operators. The operators 
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were able to sit at a safe distance, in another vehicle, and remotely clear safe lanes for the 
passage of troops. 
Around the year 2000, the schedule for this program began to experience 
significant delays. Milestone III/C shifted from FY98 in the 1996 master plan to FY01 in 
the 2000 master plan and finally out to FY06 in the 2004 master plan. There is no clear 
explanation for what happened to the program and why the schedule slipped so far into 
the future. Simultaneously, the funding became erratic from FY99 to FY04, experiencing 
almost 300% funding swings between years.  
It is evident that pull factors brought success to the program during the years the 
system supported warfighters in Bosnia. It also appears that the program began to push 
the technology beyond its demand limits and was simply not desired by the user 
community in the quantity forecasted by the program office. The program experienced its 
success in a niche community among Engineers conducting route clearance. Beyond this 
community, the demand for this system is practically non-existent.  
The most surprising observation about this program is that demand for this 
capability was not high during the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. There is limited 
discussion about the deployment of this capability among the forces deployed in support 
of OEF and OIF. It would be interesting to know if warfighters outside of the EOD and 
Engineer communities knew that such a capability existed. It appears this system would 
have been an ideal piece of equipment to utilize for route clearance during the conflict in 
Iraq.  
This may be an example of a competency trap or a breakdown in communication 
between different military communities. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the warfighter 
encountered IEDs and began to develop techniques to detect and survive against the 
threat. The warfighter became good at this procedure using inadequate technology while 
unmanned systems that were used in the Balkans sat in warehouses. Another 
consideration is that personnel who deployed to the Balkans did not communicate about 
this capability as the IED threat emerged in Afghanistan and Iraq. Young service 
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members on the ground were simply unaware of such a technology and there was no push 
factor to generate the demand for this capability. 
 
Figure 168.  EVTC/VTC/VT/SRS/CRS Schedule Comparison Illustrates 
Milestone Slippage 1994–2004 (after DOD, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 
1995, 1996, 2001, 2003, 2004) 
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Figure 169.  EVTC/VTC/VT/SRS/CRS Funding Comparison 1994–2004 (after 
DOD, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 2001, 2003, 2004) 
5. MDARS-E/I from 1994 to 2004 
The first MDARS program schedules surfaced in the 1994 master plan, as 
depicted in Figure 170. This program is interesting because it is managed outside the 
joint robotics program and controlled by the Physical Security Equipment Management 
Office (PSEMO). This program appeared to be the “outsider” program in some regards. 
The program is a highly complex program designed to conduct security inside and 
outside the perimeter of large warehouses. This system conducts its patrols autonomously 
with one operator overseeing up to 30 systems simultaneously. The autonomous 
capability is possible with this system because the boundaries that the machine operates 
within are highly structured. 
It the period analyzed, the system never achieved Milestone III/C or full rate 
production. In fact, the schedule generally slipped further into the future with each new 
master plan. The first Milestone III planned in the 1994 master plan was to occur in 
FY98. By 2000, this milestone shifted out to FY02, and in the latest master plan, 
Milestone III/C is planned for FY06, for both the Exterior and Interior variants. 
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Essentially, Milestone III/C shifted about eight years further into the future than 
originally planned. 
The slippage in schedule does not necessarily mean the program is a failure but 
the technology to make this program successful is very complex; it takes a lot of time and 
money to mature such a technology. At one point in time, it appeared that civilian 
companies had an interest in this technology. A demand for the technology suddenly 
appeared and the pooling of R&D from DOD, academia, and industry should have 
propelled this system into development. However, the demand may not have been large 
enough to keep the program on schedule, or the technology simply proved too 
challenging during the time period. 
While the MDARS program did not achieve full rate production during the time 
period covered, it certainly shared technology with other programs in the portfolio. The 
overall UGV community is arguably better off because of the MDARS program. This 




Figure 170.  MDARS-E/I Schedule Comparison Illustrates Milestone Slippage 





Figure 170 cont’d. MDARS-E/I Schedule Comparison Illustrates Milestone 
Slippage 1994–2004 (after DOD, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 
1995, 1996, 2001, 2003, 2004) 
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6. DOD Funding Compared to UGV Funding from 1991 to 2004 
As previously stated, the researchers assumed that the DOD budget and the UGV 
budgets would be more correlated, meaning that the UGV budget would rise and fall with 
the DOD budget. In fact, in Table 57 the correlation is almost zero when the full time 
period is examined. In many years, the DOD budget rose and the UGV budget declined, 
as depicted in Figure 171. This gives the impression that UGVs were not high on the 
overall DOD budgetary priority list. Unmanned systems appear to be valued and more 
money is likely to flow into future unmanned programs, but there are other programs that 
have a higher value and priority in the eyes of the DOD. Perhaps Congress expected 
UGV technology to develop at a faster rate and this possibly hurt funding in later years. 
A quick glance at the first four years of UGV funding gives the impression that people 
were overly optimistic about the outcomes. 
Table 57.   DOD and UGV Funding Correlation (after DOD 1991, 1992, 1993, 








Figure 171.  DOD and UGV Funding Comparison 1991–2004 (after DOD 1991, 
1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 
2003, 2004; usgovernmentspending.com, n.d.) 
7. The Man Transportable Robotic System (MTRS) Example: 
 2003 to 2007 
The years of this program extend beyond the scope of this research, but it is such 
an interesting case that it is worth covering in this research project. The MTRS program 
includes the TALON and PackBot robots, which serve a niche purpose within the EOD 
community. The systems are first mentioned in the 2003 master plan where it is learned 
that the EOD community began demanding its capabilities in FY01. This scenario shows 
the power of pull factors that users have on the acquisition process when something is 
deemed highly valuable and highly demanded. 
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As depicted in Figure 172, in FY01, an Analysis of Alternatives was conducted 
and the EOD community determined that a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) approach 
would best serve their needs. In May 2002, solicitations were sent to vendors, and in 
June/July of the same year, proposals were reviewed and evaluated. In October 2002, 
iRobot (PackBot) and Foster-Miller (TALON) were awarded contracts. By February 
2003, seven PackBot and TALON systems were delivered. The DOD planned a 
production decision for the second quarter of FY05 and production of the systems by 
both companies was approved. In 2003, the DOD set an objective of 250 total systems, 
and by 2005 the new objective increased to 1056 systems. By 2007, 836 systems arrived 
to warfighters with another 536 planned for a total objective of 1372 systems. This is 
more systems fielded than all other programs combined from 1991 to 2004 (DOD, 2003, 
2004, 2005). 
In a matter of six years, the PackBot and TALON went from an idea in the mind 
of an EOD technician to a fully fielded and functional system in the hands of users on the 
battlefield. This example proves that the DOD can deliver quality systems that users 
demand in a short period of time. A COTS solution can be delivered into the hands of the 
customer using an abbreviated acquisition procurement time line and not having to go 
through the lengthy joint capabilities integration development system (JCIDS) process. 
This program is possibly the best example of the power of pull factors on a new 
technology. The EOD technicians desired a robot that provided standoff from IEDs and 
allowed them to manipulate objects with a strong, yet precise arm. The warfighters also 
demanded a system that was rapidly deployable, light, easy to use, and easy to replace. 
This program can certainly serve as an example for future acquisitions, and perhaps it 
best demonstrates it is better to develop systems based on the need or pull as opposed to 
pushing systems that users may not truly desire. This system also benefits the UGV 
community because of the large quantity of units fielded. The systems received a lot of 
exposure and integration among troops. Surely many warfighters saw the PackBot and 
TALON in action on the battlefield and began to gain comfort in conducting combat 
operations in conjunction with UGVs. 
 272
Further research showed that iRobot worked on projects with DARPA during the 
mid- and late-’90s. In 1998, iRobot was awarded a contract by DARPA for the 
development of a tactical mobile robot; this led to the development of the PackBot 
(iRobot, 2014). This is essentially how the iRobot Corporation gained entry into the 
DOD. More details emerged that helped better explain the immense demand of these 
systems at the onset of Afghanistan and Iraq. Tim Trainer, the Vice President of iRobot 
product management, said,  
In the early 2000s, we had a contract with DARPA and thought it might be 
better to send a robot instead of a Soldier into Afghani caves to see if they 
held weapons caches . . . Soldiers [carried our robots] 15,000 feet up Tora 
Bora, used them in the caves, and gave us an understanding on what we 
could do better. That was our first production contract, if you will. (Love, 
2014, para. 4) 
Information on the Foster-Miller Talon robot was not as available as information 
was on the iRobot. This robot also has a history with the military that predates the 
information presented in the 2003 master plan.  
The Talon began helping with military operations in Bosnia in 2000, 
deployed to Afghanistan in early 2002 and has been in Iraq since the war 
started, assisting with improvised explosive device detection and removal. 
Talon robots had been used in about 20,000 missions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan by the end of 2004. (GlobalSecurity.org, n.d., para. 5)  
When this statement is compared to the 2003 master plan, it is evident that the 
Talon was in field use before production for the DOD was even planned on the master 
plan schedule. 
The information uncovered shows that it was not so much serendipity that led to 
the success of the PackBot and Talon, but early exposure to users and the backing of a 
legitimate agency like DARPA. The two systems are small and have some of the best 
capabilities of their time and obviously were in demand by the warfighter. This explains 
why the Analysis of Alternatives that was conducted in 2001 by EOD technicians led to 
the request for a COTS solution from these two systems. The warfighters previously used 
and were somewhat familiar with the products, leading to a high demand for the product 
as OEF and OIF became larger conflicts. 
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E. THE DARPA INTERVENTION 
This research covers UGV master plans from 1991 to 2004, and while there are 
some fielded systems to warfighters, the technology of the fielded systems did not 
advance significantly in the 14-year period, proving the complexity of the problem. There 
are some significant technology developments for UGVs in the period examined, but the 
technology is not in the hands of users and not fully integrated among the force. The 
remote ordnance neutralization system (RONS), all-purpose robotic transport system 
(ARTS) from the RACS program and engineer vehicle teleoperation capability (EVTC) 
systems are the only fielded UGV systems from 1991 to 2004. These are all basically 
remote-controlled (RC) systems. In some cases, there is the capability to deploy the robot 
to a location, and the robot can then conduct path retrace and come back to its original 
deployment location. From a big picture point of view, this is not a major technological 
breakthrough. Very determined and intelligent people from DARPA, Carnegie Mellon, 
and the DOD defense industry dedicated themselves and committed significant funding 
to UGVs in the period covered. Many gains were made, but none that led to a fielded 
robot beyond the Teleoperation capability. This further supports the claim that a major 
technological breakthrough must occur in order for UGVs to achieve a higher level 
capability such as fully autonomous operations. 
The DOD stopped making master plans in the year 2004, which is also the same 
year that DARPA announced its first Grand Challenge. The cessation of plans gives the 
perception that the DOD reached out to DARPA and asked them to boost the stagnant 
UGV program. The contractors working on the current programs of record (POR) could 
not deliver the innovative breakthroughs that the DOD desired so it was time for DARPA 
to reach out to a broader community. “The Grand Challenge was designed to reach 
beyond the traditional base and tap into the ingenuity of the wider research community” 
(DARPA, 2014, para. 2). 
In 2004, DARPA held the first Grand Challenge in which competitors were 
offered a winner-takes-all prize of $1 million. The prize would go to the first unmanned 
vehicle to travel 142 miles autonomously across the desert and cross the finish line in less 
than 10 hours. Fifteen vehicles qualified for the race; half of them died within the first 
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half mile of the starting line and none of the vehicles completed the race. The vehicle that 
made it the farthest distance traveled only seven miles. 
In 2005, shortly after the first race, DARPA announced it would conduct a repeat 
of the Grand Challenge. The prize was raised to $2 million, winner takes all for the first 
autonomous vehicle to travel 132 miles across the desert and cross the finish line. Forty-
three teams competed for the 20 available slots in the race and a total of five teams 
finished the race. A vehicle named Stanley from Stanford University finished in first 
place with a time of six hours and 20 minutes. The overall R&D funding spent by the 
competitors is unknown at this time. It is important to understand the dollar amount spent 
by the 40 or so teams that led to the major achievement of this event. This information is 
relevant because it may prove that it does not necessarily require a large sum of money to 
achieve a major technological breakthrough. 
This event proved the power of a prize competition to promote innovation. In a 
span of two years the world saw no vehicles capable of autonomously traveling farther 
than seven miles to five vehicles autonomously completing a 132-mile off-road course. 
Almost all competing vehicles made it farther than seven miles in the second Grand 
Challenge. This also shows the challenge facing the DOD in the development of UGVs 
that warfighters want and demand. LTC Scott Wadle, USMC, said, 
The first competition created a community of innovators, engineers, 
students, programmers, off-road racers, back yard mechanics, inventors, 
and dreamers who came together to make history by trying to solve a 
tough technical problem. The fresh thinking they brought was the spark 
that has triggered major advances in the development of autonomous 
robotic ground vehicle technology in the years since. (DARPA, para. 4, 
2014) 
The DARPA Grand Challenge is an excellent venue to make believers out of non-
believers. There are bright minds around the world that will come up with far-out, never-
imagined ways of solving complex problems. There are also different ways to solve a 
problem so the UGV community benefits from seeing multiple options that can be further 
explored to achieve technological breakthroughs. More variety leads to more potential 
solutions, which lead to more winning solutions in the long run. 
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There is great value in follow-on research of the UGV community from 2004 to 
present day to see the impact that the Grand Challenge and DARPA had on technology 
development. The Grand Challenge raised the bar and proved that far-out ideas are 
achievable. It will be valuable to see the role that DARPA plays in the future years of 
UGVs. While the Grand Challenge was a great accomplishment, there are still many 
other missions and capabilities within the UGV community that must be overcome to 
achieve full autonomy and for the military to realize the full potential of these systems. 
F. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS 
From the extensive research conducted on the UGV master plans from 1991 to 
2004, there are four key points which best summarize the findings. 
1. A balance of push and pull factors that can successfully integrate new 
technologies must be present. 
2. Technologies are very complex, and even with significant R&D funding 
and top personnel and organizations working on the problem, a solution 
may not be found. 
3. Communication breakdown between military services and various 
communities within the DOD may result in technology stagnation from 
one conflict to the next due to lack of visibility. 
4. The portfolio of UGVs from 1991 to 2004 generally serves the Force 
Protection warfighter function. 
Figure 173 best describes the first key point from this research. Along the bottom 
axis, UGV programs are aligned with conflicts involving the United States, which likely 
drove the development of specific UGV systems. Along the left axis is the percentage of 
overall UGV funding that a specific system consumed during the three conflict eras. In 
the column for each system, a majority rating of push or pull was given to each system 
for each conflict era. While the requirement or demand for each program existed to some 
extent, push and pull ratings were determined based on delivery of systems to the 
warfighter. 
Generally speaking, at the beginning of the UGV program, all systems were 
primarily pushed to the warfighter. All of the programs listed in Figure 173 used 6.3B 
advanced system development R&D funding. Basically, these were concepts that were 
created for demonstration purposes, with the objective of generating user demand and 
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evolutionary development. Over the years, the prototypes became effective and suitable 
solutions for specific threats relevant to the conflict era. This led to demand or pull 
factors from the user operating within the conflict regions.  
As the program matured, the push to pull ratio became more balanced. A larger 
portion of UGV funding was appropriated to programs experiencing higher user demand. 
Further research and analysis may reveal that systems that generated user pull also may 
be lagging indicators. For instance, the CRS program experienced high user demand in 
the Balkans from 1995 to 2000, but the demand for the system dropped significantly as 
conflicts began in Afghanistan and Iraq. The funding still remained high for this program 
even though there were no full rate production fieldings for future years. Another 
consideration for this particular program is explained in greater detail in point number 
three of the key take a ways. From 1991 to 2004, 57% of all UGV funding was dedicated 
to push and 43% of all funding went to UGVs that were pulled from the warfighter. 
 
Figure 173.  UGV Push/Pull from 1991–2004 (after DOD, 1991, 1992, 1993, 
1994, 1995, 1996, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004) 
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Key take away number two acknowledges the challenge of developing UGV 
technology. This technology requires the development and integration of highly complex 
sensors and software to function properly. There have been significant gains in both areas 
in the 14-year period measured, but UGVs have yet to achieve their full potential. 
Achieving full autonomy in an unstructured environment has proven difficult to 
accomplish and agencies such as DARPA, the defense industry base and academia are 
working diligently to bring this to fruition.  
Key take away number three speaks to the case of the EVTC/VTC/VT/CRS 
program. This program experienced significant pull factors from warfighters as the U.S. 
role in Bosnia increased. Warfighters operated remotely controlled vehicles from a safe 
location and conducted minefield clearing operations for mounted and dismounted 
troops. There are several reports of this program’s success in the master plan, with 
hundreds of mines neutralized because of this capability. From 2001 to 2004, the United 
States became engaged in combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and warfighters 
faced threats similar or more dangerous to the threats they faced in Bosnia, yet the CRS 
program did not experience the same pull factors. 
It is likely that the warfighter did not demand this UGV capability in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, but there may be other lessons learned from this case. Why would U.S. 
warfighters not want this capability, particularly in Iraq? Further research may better 
explain this question, but the initial answer is that a communication breakdown occurred 
between services and communities or there was a competency trap. 
It is also possible that warfighters in Iraq were not aware that remotely operated 
UGVs existed. The majority of the warfighters on the ground in Iraq did not serve in the 
Balkans and would not know of the mine clearing vehicles without being informed about 
them. Perhaps this capability was not communicated to the warfighter. Another notion is 
that the warfighter in Iraq fell into a competency trap. The warfighters had to quickly 
react to the IED threat in Iraq with the equipment they had available at the time and they 
became extremely proficient at defeating IEDs with inferior equipment. Warfighters 
added armor to vehicles, traveled at varying speeds and developed techniques to increase 
survivability. Eventually, vehicles were produced with additional armor and became 
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larger in size. However, a more sophisticated piece of equipment was available, but 
unused. The warfighter was clearing routes in Iraq manually in Engineer vehicles, but 
this could have been accomplished with the CRS system that was employed in Bosnia. It 
is difficult to measure the level of push of this program in Iraq making it a worthwhile 
topic to further research. 
Key take away number four is best supported by Table 58. The table is based off 
of data analyzed in the research and on an unmanned ground vehicle study conducted by 
the Department of the Navy (DON) in 2001. The table is centered on the six warfighting 
functions of maneuver, fires, sustainment, intelligence, force protection, and command 
and control. Under each warfighting functions are the Notions of Employment (NOE) for 
UGVs. This essentially means that analysis revealed past or potential use of UGVs for 
the following sub-missions under each warfighting function. Along the upper left axis of 
the table are the years examined and the conflicts ongoing in the period covered. 
Any UGV system or program covered in this research is placed under the 
appropriate warfighting function for that system or program. The corresponding number 
indicates the NOE for that system or program. Some systems and programs do have 
utilization under multiple warfighting functions and NOEs but categorization is based on 
primary intended use as indicated in the master plans. 
The majority of all programs and systems fall under the force protection 
warfighting function; 14 systems and programs in total over the period measured. This is 
not necessarily a negative point and this may validate the strong pull factors that come 
from niche communities, particularly EOD and Engineer users. On the other hand, it is 
worth considering that the portfolio of UGVs is too heavy on force protection. UGV 
programs seem to naturally gravitate to use under this warfighting function. Consider the 
UGV programs and systems that are listed under other warfighting functions: the TUGV, 
MULE and MPRS programs did not achieve full rate production. The TUGV and MULE 
programs appear to exhibit limited pull factors from the warfighter in the years examined.  
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UGV technology may not fully integrate into the DOD until there is more of a 
balance of systems across the warfighting functions. It is important to field systems that 
conduct other warfighting functions if UGV technology is to become a regular part of our 
military forces.  
Table 58.   Warfighting Functions and Notions of Employment (NOE)  




V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY 
Positive technological developments from 1991 to 2004 resulted in significant 
growth for the UGV program and community. The first master plan featured only three 
programs, but by 2004, the portfolio grew to 14 programs, each benefitting from shared 
technology, hardware, and software. The growth of the overall program is noteworthy, 
however, technological advancements are not ground breaking and demonstrate the 
complexity of UGVs. While testing of new ideas and systems is certainly ongoing, the 
system fielded to end-users essentially consists of a robot with a remote control. At best, 
the systems have the ability to operate semi-autonomously, deploying down a pre-
planned route and returning automatically along the same route. However, this does not 
mean that the current UGVs do not have value. The UGV’s purpose was to allow the 
warfighter to conduct mission objectives from a safe distance, primarily dealing with the 
detection, removal, and reduction of UXO. UGVs have undoubtedly fulfilled their 
purpose and have saved countless lives in combat and non-combat operations. 
The overall UGV program was affected by a few trends. Members of Congress 
and other personnel, especially those that have the power to affect DOD program 
funding, should take note. Fluctuating budgets consistently limited program development 
and schedules in almost all master plans. Research indicates that if current funding is 
reduced in the next year, the schedule will probably shift and affect the desired time line 
and outcome of the program. If funding, however, remains consistent for these small yet 
innovative programs, advancement will remain more consistent and programs will reach 
expected goals.  
From 1991 to 2004, the total funding for the UGV program is about $500 million. 
This is essentially a rounding error for the federal government. When this amount is 
distributed among all of the programs over 14 years, the dollar amount per program is 
quite small. However, a small change to the program’s limited funding has considerable 
effects. 
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Additionally, from 1991 to 1999, almost all UGV funding went to R&D. Budget 
uncertainty during the R&D phase proved to be detrimental to every program schedule in 
the portfolio. In many cases, academia and industry rely specifically upon this funding to 
experiment with innovative technologies and to conduct demonstrations. It is difficult to 
demonstrate a technology if the funding to develop systems and prototypes is cut. While 
Congress would like to see immediate results from the funding, this is unrealistic, as 
research takes time to transform into tangible results.  
Students in the acquisition curriculum must be aware that cutting-edge technology 
programs are at risk of schedule slippage. Another observation from the UGV program is 
that funding is not the only challenge to success, as complex technology itself can be a 
challenge. For instance, the Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicle (TUGV) program was 
formally nominated as the top priority UGV program in the early years. The TUGV’s 
primary goal is to conduct the RSTA mission, which is one of the most complex military 
missions. It requires a UGV to conduct highly autonomous decision-making in an 
unstructured environment. As of 2004, this was not possible and likely not achieved as a 
result of immature technology. Even when the TUGV was the most highly funded 
program in the portfolio, its chances of success were at a disadvantage.  
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) played a role in 
UGV technology since the program’s inception. It is not surprising that the agency was 
called upon in 2004 to help propel UGVs to a higher level of performance. With the 
desire to achieve full autonomy in unstructured environments and the lack of 
technological breakthroughs in this community, DARPA must continue to reach out to 
the world’s innovators to achieve a higher level of performance. DARPA must continue 
to conduct events similar to DEMO I, II, III, and the Grand Challenge that raise the bar 
and deliver immediate tangible results.  
The future of UGVs is positive, but the time line to achieve the military’s desired 
results is uncertain. More stability in program funding will help maintain schedules and 




There is a fine balance between push and pull factors, especially when dealing 
with new, cutting-edge technology. Does the warfighter actually know what new 
technology he or she wants if no new technological options have been presented? The 
answer is that warfighters need to see new options before a solution is adopted. It is 
necessary to explore new technologies and introduce them to warfighters for the sake of 
determining future needs. The warfighter must also have the ability to utilize new 
systems so that feedback can be provided that results in products that meet the user’s 
needs. The warfighter will demand what is needed at the appropriate time and from this 
will determine which programs will become the priority for a specific period of time. 
UGV technology development is extremely complex in nature. Many people and 
agencies have committed their lives and their money to the development of these 
systems. In the period of time examined, full autonomy could not be achieved, partly 
because current technology is not mature enough.  
To maximize the available technology and to achieve a major technological 
breakthrough, consider the following recommendations: 
1. Conduct more competitive technology development prize challenges 
similar to the DARPA Grand Challenge. 
2. Continue to fund the development of new technology to push to 
warfighters. 
3. Listen to the demands of the warfighter and produce a sufficient amount of 
the systems demanded.  
4. Take feedback from the user to improve future system increments. 
5. Continue to grow the UGV technology exploration community (industry, 
academia, and other government agencies). 
6. Ensure that users are aware of all UGV systems and capabilities in the 
portfolio, particularly the systems that may be in warehouse storage. 
7. Create a balanced portfolio of UGV systems that serve multiple 
warfighting functions. 
C. RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Future research possibilities are endless and potentially impactful. During this 
research project, four key areas for future focus surfaced. 
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1. Complete the historical analysis of the UGV program from 2005 to 
present. Consider the use of the DOD unmanned systems integrated 
roadmaps or utilized individual program records from the Robotic 
Systems Joint Projects Office (RSJPO). 
2. Conduct an analysis that describes the impact that DARPA has had on the 
overall UGV program. This research should place a majority of the 
emphasis on the effects to the UGV community following the DARPA 
Grand Challenges. 
3. Create a case study on the Man Transportable Robotic System (MTRS) 
program. This case would involve tracing the history of the PackBot and 
TALON robots. The case should present the story of how these two small 
companies fielded two of the most well-known robots in the U.S. military. 
4. Conduct research on storage of UGVs at the end of a conflict. Examine the 
process for warfighters to access this equipment at the beginning of 
another conflict. How does the warfighter find out what equipment is in 
storage? Is this process efficient, and are there improvements that can be 
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